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 ABSTRACT 
 






During the Cold War, the State Department sent architects, engineers, and legislation 
specialists to almost every Latin American and Caribbean nation to develop housing along 
US lines.  These International Housing efforts were part of larger development aid programs 
in the region and were implemented to secure alliances, suppress radicalism, and promote the 
American way of life abroad.  The dissertation focuses on three case studies—in the 
Caribbean, Guatemala, and Peru—to examine the influence the United States had on Latin 
America’s built environment and show how architecture has functioned as an important 
component of US foreign policy.  The dissertation demonstrates how Cold War housing aid 
introduced new materials and construction techniques, encouraged homeownership by 
promoting mortgage financing, and helped supplant local, Latin American urban forms with 
US architectural types and city plans in order to create the image of a modernizing, capitalist, 
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In the mid-1960s, when Carmen de Patiño moved into her modest house on the outskirts 
of Bogotá, she decorated her simple living room with just two portraits: a colored picture of 
Jesus Christ and a photograph of John F. Kennedy.  These were her two saints.  Perhaps they 
were a bit of an odd couple, their faces hanging side-by-side, but to Patiño, they were both 
martyrs who had provided her with salvation.  While Christ had earned his sanctified place by 
giving Patiño life and grace, Kennedy had provided her with shelter.1 Patiño lived in Ciudad 
Kennedy, or Kennedy City, a new satellite city outside Bogotá, built in the early 1960s with US 
government dollars and American “know-how” under the Alliance for Progress, President 
Kennedy’s massive development program for Latin America.2 Kennedy City was an ambitious, 
even utopian, project that at the time was the largest single housing development in Latin 
America, 12,000 units for about 90,000 mostly low-income residents, but by 1968, the 
population reached 150,000 people.3 Combining a variety of housing types—multi-storied 
apartments, detached houses, and self-built homes—the project was designed to address 
                                                
1 Paul L. Montgomery, "Sadness Envelops Ciudad Kennedy Outside Bogotá," New York Times, 
Jun. 10, 1968. 
 
2 Improving Latin America’s housing was one of twelve Alliance objectives, as outlined in the 
Charter of Punta del Este (adopted August 17, 1961), which ranged from raising income levels to 
land reform.  Kennedy City was originally called Ciudad Techo.  The name was changed in 1963 
after the president’s assassination. 
 
3 Montgomery, "Sadness Envelops Ciudad Kennedy Outside Bogotá."; George Natanson, 
"Colombia Is Making Progress a Habit," The Washington Post, May 10, 1964.  
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Bogotá’s growing squatter problem and raise housing in Colombia to US standards.  In 1962, 
there were only 155,000 housing units for Bogotá’s 211,000 families and less than 40% were 
deemed “acceptable.”4 Around the corner from Patiño’s house lay a plaque memorializing the 
spot where the US President had placed a ceremonial cornerstone for Kennedy City in December 
1961 (Figure 1), after which he told the audience of future residents and Colombian dignitaries, 
“Those of us who love freedom realize that a man is not really free if he doesn’t have a roof over 
his head.”5 Shelter and freedom, the Kennedy administration was intent on spreading both 
throughout Latin America. 
This dissertation is, in essence, the story of how a woman like Carmen de Patiño, a poor 
Colombian living on the outskirts of Bogotá, came to live in a city named for and built by 
President Kennedy, how citizens across Latin America and the Caribbean came to inhabit homes 
designed by, paid for, or organized by the US government in the 1950s and 1960s, a period in 
which the State Department launched housing and city planning programs in almost every Latin 
American nation.  US officials were determined to combat the growth of the region’s 
shantytowns—the favelas of Brazil, barrios piratas of Colombia, callampas of Chile, barriadas 
brujas of Panama, and ranchos of Venezuela—which had become an increasingly dominant part 
of Latin America’s urban fabric.  As a result of a population explosion and migrant flows from 
rural areas to urban centers, by the mid-1960s, squatters made up an estimated 10% of the 
                                                
4 Timothy O'Dea Gauhan, "Housing and the Urban Poor: The Case of Bogotá, Colombia," 
Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 19, no. 1 (1977). 
 
5 John F. Kennedy, “Remarks at the Techo Housing Project in Bogotá,” Dec. 17, 1961, The 
American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8493 (accessed Jan. 23, 
2011).   See also, John F. Kennedy, "Discurso Que Pronunció el Ilustre Desaparecido Presidente 




population of Guatemala City, 35% of Caracas, and 20% of Lima.6 US housing aid, which took 
the form of assistance in design, construction, finance, and legislation, resulted from multiple, 
and sometimes conflicting, foreign policy goals: to re-establish US relations with Latin America 
on a more friendly basis, to modernize Latin America along US lines, and to reduce the growth 
of radical movements by improving social conditions.  State Department officials were 
convinced that “city slums” were “breeding grounds of Communism.”7 Between 1961 and 1965, 
the height of US involvement in Latin American housing, the federal government committed 
loans totaling close to $500 million to finance about 500,000 low-cost homes in the region.8 
State Department technicians helped build hundreds of housing projects along with entire new 
cities and towns, including Kennedy City in Colombia, Vila Kennedy in Brazil (Figure 2), and 
Ciudad Alianza (Alliance City) in Venezuela.  They also rewrote legislation, instituted new 
minimum standards, introduced large-scale construction, and spread the US suburb to Latin 
America. 
 
                                                
6 William Mangin, "Latin American Squatter Settlements: A Problem and a Solution," Latin 
American Research Review 2, no. 3 (1967): 65-6. 
 
7 “Confidential Security Information, Program Policy Review Board,” 14 Apr. 1953, p. 8, file 
TCA, box 1, RG 469, IIAA, Health, Welfare, and Housing Division, Subject Files, 1949-53, US 
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (hereafter designated NARA). 
 
8 Jerome I. Levinson and Juan De Onis, The Alliance That Lost Its Way: A Critical Report on the 
Alliance for Progress (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 259-60. Between 1961 and 1964, 
Colombia received roughly $50 million for housing, including: $12 million and $7.5 million to 
its government, largely for aided self-help housing; $10 million for housing cooperatives; $5 
million earmarked for the creation of a savings and loan system; about $746,000 Cooley 
Amendment loans to build 475 houses; a $15.2 million Inter-American Development Bank loan; 
and $8.2 million in housing guaranties to build 2,000 units. “Latin American Regional Housing 
and Urban Development Projects Available to the Missions,” 1 May 1964, folder 282, box 7, 




This dissertation is a history of the rise and fall of US housing aid to Latin America and 
the Caribbean.  The cycle takes place during the 1950s and 1960s, the period of Truman, 
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, and of newly independent nations emerging in Africa, Asia, 
and the Caribbean; of bomb testing in the Nevada dessert and bomb-shelters in new suburbs, of 
belief in American strength and the reactions of American fear.  It was the era of Great American 
can-do optimism launching an array of overlapping international military and aid initiatives: the 
Marshall Plan and the Korean War, the Peace Corps, USAID, and Vietnam.  Behind these 
endeavors lay a profound belief in American exceptionalism, the unquestioned superiority of the 
American way of life, and a sense that the world could be—and would want to be—remade in its 
image. 
During the Cold War, the United States provided housing assistance throughout the 
developing world, not just Latin America, as the shortage of adequate housing and rise of 
shantytowns was a worldwide problem.9 By 1960, it was estimated that roughly one hundred 
fifty million families in the developing world needed better housing, while a housing deficit of 
thirty million houses existed in the developed world.10 State Department housing technicians 
rotated between posts in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and the Americas to address the 
international postwar housing crisis.   
                                                
9 I use the terms “developing” and “developed” nations in this dissertation despite the fact that 
these terms have been largely dropped from usage because of their inference of the “developing” 
world as inferior and assumption that the Western model of development is the end goal.  I use 
these terms, because they were employed by individuals in the 1950s and 1960s and help express 
how they viewed the world: with all nations on the same development course, the “developing” 
following the “developed” on a unidirectional path towards industrialization and modernization. 
 
10 Ernest Weissmann, "Mutual Aid in Low-Cost Housing," The ANNALS of the American 




While the history of “international housing,” as the field of shelter assistance became 
known, is a dense and global story, encompassing a wide range of nations, actors, projects, and 
policies, this study is limited to US government programs in Latin American and the Caribbean, 
a region the State Department treated as a geographic unit throughout the 1950s.  The region 
offers a rich focus for many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that Latin America 
received the largest share of housing funds during the 1960s.  As a result, the region also played 
a central role in the development of international housing programs and policy.  With extra 
funds, US technicians had more freedom to experiment with different types of aid, from 
construction assistance to the development of new financial institutions.  When technicians were 
eager to initiate a self-built housing program in an urban environment, they first tried it in 
Paramaribo, Surinam.  The first US-sponsored FHA was established in Peru.  And the first time 
the US government decided to guarantee an investment in private homebuilding abroad, it was in 
Latin America.  
In the 1950s and especially the 1960s, the so-called “Decade of Development,” a 
multitude of institutions were involved in international housing: universities, labor unions, non-
profit foundations, and multilateral organizations, such as the UN, and the Organization of 
American States (OAS).11 The US government, however, was the primary provider of housing 
assistance, in both experts and dollars, and thus the most influential institution in the field of 
international housing.  Other organizations participated in more limited programs and at times 
                                                
11 For a summary of the international housing field, including the US government and other 
organizations, see Committee on Banking and Currency US Senate, Study of International 
Housing: Subcommittee on Housing, Committee on Banking and Currency, United States Senate 
(Washington, DC: US Govt. Print. Off., 1963); and Committee on Banking Housing and Urban 
Affairs US Senate, Study of International Housing; Reports from US Agencies and International 




collaborated with the US government.  The International Labor Organization established an 
international housing group aimed at improving workers’ shelter worldwide.  The United 
Kingdom, through its Colonial Office, sought to improve the quality of housing in its former 
colonies.  The United Nations Technical Assistance Administration helped countries develop 
housing policies, legislation, and technology, programs that were worldwide in scope but smaller 
than those of the US government.  In Latin America, the OAS hosted housing meetings to aid the 
exchange of knowledge among member nations, and in 1951, established the Centro 
Interamericano de Vivienda (CINVA; Inter-American Housing Center) in Bogotá as a regional 
center dedicated to housing issues.  CINVA initiated research into a variety of fields, from the 
development of new materials to community planning, and shared information and strategies 
through publications and training courses.  CINVA was run with a decidedly US tilt and helped 
spread US planning and housing ideas throughout the region.  Its first three directors—Leonard 
Currie, Eric Carlson, and Walter Harris—were North American, and in 1961, the center began to 
receive guidance from Yale University.12  
Universities in the United States acted as loci for international housing research, sending 
out professors to advise foreign governments and receiving foreign students who came to study 
architecture and planning, many of whom were sponsored by the US government.  The Small 
Homes Council of the University of Illinois researched housing issues of the developing world 
and sent a group of three professors to Colombia through the State Department to develop a 
                                                
12 “Inter-American Housing Center,” folder “Memos to Administrator,” box 2, RG 207, 
International Affairs Subject Files, 1942-64, NARA; "The Inter-American Housing and Planning 




national housing plan from 1955 to 1957.13 The University of California, Berkeley became an 
early hub of studies of Latin American city development through Professor Francis Violich, who 
served as a planning consultant to São Paulo and Caracas and helped develop urban planning 
programs for the Peace Corps and Ford Foundation.14 MIT and Harvard became involved in 
international housing in 1961, when the government of Venezuela invited their architecture and 
planning professors to assist in creating Ciudad Guayana, a new city intended to serve as the 
country’s third major industrial development center.15 Four years later, with help from the Ford 
Foundation, architects Horacio Caminos and Reinhard Goethert established a program at MIT 
that focused on the urban design of developing countries.  Throughout the 1960s, other 
architecture and planning schools similarly began to offer courses and programs on international 
housing and squatter settlements.16 
Lobbying groups for private housing in the United States, including the National 
Association of Homebuilders, the Federation of Cooperatives, and the National League of 
Savings and Loan Associations, established international housing groups and committees to find 
                                                
13 The State Department often contracted out technical assistance programs to universities.  One 
of the first university contracts for housing sent a team from the University of Maryland to 
establish a shelter program in British Guiana. 
 
14 Francis Violich, Cities of Latin America: Housing and Planning to the South (New York: 
Reinhold publishing corporation, 1944); ———, "Housing Is Field for Pan American 
Cooperation," Journal of Housing 4, no. 9 (1947); Francis Violich and Robert Daughters, Urban 
Planning for Latin America: The Challenge of Metropolitan Growth (Boston, MA: 
Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain in association with the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 1987). 
 
15 Anthony H. Penfold, "Ciudad Guayana: Planning a New City in Venezuela," The Town 
Planning Review 36, no. 4 (1966).  
 
16 Letter from Ignacio Armillas to AID Information Attache, 15 Dec. 1967, folder “Soc 4: 





investment opportunities abroad and ensure that State Department policy aided private builders 
rather than foreign housing authorities.  These trade groups had their eye on the large, open 
markets of the developing world, and they appealed to Congress’s free market ideology to 
develop federal programs that would help private builders construct housing abroad.  
State Department shelter experts were thus part of a much broader international housing 
field, whose leaders tended to rotate between various programs.  Eric Carlson, the first director 
of CINVA, went on to become the Chief of the United Nations’ Housing Section.  Early 
international housing advocates also included Jacob Leslie Crane, who established the State 
Department’s international housing program and whose influence will be discussed in these 
pages.  Crane worked with architect Ernest Weissmann to develop a Housing, Building, and 
Planning Branch at the UN, which Weissmann headed beginning in 1951.  The international 
housing field also included Charles Abrams, the housing and planning expert who helped 
establish public housing in the United States, served as an advisor to twenty-one countries, and 
helped found the Middle East Technical University in Turkey.17  
International housing entered US foreign policy under President Truman, who launched 
the Point Four program in 1949 to share American technology and “know-how” with 
underdeveloped nations.  Housing was an important component of US development aid, because 
it provided visible evidence of the program’s effectiveness and had an immediate impact on the 
lives of the target group, the middle and lower classes.  The early programs of the 1950s offered 
                                                
17 Weissmann, "Mutual Aid in Low-Cost Housing"; for a biography of Abrams, see A. Scott 
Henderson, Housing and the Democratic Ideal: The Life and Thought of Charles Abrams (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2000); For Abrams's views on his experience as an 
international houser, see Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World 




limited assistance, restricted by Congress’s refusal to provide money to construct homes abroad.  
In this period, US technicians focused on introducing new low-cost materials, architectural plans, 
and construction techniques to developing nations without great expenditure on the part of the 
United States government.  In the 1950s, when Cold War struggles were fought more fiercely in 
Asia and the Middle East, especially Egypt, India, and Korea, these areas received the largest 
share of development aid.  Housing experts initiated a variety of programs in these regions, 
including the planning of rural villages in Egypt, Iran, and Iraq, slum clearance in Beirut and 
Burma, the development of local building materials in Afghanistan, the demonstration of low-
cost construction in India and Korea, and the creation of foreclosure and mortgage laws in 
Taiwan.  Latin America, which seemed stable in its hemispheric loyalty to the United States, 
received less development aid.  Programs included introducing new low-cost materials, such as 
concrete and earth blocks to the Caribbean, demonstrating efficient building methods in Chile, 
and preparing a comprehensive city plan for Managua, Nicaragua.  One of the largest housing 
programs of the 1950s was established in Guatemala to help stabilize the country and put it on a 
US-friendly development path after the CIA overthrew their supposedly communist government. 
US relations with Latin America shifted after Vice President Nixon’s disastrous trip to 
the region in 1958, where he was met with violent protests, and the 1959 Cuban Revolution, 
which firmly placed a Communist threat in the “backyard” of the United States.  To stifle Fidel 
Castro’s influence and the region’s growing anti-Americanism, Eisenhower established an 
extensive economic development program for Latin America, which Kennedy later expanded 
into his Alliance for Progress in 1961.  The Cuban Revolution provoked the flow of development 
aid to Latin America, and international housing consequently grew from a limited, technical 
program to one that had the authority and financing to significantly influence housing in Latin 
10 
 
America: US experts developed local housing authorities that built projects with US loans; 
private US builders were assisted in constructing housing developments in the region; and the 
United States exported its systems of savings and loan institutions and mortgage insurance to 
Latin America.  The goal was not just to remove the misery of the region’s shantytowns but to 
create a culture of broad homeownership, to replicate the seeming success of postwar American 
housing policy. 
This dissertation describes the creation of the pan-American Dream, the US government 
desire to spread homeownership throughout the Americas.  In the postwar period, the single-
family home was more than a national US ambition, it was a foreign policy objective for Latin 
America.  The thinking was simple.  As explained by the US ambassador to Nicaragua in 1958, 
“If you put a man in a home, you make a little Capitalist out of him.”18 This logic permeated the 
thinking of international housing officials in the State Department.  A man in his own home with 
a mortgage was a man with a stake in the stability of the country, a man less susceptible to 
revolution and radicalism.  Officials believed that part of what made the United States a strong 
democracy was that it was a homeownership society, where individuals did not rely on 
government handouts but earned their own homes through their own abilities.  To extend 
democracy, self-reliance, and free market solutions to Latin America, US international housing 
policy sought to promote homeownership in the region, and the vast majority of aid was 
dedicated to building single-family homes for sale.  The US exported its system of mortgage 
                                                
18 Quoted in, World Homes, Inc., “1961 Annual Report,” 2, folder “Peru—Hogares Chavarria 
(Cooley Loan), Bulk File #1, 527-E-026,” box 319, RG 286, Acc. No. 69-A-1867, NARA.  
Uncataloged USAID cartons in the US National Archives are identified with the accession 




financing to Latin America, making the twenty-year, twenty-percent down mortgage a chief US 
export.  
This an account of how United States officials tried to solve Latin America’s severe 
shelter crisis by implementing US housing systems and values.  It is thus also a narrative of 
hubris and failure.  By the end of the 1960s, US officials had become aware that their 
international housing policy had failed.  Private US builders were the main beneficiaries of many 
government programs.  State Department officials realized that housing was a complex issue, 
involving a multitude of economic and social factors, and requiring more than the simple 
application of expertise and loans.  US housing programs hardly made a dent in Latin America’s 
overall shelter needs.  The Alliance for Progress itself was deemed a failure, never delivering on 
its promise of social and economic growth.  Development was far too complex a problem.   
Kennedy City, what was to be the hallmark of the president’s efforts in the region, turned 
into a squatter town as a result of its poor planning.  The city lacked an efficient system of 
transportation until 1969 when the mayor of Bogotá finally obtained a fleet of Soviet buses for 
Kennedy City.19 Shacks sprouted up between concrete homes, and overwhelmed by migrants 
from rural areas, it soon became a locus of poverty and crime.  Indeed, in Congressional debates 
of the late 1960s, Kennedy City was held up as a visible example of the failure of US 
development aid.  In 1973, the United States returned to providing limited and modest housing 
aid, as it had in the 1950s, and mostly ceded international housing to the World Bank. 
This dissertation is also a portrait of a neglected group of small-time architects and city 
planners.  A multitude of actors participated in State Department international housing 
                                                





programs—architects, engineers, planners, materials specialists, bureaucrats, and bankers—
whose technical skill in the service of US interests abroad led them to be known as “shirt-sleeve 
diplomats.”20 Who were these technicians, these experts, and defenders of the free world?  For 
the most part, they came from the government’s housing authorities and later from its housing 
finance sector, its savings and loan institutions and mortgage markets.  A great variety of 
housing specialists served their country, from professors to private contractors, from modest 
individuals to know-it-alls.  It is difficult to draw generalizations from this diverse group, but 
their patriotism, anti-communism, and belief in American progress ran as a leitmotif through 
their correspondence.  Despite their certainty that the American system of private markets, 
homeownership, and housing authorities could help reduce the world’s squatter towns, most tried 
to avoid seeming like “ugly Americans” or Yanquis Imperialistas and made efforts to show 
respect to other cultures, to learn foreign housing practices, and to find culturally appropriate 
solutions, a sensitivity that in the early years trickled down from Jacob Crane in Washington.  A 
relatively small group did not care to get to know their host countries, treated locals with a 
patronizing attitude, but were not removed from their positions.  What does link the biographies 
and resumes of all these men—and evidence of a female US housing technician has yet to be 
found—what pulls the lives of these different men together is their averageness.  Except for a 
few, rare exceptions, they were not “big names” in their fields.  No, they were rank-and-file 
architects, engineers, and specialists who were unknown in the States, but transposed abroad, 
with the glow of expertise, these men developed influential spheres of activity and achieved a 
significant impact on their host countries. 
                                                





These architects and planners carried the mantle of the Modern Movement; they were 
proponents of the utopian possibilities of new materials and construction methods, researchers of 
housing, developers of master city plans, and practitioners of a rational architecture.  The houses 
they designed in Latin America were mostly simple concrete homes with clean, boxy lines.  It 
was not just that such designs were cheap—in many instances, concrete actually made the house 
more expensive—it was that a Modern aesthetic could express that these countries were on an 
upward path of economic growth and industrialization, with a Western model of development as 
an end-goal.   
This dissertation is also the biography of a construction system, aided self-help housing.  
To address the significant financial and industrial limitations of “underdevelopment,” US 
technicians implemented radically new low-cost construction methods and materials.  In the 
early 1950s, they began to experiment with aided self-help housing, whereby owners built their 
own homes with institutional support, supplied with a combination of plans, materials, funds, 
and supervision.  The low-cost construction system was born in Sweden and popularized through 
a successful local government program in Puerto Rico that used self-help to provide low-income 
residents with new houses.  State Department officials seized on self-help housing, spreading it 
to the rest of the Caribbean and the developing world, and influencing other organizations in the 
field to follow suit, believing that building one’s own home created “responsible citizens with 
self-respect” as well as lowering housing costs.21 In the 1960s, the system became the Alliance 
for Progress’s signature policy.  An Alliance for Progress coloring book for Latin American 
children illustrates the ideals aided self-help construction was to impart—cooperation, a sense of 
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community, individuals who solve their own problems—and the way the single-family home 
was to introduce US middle-class values to the region—the cohesive nuclear family and 
wholesome childhood (Figures 3 and 4).22 This history of self-help housing, however, has been 
mostly forgotten.  Scholars and advocates of self-help housing have assumed its use began with 
John F.C. Turner in the 1960s and the World Bank in the 1970s, when, in fact, the US 
government was responsible for its initial spread worldwide.23 This dissertation charts the history 
of self-help housing from its roots in Puerto Rico and shows the significant role the US 
government played in its adoption.   
This dissertation is an analysis of how the United States has influenced Latin America’s 
built environment in the twentieth century, a surprisingly neglected topic.  Histories of the period 
have overlooked the US impact, instead focusing on the more visible influence of modern 
European architecture: the rise of art deco and art nouveau, “culminating” in the appearance of 
stripped-down, Corbusian architecture and planning.24 Historically, and still today, the rise of an 
                                                
22 “Alianza para el Progreso, Libro para Colorear,” Apr. 1964, folder “FPC: Food for Peace,” 
box 171, RG 286, USAID/Guatemala, Acc. No. 69-A-3601. 
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indigenous, yet European-influenced Modern architecture in Latin America has by far received 
the most scholarly attention, and has been viewed as a sort of pinnacle of the region’s 
architecture.25 Scholars, such as Valerie Fraser, Eloy Méndez, and Mauro F. Guillén, have 
analyzed how Latin American governments employed Modern architecture in nationalist 
development programs to signal “modernization,” a trend analyzed in the post-Revolutionary 
building campaigns in Mexico City, President Juscelino Kubitschek’s construction of Brasilia, 
and the housing projects Carlos Raúl Villanueva designed in Venezuela.26 Indeed, the vast 
majority of studies have focused on the wealthier countries of Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and 
Venezuela, and most especially the avant garde architects working within them—Alberto 
Prebisch and Amancio Williams in Argentina, Mario Pani and Luis Barragán in Mexico, Oscar 
Niemeyer and Lucio Costa in Brazil, and Carlos Raul Villaneuva in Venezuela, to name the most 
renown.27  
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Valdés, 2004); Guillén, "Modernism without Modernity: The Rise of Modernist Architecture in 
Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, 1890-1940."  The design of Brasilia has received more scholarly 
study than perhaps any other capital: James Holston, The Modernist City: An Anthropological 
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European Modernism played a central and crucial role in shaping the Latin America’s 
built environment, but the US influence amounts to more than what is usually ascribed to it: 
skyscrapers, shopping malls, and California Mission Revival villas.  Until World War II, 
European concepts dominated Latin American architecture culture, but the rise of the United 
States as a global superpower resulted in a stronger role in all aspects of Latin American culture.  
The US influence on the region’s architecture was considerable, but it primarily entered in 
bureaucratic form, rolled into policy directives and foreign aid initiatives.  Especially in 
countries that lie beyond the scope of most architectural histories of Latin America—that is, in 
countries that were poorer and possessed a less-developed professional architectural culture—US 
development programs had an extensive impact, creating US-style suburbs on the outskirts of 
capitals, introducing large-scale building, and establishing US housing practices.  This 
dissertation examines the international flows of architectural and planning ideas, and the role 
foreign aid programs played in “imposing” US planning concepts.28 The case can be made that 
the American technocrat had, in fact, as great an impact as the avant-garde architect.  Some 
studies have already begun to push in this direction.  Jorge Francisco Liernur has analyzed the 
rise of “technical expertise” in the postwar period and its effects on architecture culture.  He has 
argued that European avant-garde architects abandoned their role as “revolutionary artists” and 
became responsible “experts” as an act of self-preservation.  Facing an increasingly 
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“bureaucratized” world, with the state playing an ever larger role in managing city growth and 
economic development, CIAM architects became specialists of physical planning and found 
opportunities working for governments and institutions.  As part of the study, Liernur analyzed 
the way these “expert” architects, such as José Luis Sert and Richard Neutra, spread Modern 
architectural theories to Latin America.  This dissertation also focuses on the ascension of the 
technician after World War II, but it is a counterpart to Liernur’s research, charting its effects on 
the built environment, rather than on architects, and looking at the broader history of the average 
State Department architect, engineer, and planner whose expertise was far different than that of a 
CIAM architect.  Jeffrey Cody has also studied the role of US technical experts, from private 
companies, institutions, and government agencies in exporting American architectural forms 
from the 1870s the present.  His wide-ranging work looks at specific US exports, steel-frame 
skeletons, concrete construction, and city planning principles, and their effects on locations from 
Buenos Aires to Hong Kong.29  
To date, there are no extensive studies of the US government’s international housing 
program.30 As a result, this dissertation grew out of heavy archival research and pieced together 
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the history of the program through official documents, photographs, and films.  The majority of 
the material comes from the US National Archives, specifically the papers of the State 
Department, its aid agencies, and the Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA).  While the 
State Department papers were well-organized and catalogued, those of its aid agencies, 
especially the US Agency for International Development (USAID), were not.  As my study 
approached the 1960s, the archive became increasingly chaotic and difficult to navigate, and I 
found myself opening up many unmarked boxes that had not seen light since they were sealed up 
in US embassies abroad.  Because much of the USAID archives remains classified, I submitted a 
Freedom of Information Act petition to declassify the papers related to international housing 
when I began my research in the summer of 2008.  This petition is still under review, but I hope 
the USAID collection will soon join the vast quantity of declassified international housing papers 
at the National Archives, a collection that awaits fuller scholarly attention.  To overcome a US-
centered bias, resulting from a reliance on the National Archives, I also conducted research at the 
Archivo General de Centro América (General Archive of Central America) in Guatemala City.  
However, not much documentation could be procured, as the archive does not have the funds to 
fully catalog and organize its collection from the twentieth century. 
As the material from the archives attest, US housing programs in Latin American and the 
Caribbean differed from country to country, as each nation had its own particular history, 
problems, and path of development.  Because the scope of this project is quite broad, the 
dissertation tells the history of US international housing in Latin America through three case 
studies, chosen because they exemplify different types of housing assistance, and because they 
illustrate the evolution of shelter aid to the region. By juxtaposing these three case studies, the 




diversity of international housing programs will be brought to light as well as the variety of 
results in different countries.  The first chapter examines the creation of the Point Four program, 
President Truman’s plan to share US “know-how” with the developing world, and how housing 
came to play a role as a result of the lobbying efforts of Housing and Home Finance Agency 
(HHFA) officials.  The chapter focuses on the development of early international housing policy 
and the struggles of HHFA officials to create a Point Four housing program. 
The first case study, US housing programs in the Caribbean in the 1950s, is detailed in 
Chapter Two and exemplifies the more limited type of housing aid offered in the early, tentative 
years of the program, when US technicians primarily focused on the introduction of new 
materials and designs.  The chapter charts the formative role Puerto Rico, as a US 
commonwealth, played in both development theory and the Point Four program.  US technicians 
sought to reproduce the “economic miracle” the island had achieved in the 1940s.  For housing, 
this meant exporting Puerto Rico’s system of aided self-help housing.  Using different Caribbean 
islands as laboratories, US housing technicians experimented with various forms of aided self-
help, ultimately developing a particular house type: a modern, square concrete home.   
In Chapter Three, the dissertation then moves to Guatemala, the largest international 
housing program in Latin America in the 1950s, where the lessons of the Caribbean’s aided self-
help program were applied on a larger scale, as a means to strengthen the anti-communist 
“Liberation” of 1954. Guatemala is an important case study as it straddles the shift in 
international housing from government-to-government funding of aided self-help housing to a 
greater emphasis on private enterprise with the establishment of an FHA and system of savings 
and loan system.  The chapter illustrates how the creation of these new bureaucracies altered 
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Guatemala’s built environment. These programs served as a model when international housing 
expanded in the 1960s under Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress.   
The final case study, detailed in Chapter Four, focuses on one of the new Alliance 
programs: the US government sponsorship of a private homebuilding in Latin America.  The 
chapter traces the large role private industry played in State Department international housing 
through the history of Nelson Rockefeller’s IBEC Housing Corporation.  Rockefeller established 
the IBEC Housing Corporation as a means to show that corporations could profitably introduce 
new materials and US housing practices into Latin America and the Middle East.  The chapter 
looks at IBEC’s innovative housing solutions as well as the way various international housing 











It was the fourth and final point of Harry Truman’s 1949 inaugural address that 
transformed US relations with the developing world.  Before an audience of a hundred thousand 
people, and millions more over radio and television, Truman concluded his speech by 
introducing a new and enduring strategy to foreign policy—development aid.  The Chicago 
Daily Tribune summarized Truman’s address as one that did two things: “Rips Reds, Offers Aid 
to Free Nations,” a pithy heading, and one that pointed to the way Truman had framed 
development aid as a means to check the spread of communism.1 Indeed, from its inception, 
from the moment Truman read the fourth point of his address, foreign aid was tied to US foreign 
interests and the Cold War.   
The president commenced his address with a stark description of the state of the world, 
the current struggle between the opposing forces of democracy and communism, between 
“peace-loving peoples” that believed in freedom and justice and a “false philosophy” that relied 
on “deceit and mockery, poverty and tyranny.”  The United States, Truman claimed, needed to 
lead the initiative against the communist threat, and to do so, the President proposed a “program 
for peace and freedom” that involved four courses of action.  His first three points promised 
support for the newly-formed United Nations, to aid world economic recovery through the 
                                                




Marshall Plan and the promotion of world trade, and to strengthen “freedom-loving nations” 
through military means and joint security plans.  “Fourth,” Truman stated,  
we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific 
advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of 
underdeveloped areas.  More than half the people of the world are living in conditions 
approaching misery . . . Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more 
prosperous areas.  For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the 
skill to relieve the suffering of these people.  The United States is pre-eminent among 
nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques.  The material resources 
which we can afford to use for the assistance of other peoples are limited.  But our 
imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and are 
inexhaustible.  I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the 
benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations 
for a better life . . . Our aim should be to help the free peoples of the world, through their 
own efforts, to produce more food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more 
mechanical power to lighten their burdens . . . It must be a worldwide effort for the 
achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom.”2   
 
And with his fourth and last point, the President committed the United States to providing 
“technical knowledge” to the developing world.  It was a modest proposal, not a promise of 
money or materials, but a stated mission to share US “know-how,” to give poor countries the 
tools they needed to accelerate their own development.  It was something altogether different 
than the Marshall Plan, the US’s first major foreign economic assistance program, which 
combined technical and financial support to rebuild and stabilize war-torn Europe.  Truman’s 
program, named Point Four for its placement in the inaugural address, aimed solely to share 
“know how.”  It was a shoestring Marshall Plan for the developing world. 
 When newspapers and publications chronicled the development of Truman’s initiative, 
from his address to an actual program, the term they invoked most often was “American know-
how”—a colloquialism that entered popular speech in the 1940s.  “American know-how” was 
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described as an antidote to the problems of “backward areas.”3 The United States, already having 
suffered through the pangs of industrialization and emerging victorious, would use its 
accumulated wisdom to guide other countries towards a smoother transition.  Prevailing theories 
of modernization assumed that all countries were on the same, inevitable development path, 
progressing from traditional to sophisticated economic and political nations, akin to Western 
countries, and that those at the bottom should follow the ways of those at the top to reach 
economic prosperity.  The rich countries were to serve as models for the poor, an assumption that 
implied that knowledge only flowed in one direction, from the developed nations to the 
developing ones.4 Social change, and the interrelationship between political, social, economic, 
and cultural values was little understood. 
There existed another contemporary phrase that equally described the impetus for Point 
Four: “can do.”  For the program not only reflected a postwar confidence in American expertise 
but also the idealistic belief that the West’s scientific advancement rendered all of the world’s 
problems solvable.  In 1951, British historian Arnold J. Toynbee summarized such thinking 
when he wrote that the “permanent industrial revolution,” had, “for the first time in history, made 
the ideal of welfare for all a practical objective instead of a mere utopian dream.”  As a nation 
“pre-eminent…in the development of industrial and scientific techniques,” as Truman had 
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phrased it, the United States felt it was uniquely able to solve the world’s major problems.5 The 
field of economic development grew out of this can-do-ism: after the war, social scientists began 
to study how the US could help countries that had been left behind in the development process.  
Cold War struggles between the US and Soviet Union over influence in the “third world” 
heightened interest in the fields of economic growth and international aid.  While the term 
“economic development” was hardly in use before the war, by the 1940s, it was the most written 
about branch of economics, and with Truman’s Inaugural Address, it became a State Department 
objective.6 
 
History of US Technical Assistance Programs  
Truman’s Point Four had its roots in earlier technical assistance programs that the US 
government had developed in Latin American in the 1930s.  In 1938, in response to continued 
requests for economic, social, and scientific help from foreign countries, Congress authorized 
federal departments and agencies to send employees for temporary duty with the governments of 
other American nations, the Philippines, and Liberia.  Before then, missionaries, private 
companies, and philanthropic organization had created an informal system of sharing US 
technology and knowledge.7 In 1940, eighteen federal departments and agencies together 
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established the Interdepartmental Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation to better 
coordinate technical assistance to Latin America in a variety of requested fields, from civil 
aviation to housing.  The Committee operated on a small budget, and its missions, involving one 
or two experts in a given field, were limited in time and scope and were advisory in nature.8 
In April 1940, Roosevelt appointed Nelson Rockefeller to coordinate a program to 
improve cultural and commercial ties between the United States and Latin America as part of his 
Good Neighbor Policy to court better relations with the American republics.  This program grew 
significantly when the United States entered World War II and interest in Latin American 
security and material resources heightened.  In early 1942, Rockefeller created an expanded 
technical assistance program, establishing the Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA), a 
government-owned corporation authorized to conduct cooperative programs with Latin 
American governments in public health, agricultural development, and education—fields that 
reflected Rockefeller’s view of the IIAA as an institution devoted to social improvement.  Both 
the Interdepartmental Committee and IIAA served as primary models for Truman’s Point Four in 
its use of traveling experts, limited missions, and fields of focus.9 Point Four attempted to expand 
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Following the Point Four announcement, the whirr of the great machine of government 
bureaucracy could be heard over Washington—the hurried typing of memoranda, the passing of 
policy papers to and fro, and the mumblings of exploratory meetings, committees, and 
conferences—as each agency hurried to leave its imprint on this new project.  Government 
departments, from Agriculture to Treasury, pushed memoranda through their ranks and upstream 
to the State Department, memoranda that described potential programs in their respective fields 
and, of course, the large amount of funding it would require.  Meanwhile, the State Department 
released its own flow of papers traveling downstream, outlining overall policy, budget, and 
programming ideas to the other departments.  If one could have sat atop the Washington 
Monument and charted the paths of papers, moving from building to building, the network of the 
new Point Four program would have emerged.  At the center, at the nucleus, was the New State 
Building on Twenty-First Street and Virginia Avenue, the State Department’s most recent home, 
built to accommodate most of the department’s swelling ranks, having grown from 1,000 to 
7,000 employees during the war.  It was a building much unlike the State Department’s previous 
offices in the elaborate, neo-baroque State, War, and Navy Building adjacent to the White 
House.  The New State Building was a high Modernist building; plain, stoic, and with a stripped-
down version of Washington’s columned porticoes, the edifice communicated that the State 
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Department had kept up with the new, modern twentieth-century world.10 Vital nodes of paper 
traffic emerged around the national mall, at the beaux-arts headquarters of the Department of 
Agriculture, and the buildings of the Treasury, Interior, Commerce, and Labor Departments.  
These major agencies had the largest input in creating the new program and formed the core of 
the country’s early technical assistance program.  A substantially smaller node could be placed at 
the peripheral Normandy Building, just north of the White House on K Street, the home of the 
Housing and Home Finance Administration (HHFA).11  
 The Normandy Building hummed with Point Four activity, a vibration that mostly 
emanated from one man, Jacob Leslie Crane (Figure 1.1).  In just the first two weeks of 
February, Crane, the Assistant to the Administrator of the HHFA, wrote and delivered two 
papers to interdepartmental groups working on Point Four policy, met with about a dozen people 
in the State Department, answered two State Department Point Four questionnaires, and prepared 
letters from the HHFA Administrator to Assistant Secretaries of State—all in an attempt to 
secure a prominent role for housing in Point Four.12  
 The world housing shortage was Crane’s crusade, and he saw international cooperation—
the sharing of methods, ideas, technology, and legislative and financing schemes—as a means to 
solve it.  The wide-scale destruction of homes during the war was not the sole cause of the major 
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shelter crisis.  Inadequate and poor housing was a worldwide problem, exacerbated by post-war 
political and economic insecurity, inflation, a scarcity of materials and technical know-how, 
migrations from rural to urban areas, and population booms. 
Born in 1892 in Benzonia, Michigan, Crane had been a houser for most of his life, 
studying planning at Harvard and working for various government agencies thereafter: the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, Defense Housing, the Federal Housing Administration, and the 
National Housing Authority (the predecessor to the HHFA).  In the mid-1940s, he also became 
an avid international houser, pushing for cooperation to address housing issues worldwide.  
Crane and other members of the HHFA served as foreign housing advisors through the federal 
government’s early technical assistance programs in Latin America and Europe.  Crane was sent 
on an advisory mission to England in 1944.  After the war, he helped establish a United Nations 
shelter program with Ernest Weissmann.  He published appeals in journals and spoke at 
conferences, where he would stand before a lectern and chastise the audience for expecting 
“suitable housing to just grow in the wake of…‘progress.’”13  
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In 1946, Crane sought to transform his international work at the HHFA into something 
more official.  Taking a cue from the Department of Agriculture, which had recently set up an 
Office of Foreign Agricultural Relations to tackle the “world food problem,” Crane set up the 
Office of International Housing Activities Staff (IHAS), which was to represent the HHFA in all 
international matters, develop policy for the export and import of housing materials, be 
responsible for the foreign exchange of information and officials, and act as liaison to the State 
Department and UN.14 Crane’s new office corresponded with housing agencies abroad—writing 
to other housers to uncover new strategies, responding to their queries regarding the American 
system—and regularly published findings in a “Foreign Housing Bulletin” for housing officials 
worldwide.   
The IHAS office also sent technicians on short missions abroad.  Three HHFA experts—
Roy J. Borroughs, Earl V. Gauger, and John L. Tierney—went on a three-month mission to 
Manila in 1946 to advise on the organization, financing, and execution of a housing program for 
the Philippines.  Barton P. Jenks was appointed as a housing consultant in the US embassy in 
Paris.  Within the Americas, HHFA experts took on advisory missions to Brazil to help initiate a 
national housing agency (1946), to Colombia (1946), Ecuador (1946), Uruguay (1946), Mexico 
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(1947), and to Haiti to conduct a housing study (1948).  Crane sent architect Stephen Arneson to 
Venezuela in 1947 to help launch the country’s first wide-scale, long-range housing program to 
build shelter for 40,000 workers.15 Foreign housing officials also visited the HHFA; about 
twenty coming each year from Latin America in the years right after the war.16 Acknowledging 
the role the IHAS played in the field of international relations, the State Department began to 
partially fund the office in 1948.  By 1950, Crane had assembled a cast of international housers 
at the HHFA, permanent employees and part-time consultants, who would form the initial core 
of Point Four housing technicians.   
 
Housing Know-How 
Foreign governments requested the aid of US technicians, allowed them to set up shop in 
their offices, and listened to their advice, because these individuals brought with them American 
“expertise.”  By the late 1940s, it appeared that the United States had conquered its own 
significant, postwar housing shortage, created by returning soldiers, a newly prosperous 
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population, and a housing stock that had stagnated during the Great Depression.  The federal 
government stimulated construction through the reform of mortgage financing and the promotion 
of large-scale construction.  While issues of modern design were the territory of the Europeans, 
American “know-how” resided in the fields of materials, financing, legislation, low-cost design, 
mass production, organization and planning, and building codes and standards. 
The federal government became involved in housing during the Great Depression as a 
means to stimulate the economy through the building sector.  The government built a significant 
amount of public housing for the low-income population, beginning with the Housing Act of 
1937, which established the US Housing Authority to oversee federally subsidized housing that 
was owned and operated by local agencies, but many members of congress passed public 
housing acts while holding their noses; state-sponsored housing had the stench of socialism.  
Because they believed the “American way” was instead to help the free market solve the housing 
issue, congress also passed legislation that stimulated the private homebuilding sector, 
establishing savings and loans institutions and residential mortgage insurance that helped the 
middle-class purchase single-family homes.   
In 1934, congress established the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to induce 
private home construction by insuring low-interest, long-term mortgages for home sale.  The 
FHA did not directly build homes nor loan its own capital; it encouraged lenders to invest in 
residential mortgages by insuring them against loss.  If a borrower was unable to repay his or her 
loan, the FHA paid the balance.  Its regulations universalized the twenty-year mortgage, allowing 
the middle class to purchase homes with smaller down payments and longer repayment periods.  
By 1957, the FHA had financed 4.5 million suburban homes, thirty percent of new homes built 
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in any one year.17 The FHA also altered the fabric of the built environment, as its mortgage 
insurance could only be applied to houses that fit its design guidelines.  FHA regulations favored 
the construction of single-family homes in low-density suburban areas and laid out minimum 
construction standards, including lot areas, materials, and the type of home.  FHA mortgage 
insurance spurred the activity of the volume builder-developer more than the individual with a 
contractor, multiplying suburban subdivisions throughout the United States.18 
The government-supported growth of savings and loan institutions (S&Ls or thrift 
institutions) also made it easier for the middle-class to attain mortgages.19 S&Ls function by 
pooling savings from the public, which they in turn lend to homebuyers as low-interest 
amortized mortgages.  When thrift institutions broke down during the Great Depression, the 
federal government stepped in to create and fund the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB), which 
acted as a central credit facility to supplement the resources of local thrift institutions and ensure 
their liquidity.  From the 1930s to the 1970s, savings and loans were the largest source of 
mortgage loans in the country, as thrifts moved from their roots in Progressive Era social 
philanthropies to full-fledged, button-down businesses.20 
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These two programs had a profound influence on the culture and landscape of the United 
States.  Until World War II, the majority of households in the United States rented their homes as 
only the more affluent could attain home financing, but between 1940 and 1960, the national 
homeownership rate grew from forty-four to sixty-two percent, mostly stimulated by the creation 
of the FHA and a federally-supported system of savings and loans.21 The programs changed the 
country from a nation of renters to a nation of mortgage-holding homeowners, from city-dwellers 
to suburban residents.  The United States thus developed a bifurcated housing system: while the 
government built public housing projects for the poor, mostly black, urban class, it enabled 
mostly white, upper-class families to buy suburban “dream homes.”22  
While these novel financing instruments made it easier for Americans to purchase homes, 
new construction techniques developed during the 1930s and 1940s made it easier for developers 
to build them.  The great postwar housing demand stimulated the research of developing faster 
and cheaper ways to build.  A variety of housing research institutions were established with 
government support: the Small Homes Council at the University of Illinois, the Housing 
Research Foundation at Purdue—which was an early developer of prefabricated panel housing—
and other programs at Cornell and the University of Kansas.  Private organizations, such as the 
Albert Farwell Bemis Foundation, sponsored similar investigations into prefabrication and new 
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house designs.23 It was an era that saw the first uses of new materials, including large panels of 
gypsum, asbestos cement, and insulation board, as well as advances in pre-fabrication, panelized 
systems, and modular coordination, which helped foster the rise of large developments.  
American builders, such as William J. Levitt, David D. Bohannon, and Fritz B. Burns, advanced 
large-scale building during the postwar period, using mass-production techniques, introducing 
prefabrication and panelized systems, mastering project scheduling, and taking advantage of 
advancements in power tools, heavy equipment, low-cost designs, simplified plumbing 
techniques, aluminum siding, and factory-built kitchens and bathrooms.24 
When US technicians advised other countries in their housing sectors, it was this “know-
how”—in financing, planning, and technology—that they shared.  This “expertise” contained an 
ideological component—faith in the private market, the importance of homeownership and 
single-family housing, and a belief in the potential of industrialized technology—and in 
introducing US housing systems to other countries, the technicians also exported these values. 
 
Development of the Point Four Program 
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One can easily imagine how Crane felt in 1949 when he heard the President call for 
helping “the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce…more materials for 
housing” in his inaugural address.  Here was a houser, fifty-six years old, who had dedicated his 
life to a cause the President now seemed to be championing from the world’s stage.  Despite 
Crane’s best efforts, the federal housing agency had thus far only played a trivial role in State 
Department affairs.  The numbers describe it best: when the State Department submitted its 
budget for Cultural and Scientific Cooperation in early 1949, the HHFA was allotted $5,430, 
while the Department of Agriculture received $1.376 million.  But here was the President, 
promoting housing technology as a means to ensure the stability of the free world.  Crane must 
have passed from disbelief to elation.  He outlined a full housing program that incorporated 
much more than materials production, with a budget of more than a million dollars a year, nearly 
a hundred people from various countries working in the field and additional employees for his 
office staff.25   
Crane had also been in government long enough to know that his vision would have to 
acquiesce to the realities of State Department policy-making.  He knew he had “plenty of 
educating to do.”26 Entrenched views would not be easy to change, and the President’s inaugural 
utterances did not carry the weight necessary to push against the big departments, each already 
sectioning off its own share of the budget.  Yet, he did have some reason to hope: signs were 
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emerging that other development organizations were beginning to value housing’s role in their 
missions.  In 1949, the Export-Import Bank, a US government institution dedicated to making 
loans that facilitated the exchange of commodities with other countries, announced its first 
international loan for housing—$5 million to Israel—and when the first Point Four canvass of a 
foreign country was completed in Iran to determine its needs, reports proposed sending five 
housing and town planning experts, where the HHFA had suggested only one.27       
 When the State Department requested proposals from each specialized agency for a Point 
Four program in its field, Crane knew he needed to sell housing.  Housing aid, perhaps more than 
any other field, was regarded as a handout and a drag on economic development.  Between the 
end of World War II and the early 1960s, theories of economic development identified capital 
formation—the tangible, non-financial assets used to produce goods and services, such as 
factories, equipment, and infrastructure—as the most important factor in growth.28 Housing was 
viewed as a diversion of resources from this sector, and theorists believed that general growth 
and prosperity would naturally improve the quality of shelter.  Furthermore, the housing crisis of 
the developing world was of such magnitude that State Department officials viewed it as a 
“bottomless pit”—too severe for foreign assistance to be effective.29 Congress was also 
apprehensive about funding housing abroad, something it felt should be addressed through the 
private market.   
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In his Point Four proposal for the State Department, Crane attempted to depict housing 
aid as a program that meshed with prevalent development theories.  Housing, as described by 
Crane, was “an important part of overall economic and social development.”  Since Truman 
wanted to help countries produce more factories, Crane described how housing could accomplish 
this goal by stimulating the construction of plants for materials and construction machinery.  
Members of Congress had also indicated that they wanted Point Four to stress international trade 
as an engine of growth.  No problem, shelter construction promoted trade and investment in 
equipment.  Crane’s proposal also echoed the objectives of aid officials who described technical 
assistance as a form of “self help.”  As Truman had stated in his address, the Point Four program 
would help other countries develop “through their own efforts.”30 The government would not 
invest in foreign nations but assist them in using their own resources, mobilizing their own 
intellectual and financial capital, towards development.  Crane likewise described his Point Four 
housing program as one that would help underdeveloped countries “help themselves” to raise 
their housing standards by stimulating local materials and housing industries and providing 
assistance in housing financing, planning, architecture, construction, materials engineering, 
legislation, and administration.   With an allocation of roughly $852,000, he hoped to send US 
technicians abroad to work “within available resources” (i.e., with domestic capital and little 
financial aid from the US), to bring professionals and students from abroad for training in the 
United States, and to develop multilateral housing testing and training stations, similar to the 
Organization of American States’ housing center in Bogotá, in three different underdeveloped 
regions.  Crane’s program was small compared to the proposals of the major agencies, but he 
                                                




hoped to compensate for his small budget by enlisting the participation of state and local housing 
and planning organizations, universities, the private building industry, citizen housing groups, 
and professional associations, a level of involvement that already existed in the international 
activities of the Department of Agriculture and Public Health Service.31  
In early 1950, the State Department sent Congress its Point Four proposal.  The final act, 
which Truman signed into law on 5 July 1950, was a compromise between the President’s grand 
vision and Congress’s concerns.32 The President wanted a large program, $45 million for the first 
year.  Congress was worried that Point Four could easily become a Marshall Plan for the 
developing world, with US taxpayers financing the economic growth of various geographic 
regions.  To ensure that the program offered technical assistance—and not economic aid—
Congress put a low cap on its budget, an appropriation of $37.5 million for the first year for 
“surveys, demonstration, training, and similar projects.”33 
Out of fear that US technicians would start building public housing and other socially-
oriented projects abroad, Congress put strong limits on Point Four activities.  While the Marshall 
Plan had provided aid to rebuild a continent destroyed by war, Point Four was to be the start of a 
separate lineage, development aid, tackling the “social problems arising out of…economic and 
technological change.”  The Point Four program, as described by the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, was “primarily one of showing people in the underdeveloped areas how they 
can improve their lot by themselves…not a program for the purpose of giving economic help in 
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the form of commodities and capital equipment.”  It continued, “Emphasis was to be on 
assistance in the form of men, not materials,” transferring “know how” through teaching and 
showing.34 The initial Appropriation Act stated that Point Four funds could not be used for the 
construction of any project except for demonstration or instructional purposes.  “Self-help” 
formed the core philosophy of Point Four, using American expertise to help other countries 
develop themselves.35 
Funds for economic growth were to come from sources within the host countries and 
from private US capital that would be encouraged to flow abroad.  Until the late 1950s, officials 
in Washington believed that instead of supplying large development loans, the best way to 
stimulate economic growth was to encourage nations to improve their investment climates and 
attract private capital.36 To promote trade, Point Four was authorized with an investment 
guarantee program under the Export-Import Bank, which protected private US investments in 
developing nations against certain types of loss, such as expropriation, confiscation, and 
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seizure.37 Congress also allocated roughly $400,000 to the Department of Commerce to help US 
businessmen find investment opportunities in underdeveloped areas.38 The Point Four program 
was tasked with proving that both democracy and capitalism could create a just and prosperous 
nation for all members of society.  Reflecting on the nature of the new program, Truman noted 
that, “Communist propaganda holds that the free nations are incapable of providing a decent 
standard of living for the millions of people in under-developed areas of the earth.  The Point 
Four program will be one of our principal ways of demonstrating the complete falsity of that 
charge.”39  
Even after the passage of enabling legislation, Point Four still existed more as a shapeless 
philosophy than as an actual, physical program.  Truman had provided a vision while Congress 
had supplied a budget and limitations, but both left it to a slow-moving bureaucracy to give the 
idea form and determine what “technical assistance” would actually look like.  But a heavy 
bureaucracy, which can only move when all of its agencies, departments, offices, people, 
memos, reports, and parts are in line—and then only an inch forward—does not push upwards on 
the difficult path towards innovation, but rather slides down toward the swift and easy.  In charge 
of the new program, the State Department pursued the trajectory of least effort and implemented 
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a system where it delegated work to roughly twenty specialized agencies, which in turn 
organized programs in their fields—a system based on earlier technical assistance efforts.  Three 
fields took up 80% of the Point Four budget between 1950 and 1955—agriculture, public health, 
and education—the same fields that had defined the IIAA.40 In October 1950, the Technical 
Cooperation Administration (TCA) was created within the Department of State to coordinate 
Point Four, with Dr. Henry G. Bennett, the president of the Oklahoma Agriculture and 
Mechanical College, as its first administrator.  
Beginning with Point Four and the TCA, foreign aid entered a two-decade-long course of 
disorganization and chaotic management.  After only a year of existence, in October 1951, the 
TCA underwent its first of several major administrative reorganizations to centralize the program 
within the State Department and to decrease the power of the agencies.  Within its first ten years, 
US development assistance was restructured into many bureaucratic incarnations: first as the 
TCA (1951-53), which then became the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA; 1953-55), 
followed by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA; 1955-61), which became the US 
Agency of International Development (USAID; established 1961), the aid agency that exists 
today.  The US foreign aid program was never allowed to settle into an easy rhythm.  Part of the 
problem was that each ensuing administration—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson—
remolded the program, in organization, purpose, and ideology, to suit their own outlook and 
strategic needs.  The other issue was that development theory was an emerging discipline, and 
aid policy shifted in response to new concepts and beliefs that arose as the field matured.  In 
                                                




other words, no one in the development field—the theorists in their offices and the technicians in 
the field—ever quite knew what they were doing. 
 
Point Four Housing Assistance 
Once policy- and decision-making were centralized within the Technical Cooperation 
Administration (TCA) at the end of 1951, the HHFA and other agencies played more of a 
backstopping role for Point Four.  Generally, TCA officials supervised each nation’s overall 
programming, while technical agencies handled specifics—providing general knowledge, 
assisting in program development, and recruiting technicians.  Once a Point Four agreement was 
signed with a developing country, the TCA hired a country director, a small staff to assist him, 
and a number of experts to work on projects in their fields.  Technical assistance tended to either 
take the form of an advisory program, where technicians acted as consultants to the host 
government but did not engage in actual operations, or of a servicio, which the IIAA had 
developed in Latin America.  A servicio functioned as a jointly staffed bureau within the host 
government, whose programming was planned, financed, and executed by both governments.  In 
1952, there existed thirty-nine servicios in Latin America in the fields of health and sanitation, 
education, and agriculture.  With nationals of both countries working side-by-side, it seemed to 
be an ideal way to foster cooperation and training.41 
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The TCA was divided into three regional offices: the Near East and Africa, Asia, and 
Latin America, which included the Caribbean.42 The most efficient method to ascertain the US 
government’s regional interests in the early 1950s is to look through Congress’s dry bilateral 
Point Four budgets for a standard year.  For the 1953 fiscal year, Congress authorized roughly 
$118,600,000 for Asia and the Pacific, $50,800,000 for the Near East and Africa, and 
$20,300,000 for Latin America.  Another $15,700,000 was authorized for multilateral technical 
assistance through the UN and other international organizations.43 Latin America was a low 
priority for US foreign policy throughout the 1950s; at the time, Asia and the Middle East, 
especially India and Egypt, were much more important Cold War hotspots.44 Housing was also a 
minor field within the Point Four program and was allocated only seventy percent of what Crane 
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had requested—roughly $600,000.  By comparison, agricultural and health assistance, receiving 
$12.7 and $17 million dollars, respectively, represented the largest programs.  Smaller fields 
included education ($6 million); labor ($5 million); industry ($5.4 million); reclamation, hydro-
power and flood control ($6.4 million); and transportation ($3.5 million).45 
In some respects, the topic of this study—State Department housing aid to Latin 
America—started off as a peripheral program of a marginalized area.  Housing consistently 
received less money than other fields of technical assistance, and Latin America was a region 
that Truman virtually ignored and Eisenhower only engaged at the end of his administration 
when it flared up in anti-Americanism.  However, it is interesting to see how a comparatively 
small program played such a substantial role in the development of many host countries’ shelter 
sectors, especially those lacking a mature professional architecture culture.  In general, the TCA 
and its later incarnations sent only one or two housers on missions abroad, but these experts, 
placed in high-level positions, where they were capable of writing new legislation, creating new 
housing authorities, and designing new towns and buildings, had an extensive impact on the built 
environments of their host countries.  Although housing assistance commenced with a small 
budget allocation, within a decade, the situation changed dramatically.  By Kennedy’s election, 
Latin America would be at center stage and housing assistance would be singled out for the 
significant role it was to play in the region’s development.   
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With new Point Four funds, the HHFA International Housing staff expanded to about 
twenty employees.46 The office included idealistic men like Harold R. Hay who left his job in 
1951 as a private consultant on building materials and took a pay cut in order to work for a 
grander cause, Point Four.  His first mission sent him to India, where he researched and 
developed indigenous housing materials.47 Most of the technicians had backgrounds that were 
similar to another new hire, Philip W. Bourne, who held degrees in architecture from MIT and 
planning from Harvard, and had worked for housing authorities in Honolulu, Boston, San 
Antonio, and Los Angeles before joining the International Staff.48 Indeed, a significant 
percentage of international housers came from the government’s public housing programs. 
During the early, tumultuous years of technical aid, Crane’s efforts settled into two 
categories—planning and lobbying.  While the TCA’s disorganization made it difficult to affect 
policy, there also existed a strong institutional prejudice against housing: Administrator Bennett 
had displayed little interest in housing and Congress was hostile towards any Point Four 
construction program.  The TCA thus made little effort to develop an international housing 
program.  The bureaucracy was set in its heavy ways, and Crane was trying to push an elephant 
with paper memos.   
Point Four housing initiatives were ultimately developed as a result of a demand-side 
pull.  Housing technicians were sent abroad not because of Bennett, Crane, or any other official, 
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but because foreign countries requested housing assistance from the United States.  Crane had 
anticipated handling only a few Point Four housing projects during Point Four’s initial year, 
since the State Department had carved out such a small role for housing, but by December 1950, 
requests for shelter assistance had already come from a multitude of places, including Egypt, 
Iran, Liberia, Costa Rica, Panama, and Peru.  In mid-1951, Bennett finally approved the first 
nine Point Four projects for the HHFA to conduct in Antigua, Brazil, Costa Rica, Colombia, 
Egypt, Pakistan, India, Iran, and funding for a Johns Hopkins University study on tropical 
housing.49  
In the early years of Point Four, Crane developed its housing programs and determined 
the type of assistance US technicians provided abroad.  The TCA recruited two men from his 
HHFA staff to head its housing office: Bourne was responsible for Asia, Africa, and the Middle 
East, and Donald R. Laidig was in charge of Latin America.  Over time, as the State 
Department’s aid agency became stronger, decision-making moved away from the HHFA, but 
the new officials continued Crane’s programming.  US international housing policy did not 
develop smoothly, as officials groped their way through problems.  “Expert” housers were sent 
to the field with little or no prior experience in the developing world, testing housing approaches 
for the first time and altering methods as they went along.  Within the field of housing, officials 
in Washington never developed a coherent policy or conducted an extensive evaluation of their 
                                                
49 Point Four was still only one aspect of the HHFA’s international work.  In early 1951, the 
office was engaged in a multitude of programs, primarily through the UN, OAS, Ex-Im Bank and 
Point Four.  For IHAS work on international activities, see Memorandum from Jacob L. Crane to 
Raymond M. Foley, 11 Sep. 1950, folder “Memos to Administrator,” box 2, RG 207, 




programs.  Instead, they lumped new ideas onto old and created ever-expanding, evermore 
disorganized housing programs.   
The program at first was quite simple.  Crane understood that the developing world’s 
housing shortage resulted from a complex set of structural issues—such as financing, savings, 
and community development—as well as issues specific to housing—the need for better 
materials, design, and construction.  In Washington, however, there only existed the political will 
to tackle the latter issues.  Crane and his team thus limited their scope to researching and 
implementing low-cost homebuilding methods that addressed conditions in the developing 
world.  Except for a few city planning projects in Iran, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua, the emphasis 
of housing aid in the 1950s mostly centered on introducing alternative construction techniques, 
minimum house designs, and novel building materials. 
In providing “know-how” to the construction-side of housing, there existed two possible 
approaches: the low tech—using indigenous materials and traditional building methods—and the 
high tech—implementing modern machinery and modes of production.  The latter path was 
already being charted by US entrepreneurs, who had developed many Jetsons-like housing 
schemes that did not sell domestically but made their way to the developing world, where 
governments were eager to find cheap and quick solutions to their housing woes.  Wallace Neff 
built developments in Pakistan, Venezuela, and South Africa with his Airform Construction 
System, which sprayed concrete over an inflated neoprene-nylon bag, resulting in rounded 
“bubble houses.”50 In Liberia, LeTourneau, the great earth-moving equipment company, tried out 
its “Tournalayer,” a massive machine that could produce one small concrete house per day—
                                                




“Like a giant chicken laying eggs.”51 The Bush Construction Company built prefabricated 
structures in Colombia in 1951, and the Billner Firm used tilt-slab building in Colombia, Egypt, 
and Italy.  The fact that all of these were one-time-only projects indicates that the systems were 
inadequate.  The cost of the equipment and skilled labor resulted in houses beyond the average 
developing-world budget.  Crane knew that importing house-making contraptions was not a 
viable option, even if countries, such as Chile, were demanding the Tournalayer, and that there 
was “no one solution” to the housing problem.52 If the goal was long-term development, 
however, local talent and resources would have to be mobilized. 
Technicians at the HHFA in Washington and out in the field conducted research to create 
new low-cost house designs that addressed the financial and industrial limitations of 
underdevelopment.  Their work represented an offshoot of investigations during the interwar 
years to design a “minimum house” that most US workers could afford.  Private institutions, the 
government, and homebuilders led the effort to scientifically develop the smallest and most 
efficient dwelling by studying households and simplifying home designs to fit their daily needs, 
streamlining construction, and introducing mass-production techniques, such as prefabrication 
and modular coordination.  The HHFA and FHA played a significant role in both developing and 
disseminating prototypical plans for “minimal houses.”  In a proposed minimum house plan 
published by the FHA (Figure 1.2), the house’s basic essentials were reduced to fit within a 
simple square: a living room, combination kitchen-dining room, two bedrooms, and a bathroom.  
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The public spaces occupied the front of the house while the bedrooms and bathroom pivoted off 
a small hallway to provide greater privacy.53  
For Point Four, Crane wanted to develop a “minimum house” for the low-income 
population of the developing world, a shelter whose cost would need to be of a different order.  
His approach combined the modern and the pre-industrial: a scientific analysis of individual 
needs, the use of space, and designs with the application of traditional building materials and 
techniques.  The HHFA’s international housing research focused on developing indigenous or 
easily-produced building materials, unindustrialized construction techniques, and simple house 
designs.  
It was not an easy mission to fulfill.  The problem, as described by US housing technician 
George Reed, writing from his post in Burma, was that “While American drive, American ability 
to organize, the American experience in planning housing, in thinking through legislative, 
financial and budget, social and economic implications of housing are very useful to countries 
newly starting in housing work, for the most part, American methods of construction or 
techniques of building or American habits as regards use of materials are not applicable.”54 The 
US and the developed world in general knew little about methods for producing and using 
traditional materials for low-cost housing.  Many organizations, active in international housing, 
had begun to investigate the issue.  The United Nations funded research in building materials, 
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which culminated in an exhibition in New Delhi in the autumn of 1953 that demonstrated 
improved ways of using materials indigenous to Southeast Asia.  In Latin America, CINVA, the 
housing and research training center of the Organization of American States, began to investigate 
the application of local materials to low-cost housing.  Crane’s office joined this effort, 
researching the production of simple, locally-made building materials for housing in various 
parts of the world.   
US international housers embraced the Landcrete and Ellison machines, new devices for 
hand-making concrete and earth blocks, as the results were durable and low-cost.  The 
technicians used the blocks to build experimental, minimal house designs: the “Progressive 
House” in Zambia and the “Expandable House” in Israel—units that grew over time with the 
income of the owner.  It was a concept that architects working in low-cost housing had been 
pursuing for some time.  Although prototypes in the United States had been developed, the idea 
never caught on, but it made more sense in the developing world, where the additional cost of an 
extra room could push the house price beyond the financial means of a poor family.   
In the Caribbean and Latin America, research focused on the “Aided Self-Help House”—
a self-built home.55 Crane was most eager to experiment with this system, which had recently 
proved successful in low-cost housing program run by the Puerto Rican government.  The 
government had provided rural peasants with materials, architectural plans, supervision, and 
mortgages to help them build their own homes.  By eliminating the cost of labor, the program put 
homeownership within reach of some of the island’s poorest residents.   
                                                




Crane advocated the use of aided self-help housing in Point Four from the program’s 
inception.  In the late 1940s, he had even urged its use in US public housing programs.56 Two of 
Crane’s staff members, Reed and Stephen Arneson. had helped develop the Puerto Rican 
program.  Crane not only viewed the system to be the best method to significantly reduce the 
cost of a house, but he also believed it promoted American democratic values.  While there 
existed various notions about homeownership and its ability to create less radical individuals, for 
Crane, self-help in particular seemed well suited to the task of forging an American brand of 
democracy abroad.  By creating an owner-builder who “helped himself,” the system was viewed 
as a form of construction that promoted self-reliant individuals.  In the words of Crane, aided 
self-help could “stimulate and assist local planning and building by the people for themselves 
and each other, thus nurturing the growth of private initiative and enterprise and local 
responsibility for solution of local problems.”57 When Point Four initiated a housing assistance 
program in the Caribbean in 1952, it was the perfect opportunity to combine Crane’s research 
interests: indigenous materials and aided self-help. 
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  The story of US housing programs in Latin America begins in the most likely setting—
the Caribbean—where the United States has historically exerted its sphere of influence with the 
greatest confidence.  The US was the bully of its “Caribbean backyard.”  It did not think of itself 
as a colonial power, that unthinkable label was reserved for England, France, and the 
Netherlands, who controlled most of the Caribbean, but between the end of the Spanish-
American War and World War I, the US had managed to collect its fair share of Caribbean 
territory: Puerto Rico as spoils from the Spanish (1898), the Panama Canal Zone (1914), the 
purchase of the Danish Virgin Islands (1917), and the occupation of the Dominican Republic 
(1916-24) and Haiti (1915-34).  In the same period, the dollar had likewise come to dominate the 
Caribbean economy, as the United States became the region’s chief trading partner and its 
investment surpassed that of Europe.1    
Foreign aid emerged during World War II as a means for the United States to attain a 
type of soft-colonialism over the Caribbean, ensuring its stability as well as an American-
friendly model of economic development.  The region was comprised of independent, colonized, 
and semi-colonized territories controlled by England, France, the Netherlands, and the United 
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States.  Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba were, in the words of Caribbean historian 
Patrick Bryan, “independent in name, but dependent in fact,” economically and politically reliant 
on the United States.2 This chapter focuses on Point Four housing aid provided to the dependent 
overseas territories (DOTS) of the Caribbean, those that were still European and US possessions.  
Independent Caribbean islands also received aid, but through different channels.3 As in the rest 
of the world, US government housing aid was deployed in the early 1950s in the Caribbean as an 
anti-Communist tactic. 
This chapter analyzes US involvement in the development of Caribbean housing for 
several reasons, not the least of which is the fact that it is an overlooked subject.  Studies of 
Caribbean housing have mostly focused on its traditional, vernacular structures or the 
architecture of European colonialism.  Some have analyzed Britain’s housing aid to the region, 
but so far few studies have examined the role US technicians played in developing local 
government housing programs in the post-war period.4 US projects in the Caribbean also 
exemplify the first phase of State Department housing aid worldwide, which was characterized 
by small-scale experiments with inexpensive construction techniques and building materials to 
make housing affordable to the squatter and working-poor population.  
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 This study will focus on how technicians helped develop and spread the “aided self-help 
housing” method in the Caribbean.  The system implemented in this geographic region was 
exported throughout the world.   The term “self-help housing” technically refers to any dwelling 
constructed by the occupant with his or her own labor.  In a sense, self-help housing has been 
around since man built his first hut.  Aided self-help housing describes a type of self-built home 
where a low-income occupant receives outside technical or financial assistance, typically from 
the government or an aid agency.  In this study self-help and aided self-help will be used 
interchangeably.  There are many forms of aided self-help, involving different combinations of 
labor and assistance.  For example, in individual self-help, each family works on its own home.  
Mutual self-help refers to a group of families who work together as a team to construct homes 
for each other.   
In January 1957, the HHFA published a collection of aided self-help house plans and 
specifications.  The Manual on Design was published as an aid for the estimated fifty countries 
that were then experimenting with the scheme.  More than half of the twenty-two illustrated 
houses were from US-assisted projects in the Caribbean.5 After its success in the region, aided 
self-help housing formed the core of US international housing policy through the next two 
decades, as well as for UN and World Bank housing programs through the 1970s.  
 
Social Unrest in the Caribbean 
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In the 1930s, the Caribbean erupted in labor strife—strikes, hunger marches, violence, 
and destruction that challenged the prevailing colonial economic and political order.  The 
hostility marked a turning point and unleashed a great period of reform, labor organization, and 
nationalism in the region.6 The Great Depression had come early to the Caribbean, where the 
collapse of sugar prices and a series of violent hurricanes in the 1920s had already begun to 
strain the economy, and it came rough, disproportionately burdening the region’s poorer black 
population, exacerbating racial tension that had remained as a legacy of slavery.  Deep disparities 
existed in the quality of life between the region’s elite, white employers and their usually poor 
minority workers.  Except for Puerto Rico and the smaller Dutch islands, more than ninety 
percent of the population in the Caribbean colonies descended from African slaves, brought to 
the islands to work its plantation economy.  After emancipation, economic and political power 
remained in the hands of a small white minority, who now oversaw a majority peasant class.  
Plantations that had been worked by slaves became capitalist plantations, increasingly owned by 
US corporate monopolies with black laborers and immigrant workers that had been brought to 
fill the post-emancipation labor shortage.  Large populations of Indians lived in British Guiana 
and Trinidad, while Indonesians, Javanese, and Chinese made Surinam their new home.  The 
Caribbean was an agricultural, export-based economy, sending tobacco, cacao, and, above all, 
sugar around the world, but mostly to the United States.  To attract labor, many plantations 
around the Caribbean adopted a system of quasi-serfdom that granted workers ownership of 
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small parcels of land in exchange for their work.  It was a system that kept the peasant laborers in 
steep poverty, malnourished, poorly educated, and without social mobility.   
The upheavals of the 1930s were born of the inequalities created by colonialism and the 
abuses of the plantation system and gave rise to a modern proletarian movement and calls for 
self-governance.  The leaders of the labor strikes, especially Alexander Bustamante in Jamaica, 
Clement Payne in Barbados, and Tubal Uriah Butler in Trinidad, were inspired by new 
communist parties in Panama, Costa Rica, and Cuba, which spoke to their opposition to 
capitalism and imperialist domination.7 
The stability of the Caribbean was crucial to the governments of the United States and the 
United Kingdom, and especially to their war effort; the region possessed essential raw materials, 
eventually accommodated roughly 100,000 US servicemen, and was the site of German U-Boat 
activity.  The two governments led formal investigations into the unrest and established the 
Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in 1942, an early experiment in international 
cooperation, to address common social and economic problems.  From the beginning, the 
Commission mostly worked to protect US and UK wartime interests.  In fact, the UK’s West 
India Royal Commission, charged with investigating the cause of the labor riots, found 
conditions in the British territories so appalling that it decided to postpone publication of its 
findings until after the war so as not to provoke further outcries.  It was not until 1946 that the 
US and UK governments shifted their attention to the original mission of social and economic 
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development, when they invited France and the Netherlands to join the organization, creating the 
Caribbean Commission with a central secretariat in Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.8 
To stabilize the Caribbean, US and European governments planned to set the “backward 
tropical nations” on an economic development program, guided by the experience of the West, to 
increase the standard-of-living.9 The UK government initiated long-term development programs 
in most of its colonies, financed both locally and with Colonial Development and Welfare funds.  
Caribbean activists also called for national economic development programs, believing that 
financial independence would yield political self-governance.   
Housing emerged in the postwar Caribbean as a crucial development issue.  The slums of 
El Fanguito in Puerto Rico, Trench Town in Jamaica, Jon Jon in Trinidad, Carrington Village in 
Barbados, All Buoys in British Guiana, and The Pound in Dominica testified to the magnitude of 
the problem and the fact that the majority of the region’s population lived in substandard 
housing.  In its 1946 publication, the West India Royal Commission described the region’s 
housing conditions: 
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In both town and country the present housing of the large majority of the working 
people…leaves much to be desired; in many places it is deplorable…It is no exaggeration 
to say that in the poorest parts of most towns and in many of the country districts a 
majority of the houses is largely made of rusty corrugated iron and unsound boarding; 
quite often the original floor has disappeared and only the earth remains, its surface so 
trampled that it is impervious to any rain which may penetrate through a leaking roof; 
sanitation in any form and water supply are unknown in such premises, and in some cases 
no light can enter when the door is closed.  These decrepit homes, more often than not, 
are seriously overcrowded, and it is not surprising that some of them are dirty and 
verminous in spite of the praiseworthy efforts of the inhabitants to keep them clean.  In 
short, every condition that tends to produce disease is here found in serious form.10  
  
Reports from the rest of the Caribbean similarly described the “wretched” housing in Puerto 
Rico, the “poverty and bad houses” of Curaçao, and “a serious housing shortage” in the French 
West Indies.11 According to a regional survey, a typical Caribbean dwelling had one or two 
rooms with a total floor space of under two hundred square feet.  Homes were generally poorly 
maintained, ill ventilated, had pit latrines, and lacked running water and electricity.12  
Each country had its own social, economic, ethnographic, and historical make-up, but the 
fundamental housing problems across the region were still similar.  The issues were both 
structural—the Caribbean suffered from extreme poverty, an inadequate financing system, and a 
paucity of qualified technical staff and skilled labor—and particular to housing—a dearth of 
building materials and little land management.  Most of the territories had to import 
industrialized materials, such as glass, steel, and iron, resulting in prohibitive costs for most 
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residents.  Financed by a loan from the United States, Puerto Rico built a cement plant in 1939 
on the outskirts of San Juan, the only such plant in the Caribbean until British funds financed a 
plant in Jamaica, which was erected in the aftermath of a devastating hurricane in the early 
1950s, and in Trinidad in the mid-1950s.13 
To address some of these issues, European governments sponsored research into the use 
of local materials and new construction methods, building experimental houses.  They also 
assisted in the creation of housing authorities, subsidized the cost of limited state-built housing 
projects, and helped pass legislation modeled on the metropole.14 British territories, which were 
particularly well funded by the Colonial Office, led investigations into the use of clay, stone, 
wood, and bagasse, a residue of sugar cane, for walls, and the use of grass, coconut fronds, 
banana fibers, and bamboo for roofing.15  
On the smaller islands, houses were built in a traditional manner, with all parts of the 
house manually made on site.  Industrialized production, requiring less skilled labor but a large 
capital investment, was not widespread in the Caribbean, which had a surplus of unskilled labor 
and a shortage of funds.  Larger territories, like Jamaica, Surinam, and Puerto Rico, used some 
degree of industrialized construction, where several house components—window frames, doors, 
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and roofs—were fabricated in a centralized factory.  This type of construction was common in 
the United States and Europe, but its success required the standardization of parts and the use of 
modular construction, which were not practiced in the Caribbean.16 An interesting 
unindustrialized prefabrication experiment in Costa Rica used the labor of convicts, working in a 
penitentiary workshop, to prefabricate components of simple two-family wooden houses by 
hand.17 
Although scholarly attention has focused on post-war experiments in complete pre-
fabricated tropical houses, instances of their use were rare.  Realizing early on that prefabrication 
was beyond the financial means of the common tropical dweller and did little to promote local 
industry, housing officials were much less enthusiastic about the system than architects.  British 
Guiana was the site of one such experiment, where local officials developed a low-cost four-
room prefabricated house of local greenheart wood, but it was never serialized in great numbers 
due to its high cost.18 In 1950, the UN Department of Social Affairs declared that, “The 
importation of complete prefabricated buildings should not be regarded as a solution to the 
problem of tropical housing.”19  
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Puerto Rico and Aided Self-Help Housing  
In the fall of 1949, after much discussion, postulating, and planning, twelve subsistence 
farmers in Puerto Rico began to build an experimental housing development in San José under 
the aegis of the insular government.  Located just southwest of San Juan, the island’s capital, San 
José was a new rural community established in the wake of the Land Law of 1941, a reform 
program aimed at addressing the island’s unequal land distribution.20 The story of Puerto Rico’s 
economy was typical of the Caribbean’s colonies: a small, wealthy elite—in this case, tied to US 
sugar interests—controlled the vast majority of arable land, while most of the rural population 
remained landless squatters, known in Puerto Rico as agregados, or “attached” peasants.  In 
1940, there were 100,000 agregado families, about one-third of total the country’s families.  The 
story also unfolded in a typical colonial manner, with exploitation, tension and misery, a climate 
that led to some of the region’s most violent labor riots during the Great Depression, resulting in 
about twenty-six deaths.21   
The Land Law, born of the territory’s burgeoning nationalism and the US government’s 
concern for its social stability, aimed to put an end to the island’s unequal distribution of land 
and the existence of the agregado, declaring land ownership for those who live off it to be “a 
fundamental human right.”  Propelled by Luis Muñoz Marín, the leader of the Popular 
Democratic Party, and Rexford Tugwell, the last appointed US governor, the Land Law 
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reapportioned land and established new rural communities with cooperative farms, in which each 
agregado family was also given a maximum of three acres.  By 1945, over 13,000 plots had been 
allocated to agregado farmers.  Twenty years later, 363 new rural communities had been 
established for 64,800 families.22  
The new law provided agregados with land, but failed to address their housing needs.  
Agregados could not afford new homes, and their old dwellings did not provide decent shelter.  
As squatters, they tended to live in overcrowded wooden shacks that fit two small rooms and a 
kitchen into a tiny fifteen by fifteen foot plan.23 A survey of Puerto Rican living conditions from 
the 1940s commented, “many of the dwellings can scarcely be dignified by the term houses.  
They are often mere shacks thrown up almost over night out of any material at hand” (Figure 
2.1).24  
The island’s Social Programs Administration (SPA), directed by Luis Rivera Santos, was 
charged with the resettlement of agregados in rural communities, and it instituted a number of 
low-cost experimental housing systems.  The most successful and influential was the project 
begun in San José in 1949.  The twelve selected families moved their shacks to their apportioned 
lots and began to construct new homes with their own labor, as they had for generations and as 
most families around the world construct their dwellings.  But in San José, the families’ labor 
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was guided by government assistance.  The SPA supplied architectural plans, materials, 
financing, and foremen who supervised the construction.  The male heads of the family worked 
together to erect the houses, eliminating the cost of hired labor and resulting in affordable, 
sanitary homes (Figure 2.2).  While self-help construction had been implemented on various 
Caribbean islands before the establishment of the Puerto Rican program, known in various parts 
as “gayap,” “free-hand,” “meroon,” and “day to day,” these early examples were informal 
programs that were quite different than the state-sponsored Puerto Rican model.25 
The houses that slowly emerged in San José over the course of a full year’s labor were 
not spruced-up wooden shacks, electrified vernacular buildings, or sturdier folk structures.  They 
were twelve pristine white cubes, rational concrete volumes, as if transported from Modernist 
Europe to rural Puerto Rican (Figure 2.3).  The farmers, however, built these modern concrete 
homes with traditional methods.  The families used a simple block-making machine (Figure 2.4) 
and small concrete mixer (Figure 2.5) to make blocks for the walls and foundation, supported 
with reinforced concrete columns.  Local cement, sand, and stone were used for the mortar and 
concrete.  Building with handmade blocks was slow but easier and cheaper than using poured 
concrete construction, which required expensive wooden forms and a higher degree of skilled 
labor.  The house had a square plan that was minimal but comfortable: eighteen by eighteen feet, 
including two bedrooms, a living room that could also double as a bedroom, a kitchen, porch, 
electricity, and a backyard privy.  To maximize space and simplify construction, there were no 
closets, hallways, acute or obtuse angles (Figure 2.6).  In tropical climates, where dwellings were 
chiefly used for sleeping, a great need for interior space did not exist.  Once the families moved 
                                                




in, they tore down their old shacks and used the lumber to build a kitchen, door, and window 
frames.  The construction materials cost $300, and although the government fully subsidized the 
initial projects, by 1951, this cost was wholly financed through loans given to the families.  The 
market value of their land and house was estimated to be over $1,000.26   
As the program expanded beyond the initial twelve houses, the system for aided self-help 
housing evolved.  Male heads of families built in groups of fifteen, and community organizers 
were employed to create a cohesive and motivated team.  “You can expect the problems of 
human relations,” Rivera Santos commented, “when you have 15 or more persons working 
together for a long time.”  Construction was also simplified through the introduction of a 
prefabricated slab for the roof.  In 1953, when Rivera Santos had overseen the erection of more 
than three hundred units, and the SPA was initiating a thousand more, he declared the program’s 
experimental stage to be over.27 Aided self-help housing had become a bona fide housing 
program.  
Puerto Rico’s self-help housing projects were part of a much larger redevelopment 
program.  By the mid-1940s, Governor Tugwell and then Senate President Marín had realized 
that land reform was not enough to propel the island’s economic development and placed 
Teodoro Moscoso in charge of a new initiative, Operation Bootstrap.  The program sought to 
achieve economic development through industrial expansion and an aggressive pursuit of foreign 
private capital.  Abundant cheap labor, tax breaks, and a lack of trade restrictions and currency 
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exchange problems lured US capitalists to establish factories for textiles, apparel, tobacco, 
electric wiring, and other labor-intensive industries.28 The results were an “economic miracle.”  
In 1940, Puerto Rico was an agrarian, sugar-dependent island, with a population mostly 
composed of poor rural residents.  By 1958, Puerto Rico possessed an industrialized, 
manufacturing- and tourism-based economy and a per capita income that exceeded that of any 
other Latin American country, save oil-rich Venezuela.29  
The boom created a growing, dynamic Puerto Rico that architects, such as Henry Klumb, 
Santiago Iglesias Jr., Jesus Amaral, Osvaldo Toro, and Miguel Ferrer, tried to express in their 
designs for the island’s new buildings.  These architects developed factories, hospitals, 
universities, housing developments, hotels (Figure 2.7), and other buildings in a Modern 
vocabulary of clean white lines, rational volumes, and concrete construction.  To modernize the 
island’s architecture, Governor Tugwell established the Comité para Diseño de Obras Públicas 
(Committee on Design of Public Works), directed by German national Henry Klumb, which 
favored modern materials and designs.30 The architectural style was used as a means to display 
the island’s economic development, western orientation, and industrialization.  Operation 
Bootstrap director Moscoso, ever conscious of image, lived in his own Toro-Ferrer steel, 
concrete, and glass box, featured in the Museum of Modern Art’s Latin American Architecture 
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Since 1945 exhibition.31 The style showed off the island’s cement mill, a unique feature in the 
Caribbean, which supplied almost the entire region with Portland cement.  The International 
Style was employed as a lingua franca for communicating “progress,” and Puerto Rico was not 
alone in appropriating Modern architecture as a means to express its economic development.  
The governments of Mexico, Venezuela, and other Latin American countries also used Modern 
architecture in their development-oriented state building projects to signal their modernization, 
an impulse that was played out on an monumental scale in Brasilia.32  
Operation Bootstrap led to a burst of housing construction, and with access to both island 
and federal funds, Puerto Rico had the most forward-looking and experimental housing program 
in the Caribbean.  Since 1934, the Puerto Rico Model Housing Board, created by the US 
Congress, built a variety of house types with different materials and designs.  With passage of 
the 1949 Housing Act, the island also had access to Title I funds, and the authority built both 
multifamily and single-family housing in an International Style.33 Experiments in housing for the 
poorest rural population were conducted by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration, 
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which established a “land and utility” program in the town of Ponce, a bare-bones housing 
initiative where individuals moved their makeshift homes to small, subdivided lots.  At the 
intersection of four lots, families shared showers, water closets, and faucets.34 
In the private sector, mainland builders brought new techniques to the island and adapted 
them to Puerto Rican needs.  Leonard D. Long, who had become a successful homebuilder in 
Charleston, South Carolina, was one of the first mainland developers to take advantage of the 
island’s FHA financing and transport his experience in mass-construction to Puerto Rico.  His 
extensive developments on the island included Puerto Nuevo, billed as “the world’s largest 
private housing project,” about 6,000 units costing about $4,000 (Figure 2.8).  On the outskirts of 
San Juan, the project was designed to attract residents from the city’s two largest squatter 
districts, El Fanguito and La Perla.  The concrete houses consisted of five bedrooms with low-
cost alternatives, such as aluminum shutters instead of glass windows, and were erected at a rate 
of nearly 50 a day.35  
Pictures of the island’s new construction were also used to create and disseminate the 
image of a new, modernizing Puerto Rico abroad.36 The picture of the old Puerto Rico, the 
“backwards stepchildren of the US,” was supplanted with articles in Life Magazine, The 
Rotarian, and other popular magazines and newspapers that described “Opportunity in Puerto 
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Rico.” 37 The glowing narrative of these stories was accompanied by photographs of its novel 
modern architecture—the Caribe Hilton, the international airport, Caonillas Dam, schools, and 
housing projects.38 Aided self-help houses were often included in these articles as the structures 
were examples of the island’s new International Style architecture.  The homes were low-cost 
versions of the larger modern experiments and served as evidence that the insular government 
could take care of even its poorest residents (Figure 2.9).  Even peasants were living in sanitary 
concrete homes with quaint gardens.39 
Operation Bootstrap became the development path par excellence for the Caribbean and 
Latin America, seeming to show how a Hispanic country could transform from a traditional 
agrarian economy to an industrialized nation.  Other regional countries invited Puerto Rican 
officials to advise their own development programs, wanting similar results.  Rafael Picó, the 
head of the Puerto Rican Planning Board, visited El Salvador to help institute a low-cost housing 
program there.40 The “Puerto Rican model,” as it became known, presented a means to achieve 
economic growth and development through land reform and the enticement of foreign, private 
capital, and as a result of its publicity articles and photographs, the “Puerto Rican model” also 
possessed a visual component.  The end result of economic development was a Modernist island. 
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Point Four Aid and the Puerto Rico Model  
A few days after President Truman’s inaugural address, Governor Muñoz Marín, the first 
democratically elected head of government, offered Puerto Rico as a training ground for the 
Point Four program, and in 1951, the program’s first year, 138 foreign students and observers 
from around the world received technical assistance training there.  The State Department sent 
Point Four technicians to the island for orientation before heading abroad on technical assistance 
missions, and Puerto Rican officials went on “good will tours” of Latin America.  The United 
Nations, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization also granted 
scholarships for study and training on the island.  Trainees learned how Puerto Rico modernized 
its electrical power, water supply, and agricultural research as well as its solutions to land tenure, 
labor problems, and housing.  By 1956, more than 3,000 individuals had received US-funded 
training in Puerto Rico, from places as far as Pakistan, the Philippines, Israel, Ethiopia, and 
Thailand.41  
State Department officials were anxious to start a Point Four program in the Caribbean, 
believing that the region’s social problems had already allowed Communism to gain a “strong 
foothold.”42 For the United States, the Caribbean was an eastern frontier of raw goods and 
untapped markets.  Its strategic interest in the Caribbean resulted from its geographic proximity, 
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access to the Panama Canal, role in World War II, and important natural resources, such as 
bauxite, gold, diamonds, timber, cattle, sugar, fruits, chicle, tannin, and kenaf.  The US members 
of the Caribbean Commission introduced resolutions to prompt the Commission to approach the 
TCA for housing assistance to their colonies.  Puerto Rico’s successful program for aided self-
help had already spawned several similar programs in other Caribbean nations.43 The European 
representatives of the Caribbean Commission were not eager to receive US aid, suspicious that 
Point Four was an excuse for the United States to expand its Caribbean reach.  Although 
Lawrence Cramer, the US Assistant for Dependent Territories, assured the British government 
that the US was not interested in using technical assistance to “pry the colonies away from the 
mother country,” and only sought to “strengthen…the forces of democracy,” European officials 
remained skeptical.  Nevertheless, at the end of 1951, the Commission formally requested Point 
Four assistance in housing.44 
US officials wanted to implement a full development program in the Caribbean, but per 
the Commission’s request, they began with a technical assistance program limited to low-cost 
housing.  The TCA and Caribbean Commission agreement called for two US technicians, based 
in Port-of-Spain, to introduce aided self-help to the low-income population, test and develop 
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local building materials, train the local population, and advise on related housing problems.45 
Although self-help housing had already become another Puerto Rican export—with nascent 
programs established in Jamaica, the US Virgin Islands, Antigua, and Trinidad—as with the 
island’s other products, once aided self-help found mainland-US support, its export multiplied. 
At the office of the HHFA International Housing Activities Staff, Jacob Crane was 
excited to include a Caribbean program in his staff’s list of Point Four activities.  Point Four 
work had become the focus of his office’s work: ten employees in Washington were dedicated to 
the program, and the volume of TCA work had more than doubled in the previous year.  US 
housing technicians, armed with HHFA pamphlets and an earnest idealism, were working around 
the globe.  Brown Rolston, formerly of the FHA, was in Baghdad, functioning as a community 
planner and housing specialist.  Alvah J. Webster, from the Massachusetts State Housing Board, 
and two other technicians were now in Lebanon, planning a slum clearance and low-cost housing 
project in Beirut.  William Wittausch of the HHFA had just finished advising the Austrian 
government on developing a prefabricated housing industry and was dispatched to West 
Germany to help start an emergency housing program in the Ruhr district.  J.M. Fraser, a 
Singapore official, was brought to the United States to study housing and planning, while 
Mohammed Akbar had just returned to Pakistan from Puerto Rico, where he had studied aided 
self-help housing.  In Latin America, Crane was in the process of recruiting a technician to 
introduce aided self-help to the rural areas of Brazil and another to establish a city planning 
office in Managua, Nicaragua.  Osborne T. Boyd and Louis Grandgent would soon arrive in 
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Chile to improve the manufacturing of construction materials and act as general housing 
advisors.46 The HHFA assisted these technicians in the field and helped share information gained 
from different missions.  Beginning in 1952, the office published a series of reports, the Ideas 
and Methods Exchange, covering housing techniques employed in various underdeveloped 
countries, from earth building to the planning of village markets.47   
Crane’s objective for the Caribbean program was to test the effectiveness of a variety of 
different indigenous building materials for self-help housing, with each island providing a 
separate laboratory of social and economic conditions.   Although self-help had been tried in 
other Point Four missions on a small scale, the Caribbean was the first program for technical 
assistance where its introduction was the central mission.   
  
Point Four at Work 
The first step in initiating a Point Four housing program in the Caribbean was also the 
first major obstacle—recruitment.  Finding qualified personnel was a challenge throughout the 
Point Four program.  One can imagine how difficult it was to find an ideal housing candidate: an 
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architect or engineer, capable of designing with limited materials, who spoke other languages, 
appreciated cultural differences, and was willing to live somewhere uncomfortable for a State 
Department salary.  While the most obvious place to find an aided self-help specialist was in 
Puerto Rico, Crane was not able to convince many of the island’s housing officials to take long-
term jobs abroad. 
Aided self-help required technicians who knew their way around a slide rule, concrete 
mixer, and the complexities of human nature.  Following the Puerto Rican model, Crane wanted 
a team composed of an architect and a community organizer.  He eventually settled on Hector 
García Cabrera, a Puerto Rican sociologist, and Donald Hanson, an engineer from Chicago.  
Hanson was almost thirty-three years old and an idealist.  He contacted the HHFA to work as a 
Point Four technician when he first heard about he program.  His background made him 
adequately prepared for the job: a BS in civil engineering from Purdue, a degree in community 
planning techniques from the University of Chicago, a year’s experience as a draughtsman for 
Skidmore, Owings and Merrill, and three years as a planner for the Chicago Housing Authority.   
Hanson and García reported to Port-of-Spain in April 1952.  The plan for their twenty-
month assignment was to visit as many of the Caribbean Commission member countries as 
possible.  Hanson and García were advisors to the local Caribbean governments, and per 
regulations, US money could not be used to build houses.  Point Four funds only covered Hanson 
and García’s salaries and travel expenses.  Costs for house materials, equipment, and additional 
personnel were borne entirely by local governments.  In Hanson’s opinion this meant that they 
“were not in a position to exert force when it probably was needed,” but, “since we had to use 
74 
 
only suggestion and free exchange of ideas, the persons in charge of the program felt they were 
actually responsible for all decisions.”48 
Neither man had any practical experience with aided self-help, and what little they knew 
they acquired during a quick orientation visit to Puerto Rico.  To “demonstrate” self-help, they 
decided to initiate a number of limited pilot programs on various islands.  This system allowed 
them to first work on a small-scale, training local personnel and establishing organizational and 
technical methods before the host government carried out a larger program.49  
Hanson and García made short, frequent trips between the numerous Caribbean 
territories, island-hopping around the nations that requested their guidance, using letters, 
telegrams, and propeller planes to stay in contact with local officials.  March 1953 provides a 
typical itinerary, a month where they spent seven days in Trinidad, two in Barbados, one day in 
Antigua, three in Puerto Rico, and two weeks in Jamaica.50 Although Hanson and García 
followed routes that would later be replicated by many travelers, in 1953, tourism had not yet 
become the foundation of the region’s economy and travel was difficult. 
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Hanson and García initiated their first housing project in the Dutch colony of Surinam, 
located on the northern coast of South America.51 Getting a housing program underway within 
the territories of the Caribbean Commission required the State Department to coordinate a 
triangular relationship between the US government, European metropolitan powers, and the 
territories themselves.  The Netherlands was most enthusiastic about US assistance and was 
initially the only nation willing to allow US officials to deal directly with local officials. 
In June 1952, Hanson and García landed for the first time in Zanderij airfield, an 
installation largely built by the US Air Force during World War II on the outskirts of 
Paramaribo, the coastal capital of Surinam.  Surinam was the US’s primary source of bauxite, a 
basic material in aluminum, and the country produced a quarter of the world’s supply in the 
postwar period.52 Surinam had boomed during the war due to the world demand for bauxite, the 
two thousand US military personnel who had been sent to defend its mines, and the resultant US 
investment in its infrastructure.  The army was now gone, but the US-built airstrip, network of 
paved roads through the jungle, and interest in bauxite were still quite present.   
With a population of roughly 86,000 inhabitants, Paramaribo was the most ethnically 
diverse city in the Caribbean, with a population of African, European, Javanese, Chinese, East 
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Indian, Maroon, and Amerindian heritage.53 It was also one of the few settled areas of a colony 
that was still mostly uncharted rainforest, and its structures were almost entirely constructed of 
wood.  The chief exporter of bauxite had no means to produce aluminum.  As with most of the 
Caribbean, Surinam was an unindustrialized, raw-materials exporter that lacked skilled labor and 
capital.  The country found itself in the unlikely position of having an abundance of lumber and 
bauxite and a great shortage of housing. 
Paramaribo had shantytowns with dilapidated homes and open sewers, but slum housing 
even existed in the nicer parts of town, as deep city lots allowed property owners to build houses 
or stores fronting the street and rent the rear space for poorer dwellers to build small wooden 
houses.  These rear yards remained unpaved, and, in the rainy season, became a mixture of mud, 
mosquitoes, and disease.  The rear dwellings were erected in attached blocks of four or more 
units with only a board partition between the homes.  These one-room houses consisted of a 
narrow front porch that doubled as a living room and a back balcony that served as the kitchen.  
A pipe in the center of the yard furnished water and an open latrine provided sewage for all 
residents.54 
Prior to the Point Four agreement, the Surinamese government had built a trial rental 
public housing project in the town of Zorg-en-Hoop, a few miles southwest of Paramaribo.  The 
626-house project was a combination of one- to three-bedroom houses for rent with a kitchen, 
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shower, toilet, and utilities.  Constructed of concrete blocks with sheet aluminum roofs, these 
were not traditional wooden Surinamese homes.  Such materials were costly, as everything had 
to be imported, except the sand for the concrete.  Even the contractor, foremen, and skilled labor 
had to be brought in from the Netherlands, since local technical skills could not complete a 
project of such magnitude.  The result was an expensive project with a total cost of two million 
Surinam Guilders (about $1.4 million).55 
Paramaribo was the site of Hanson and García’s inaugural Point Four project and the first 
use of aided self-help in an urban setting.  The technicians mostly followed the Puerto Rican 
model, but the SPA’s large budget meant its program could not be directly transferred.  For two 
weeks, Hanson and García met with Surinamese ministers and legislators and studied the local 
housing situation, reaching an agreement to start a pilot aided self-help program under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs.56 Directed by M. de Groot, the Ministry was responsible for choosing 
families and preparing a site before the August return of Hanson and García.  The Puerto Rican 
program stressed the importance of land tenure and homeownership, issues intertwined with 
financing, and to convince participants to invest the arduous labor necessary to build a home, 
they had to know that the land and house would be theirs.  In Surinam, a twenty-year mortgage 
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was arranged though the National Postal Savings Bank, which meant the program had to be 
geared towards low-salaried, white-collar workers who would be able to meet payments.  
When Hanson and García returned to Paramaribo for their second visit, the Ministry had 
fulfilled its duties: a site owned by the government, about three miles from downtown 
Paramaribo and easily reached by bicycle, had been cleared, and thanks to heavy advertisement 
in newspapers and on the radio, four hundred families had applied for homes, of which fifty were 
selected with eighteen for the initial project.  The Ministry had also selected a staff of 
construction foremen, engineers, and social workers to provide direction and supervision for the 
project.  Hanson and García held a two-day course with the participants to discuss the basics of 
the program: the aided self-help philosophy, conditions of land tenure, terms of repayment, and 
house design and construction. 
Construction began on 15 September 1952 with a cornerstone-laying ceremony attended 
by Dr. Jan Klaasesz, the Governor of Surinam, who compared the project to a “football match”: 
it had aroused great interest but the outcome was still uncertain.57 In October, a second group of 
thirty-two families started on another community; they had already helped the first group of 
eighteen for the sake of experience.   
While work was in progress in early 1953, US officials made a silent film about 
Paramaribo’s aided self-help program to use as a recruitment and instructional tool for new 
participants all over the world.58 The entire four-month construction process was reduced to 
fourteen black-and-white minutes.  The clicking of the 16 mm film begins and the camera opens 
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on a scene in the Paramaribo slums as a Surinamese man rides his bicycle towards the camera.  
His clothes are clean and his white shirt and tie are well pressed.  The film’s text informs us that 
“Many people of varied incomes are forced to live in these [slum] houses.”  The camera follows 
the man through the city’s streets to a small, wooden shack where his wife is cooking dinner on 
the steps outside.  We see his two children and this quaint scene and infer that this is a 
wholesome family, undeserving of their housing conditions.  It begins to rain, as it does often in 
Surinam, but it also rains inside the house.  The man, we learn, is “John,” a generic white-collar 
worker who cannot afford to leave the slums or find a better home due to the housing shortage.  
The camera closes in on John as he reads in the paper that US Point Four technicians are helping 
the local government establish a new method of homeownership.  We see other families hear the 
announcement by radio.  Elation grows on their faces.  We follow John as he goes to a group 
meeting, fills out an application, interviews with a social worker, and is selected to join the new 
program.  He is going to build a new two-bedroom, 565 square foot home for his family.  John, 
along with the other selected white-collar workers, is unaccustomed to manual labor and receives 
extensive instructions from trained foremen in carpentry, concrete work, block laying, and 
painting.  We know from Hanson’s monthly reports that he trained these foremen by having 
them erect a model house, which also allowed the families to see what they would be working 
toward.59  The camera then follows John through each stage of the homebuilding process.  Most 
of the labor is done by hand.  We know from HHFA documents that the major equipment 
consists of a block-making machine—a replica of the one used in Puerto Rico—a circular saw, a 
wood planer, and a cement mixer, most of which were made by local blacksmiths and 
                                                




ironworkers from scrap metal.60 John works every day, four hours a day: first he makes blocks—
many, many hand-pressed concrete blocks.  As John, Hanson, García, ministry officials, and 
hundreds of participants across the Caribbean would soon discover, block-making was a boring 
and time-consuming activity.  John then ties reinforcing rods for the foundation, pours concrete 
he mixed himself over them, and makes wooden doors and window-frames.  Now it is raining 
outside.  No matter, the group cannot stop.  He lays the cornerstone, sets corners, and starts to 
build walls with his concrete blocks.  His son comes to help him.  His doubting friends come to 
laugh at his labors.  The roof finally goes up and, per Surinamese tradition, this is an occasion for 
flag waving, speeches, and beer.  Interior and exterior walls are finished with plaster and then 
painted, and John installs windowpanes and doors.  John’s home is finished.  His family moves 
in and his doubting friends do not laugh anymore.  They now come over to admire his kitchen 
sink, indoor shower, and electric lights. 
Here is what the film erases and what is difficult to recover: the real “sweat equity” the 
participants invested, the intense and demanding labor required in building an entire home by 
oneself.  The male heads of household put in eight-hour workdays at their regular places of 
employment before they worked on their houses after dark from six to ten in the evening on 
weekdays and then returned for the entire Saturday.  It was arduous manual labor whose 
difficulty can only be ascertained from the amount of time US technicians and Crane discussed 
the need to motivate participants.61 
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There were many unknowns in the design of these early projects, as the letters that flew 
back and forth from the HHFA out to the field make clear: What materials should be used? 
Should Hanson and García try to establish a small-scale cement mill in the Caribbean?62 In the 
end, the self-help house in Paramaribo, like the others built in the Caribbean, followed the one 
great model, the Puerto Rican self-help house.  A self-help house needed to be cheap and capable 
of construction by unskilled labor.  The Puerto Rico house had already gone through several 
permutations, and for a pilot project, it was easier to start with a working model. 
An adapted house plan emerged from discussions between Hanson and participant 
families.  The roof was one of the most important and expensive aspects of any minimal house.  
Puerto Rico had experimented with thin, pre-cast slabs, but the Paramaribo roof was pitched to 
accommodate the rainy season with a wood frame and inexpensive galvanized iron sheeting 
(Figures 2.10 and 2.11).  The house now looked more like a caricatured version of “home,” with 
a triangular roof on a square base.  The abundance of land in Surinam also allowed for a larger 
home of a little less than six hundred square feet.  Custom and the availability of timber resulted 
in a wood, rather than concrete, floor. 
The plan was similar to the Puerto Rican model: its street elevation was broken up by a 
projecting bedroom (Figure 2.12).  One entered through a central front door into the living room, 
which provided direct access into the other rooms: two bedrooms and a kitchen.  The plan was 
expandable, with the possibility of a third bedroom to be finished later.  The Surinamese house 
also had the luxury of electricity, an indoor flush-toilet water closet, shower, and an externally 
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accessed storage room.  The two-bedroom house cost about 2,500 Suriname guilders (about 
$1,400) with a market value of 6,000 guilders, much less than the 4,300 guilders for an 
equivalent government house in Zorg-en-Hoop.  The net cost to the government was little 
compared to the heavy subsidy involved in its earlier public housing scheme.63 
Hanson and García stayed until November and worked with the owner-builders through 
every step.  A Surinamese government official later praised them for their ability to “roll up their 
sleeves and get right down to work with the laborers, and not just stand around and tell them how 
to do it.”64 Hanson later wrote that he felt he had taught the Surinamese “how to turn dream 
houses into real houses . . . by the labor of their own hands.”65 
Once the program was well-established in Paramaribo, with a total of 165 houses started 
during the first year of operation, the government made plans to develop the program in at least 
three districts outside the capital to serve as nuclei for a country-wide housing program.  Surinam 
planned to build 400 self-help units a year and 300 contractor-built units for middle-income and 
ex-leper families.66  
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With aided self-help established in Surinam, Hanson and García next turned to the British 
island of Barbados.  When slavery was abolished on this sugar island in 1838, the white ruling 
elite created a new labor system whereby ex-slaves were permitted to erect dwellings on 
marginal plantation land in exchange for their labor.  Land tenure was linked to employment, and 
if a worker was dismissed, he had to remove his house.  From this system evolved an 
architecture of moveable homes, the “chattel house,” a light-timber, shack-like dwelling built on 
a loose foundation of coral stone, which allowed air to circulate underneath.  The typically 
rectangular, two-room house had an entrance on the long side, flanked by two windows, with a 
detached pit latrine in the rear.  All of the timber was imported as Barbados had none of its 
own.67 
In 1946, the Barbadian government initiated two major housing projects for low-income 
families on government-owned plantations, the Bay and Pine Estates, near the capital of 
Bridgetown.  That same year, a government survey of the capital had deemed 3,022 of the 7,984 
houses of the lower-income groups to be “unfit for human habitation” and another 4,357 in need 
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of repair.68 To reduce costs, houses on the Pine Estate were built with a mixture of indigenous 
and imported materials: local coral stone (Figure 2.13), a relatively soft stone, and “megcrete” 
blocks, a mixture of cement and bagasse.  Nevertheless, the final cost of the house still far 
exceeded the small and subsidized rent the inhabitants paid.  At the Bay Estate, one hundred new 
houses were erected and 511 houses were relocated from congested slum areas and repaired.  
The new houses had two- to four-bedrooms, constructed of stone with timber floors, and cement 
asbestos slab roofing.  Each house had its own private backyard with a privy.  Public water spots 
placed throughout the estate compensated for a lack of indoor plumbing.69   
The high cost of erecting these homes led the Barbadian government to request Hanson’s 
and García’s Point Four assistance.  They arrived in early 1953 and stayed for two months to 
initiate a pilot aided self-help project in Clinketts, a town on the northern tip of the island.  To 
encourage the erection of houses made of permanent materials, the government offered the 
participants a ninety-nine-year lease on land.  The government was unwilling to sell the land 
outright for fear it would end up in the hands of speculators.  To advertise the program, they held 
an informational open-air public meeting near Clinketts.  Local officials then selected fifteen 
families for the pilot project.  
For the design, Hanson looked into using local materials but found that the experience 
with megcrete was inconclusive and that handmade concrete blocks were cheaper than blocks or 
panels made of native coral rock.  To test house designs, two model houses were erected on the 
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Bay Estate: one modeled exactly after Puerto Rico, with concrete walls, floor, and a slab roof, 
and the other, after Surinam, with concrete walls, timber floors, and a corrugated cement roof.  
They decided to use a design closer to the second type for the fifteen families at Clinketts, since 
the slab roof seemed too complex to build, and the families eschewed concrete floors due to 
superstitions about drafts and respiratory illness.70 Two block-making machines, copies of those 
used in Surinam, were made at a local foundry, and the selected families began building under 
the guidance of foremen in February 1953.   
Like the island of Barbados itself, the final design of the houses lay somewhere between 
Puerto Rico and Surinam (Figures 2.14 & 2.15), although it was significantly smaller and more 
simple.  Each detached home measured around four hundred square feet and included a living 
room, one or two bedrooms, and a kitchen.  A pit latrine and room for bathing were located in 
the back of each private yard, emulating the Puerto Rican model.  The street elevation lacked a 
porch but had the familiar rectangular punctures for a glass and steel window and a wood panel 
door.  With a pitched corrugated cement roof, Hanson implemented the same simple concrete 
block and wooden post-and-collar-beam construction he had designed in Surinam.  The final 
houses were valued at $2,000 BWI but had an actual material cost of $1,165 BWI, which was 
paid by the participants through a government loan. 
Hanson and García left once the project was initiated, and by March, the fifteen heads of 
families had made 1,200 building blocks, working evenings by kerosene lamplight, sometimes as 
late as eleven at night.  Not all government officials fully supported the new program, preferring 
                                                
70 Later technicians were able to slowly introduce concrete floors. “Monthly Report on Technical 
Assistance in the Caribbean Area Under the Sponsorship of the Caribbean Commission,” Jan. 
1955, folder “DOTS—Reports—Housing,” box 25, RG 469, Deputy Director for Operations, 




other housing solutions, like that of the Pine and Bay Estates, and without the US technicians, 
Clinketts’s progress quickly reduced to a trickle.  In May, only two houses had foundations and 
the Barbados Advocate feared that “there is a likelihood of its failing unless new enthusiasm can 
be created.”  They lauded the island’s new little houses as signs of progress that countered the 
island’s “Bad Houses,” which were “most obvious sign of the island’s backwardness.”71 The 
families continued to work, finally finishing their homes in December 1954, twenty-three months 
after they had started. 
In April 1954, the Barbadian legislature approved funding for seven additional aided self-
help projects.  The first development, St. Michael, was located on the Bay Estate and consisted 
of two groups of fifteen houses each, both experiments in new materials: local coral stone blocks 
for the exterior walls and concrete block for internal partitions.  One scheme copied the Clinketts 
plan, and the other had a large living room that took up the front half of the house, a bedroom 
and a room that could be used as both a bedroom and kitchen.  Coral stone was also used in other 
projects in Cave Hill, St. Phillip, and Christ Church, totaling 75 houses.72 
 
And So On 
In their first year, Hanson and García also launched aided self-help housing projects in 
Trinidad, Jamaica, and Grenada.  They visited Curaçao and Aruba, where they held meetings, 
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seminars, and met with local officials to spread knowledge of the system.  Wherever they were 
stationed, the self-help housing program tended to unwind in the same fashion developed in 
Surinam and Barbados.  They first held discussions with community leaders and government 
officials to explain the method and convince skeptical officials.  Once an agreement was reached, 
local officials selected and developed a site for a small pilot program, sorted out issues of land 
tenure, selected families, and determined financing.  Hanson and García trained personnel, 
helped develop designs, determined costs, and started the first group.  Then, onto the next 
territory while the local government continued the program with the duo returning to expand the 
project. 
In Trinidad, Hanson and García started the country’s first aided self-help project at 
Hubertstown, which opened in December 1954.  The twenty by twenty foot homes took on the 
familiar design: from the front, the standard image of a house, almost as if drawn by a child: a 
triangular, pitched roof over a cement rectangle with a door and a window.  Inside, a simple plan 
of two bedrooms, a living room, and a kitchen, with a privy outside.  But there were some 
striking differences: the house was elevated on stilts to accommodate flooding issues, and to 
reduce construction time, exterior walls were made of prefabricated hollow clay blocks from a 
local factory and interior partitions were made of wood.  
Even faster construction times were achieved in Jamaica, where Hanson and García 
advised the government on expanding a pre-existing self-help housing program that had been 
initiated after an August 1951 hurricane had destroyed or damaged roughly 75,000 structures on 
the island.  With funds from Great Britain, the Hurricane Housing Organization built rural homes 
for poor farmers.  Seven thousand cottages were erected using a modest amount of self-help, 
completing houses in two months.  The state provided the land, materials—lumber, cement, 
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roofing, and hardware—and some skilled labor, while the farmers contributed local materials—
sand, gravel, and stone—and most of the labor.  Components were manufactured at a large 
prefabricating plant, unique in the Caribbean.73  
Hanson also experimented with earth construction, a type of building that had received 
attention in the United States in the 1930s and early 1940s as a potential low-cost building 
material.  The Office of Indian Affairs built both rammed earth and adobe structures in 
considerable numbers, with the largest concentration at Pine Ridge, South Dakota.  For many 
reasons, including the reluctance of the FHA to guarantee mortgages on homes built by non-
standard methods, interest in earth construction declined.  In the 1950s and 1960s stabilized earth 
construction received renewed attention as an international housing strategy.  There were many 
modes of earth construction, which included adobe blocks; poured adobe, also known as mud 
concrete; cajon, where earth was used as a wall-filling material; and rammed earth, also known 
as pisé de terre, which consisted of a combination of clay and sandy soils, mixed, dampened, and 
pressed into a form.  Earth blocks with various stabilizers, primarily lime and cement, were used 
in Point Four demonstration projects in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  In 1953, the UN 
Department of Social Affairs sponsored extensive studies by Israel’s Ministry of Labor on the 
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use of stabilized earth in home construction with the thought of developing a regional center in 
Israel.74   
In the Caribbean, Hanson used blocks made from a Landcrete machine (Figure 2.16), 
which had already been used to build schools and government buildings in St. Lucia.  Landcrete 
blocks were much cheaper than concrete as they used less cement.  Landcrete was used in Point 
Four aided self-help homes in St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and Dominica. The final house had similar 
minimal designs as used in Barbados, with the structure plastered white to mask its earth interior 
(Figures 2.17 & 2.18).75 
 By the end of 1953, Hanson and García had visited eleven countries, conducted three 
regional conferences on aided self-help, talked with leading officials and several thousand 
potential self-helpers, and helped initiate various pilot projects.  In October 1953, Crane 
organized an Aided Self-Help Workshop in San Juan, Puerto Rico to serve as a capstone of the 
first phase of Point Four projects in the Caribbean, a chance for all to share their experiences, 
ideas, and mistakes.  Forty-one regional aided self-helpers and eleven Puerto Rican officials met 
in the newly built Caribe Hilton, once described by Operation Bootstrap Director Moscoso as a 
hotel that “emphasize[d] the ‘good old USA’ aspects of the Puerto Rico situation—the modern 
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and efficient rather than the quaint and picturesque.”76 It was a fitting setting, as the Point Four 
housing program was in part intended to help the entire Caribbean transition from quaint to 
modern.  The participants viewed the system as a success and a promising tool for developing 
areas.  In providing the poor with shelter, it was agreed that self-help was “a forger and guardian 
of democracy.”77   
 
Expanded Caribbean Program, 1954 
When Dwight D. Eisenhower became president in January 1953, he sent the TCA into its 
second major reorganization.  Wanting to put all US foreign aid operations into one agency 
under the Secretary of State, he established the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA) to 
oversee military assistance programs from the Department of Defense and to absorb the 
functions of Point Four and the Mutual Security Agency, which had been established in 1951 to 
continue the Marshall Plan.  Because Point Four was associated with the previous Democratic 
administration, the program was also renamed “Technical Cooperation.”   
The initial Point Four program in the Caribbean was limited to housing aid, but when 
politics in the Caribbean started to veer left, it oiled the wheels of the newly minted FOA.  
Because US development aid was determined by foreign policy objectives rather than a 
country’s economic need, countries that seemed to pose a communist threat received the greatest 
amount of aid.  Throughout 1953, US policymakers became concerned that communism was 
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gaining a stronger foothold in the Caribbean, in places like Jamaica, Trinidad, and especially 
British Guiana, where a socialist government had won election.  FOA officials attributed events 
in British Guiana to social and political deficiencies—“illiteracy, chronic unemployment and 
under-employment, low production, poverty and the immaturity of political parties and labor 
unions,”—which “give the Communists fertile ground for propagandizing.”78  
To counter this “fertile field for Communist agitators,” the FOA expanded the Caribbean 
technical assistance program to address a wider set of development goals.  Along with low-cost 
housing, the Caribbean Commission program included efforts to foster rural development, 
including a diversification of agriculture and reduction of sugar dependence, to expand the 
fishing industry, to initiate soil conservation, and to improve education and vocational training.79 
As the FOA’s role in the Caribbean grew, it began to deal directly with local governments and 
rely less on the Caribbean Commission. 
The housing program was extended beyond its December 1953 termination date and 
additional technicians were recruited to implement a larger program.  García left at the end of his 
contract, and Hanson was put in charge of the overall program and promoted to liaison officer to 
the Commission.  Two new teams of two men were dispatched, replicating the combination of an 
architect/engineer with a community organizer.  Housing technicians were also stationed in 
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Surinam and British Guiana as part of permanent country missions.80 The new recruits started 
their service with an orientation in Washington and a trip to Puerto Rico for training in self-help 
housing.81  
Colonel Wolcott C. “Doggie” Waggaman and Ephraim Gordon Ericksen, a sociologist 
from the University of Kansas, were dispatched to the Dominican Republic, from where they 
served the Windward Islands, Barbados, and the French territories of Martinique, Guadaloupe, 
and French Guiana (Figure 2.19).  Like many technicians, they brought their wives and even 
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shipped over their cars from the United States.  In his early fifties, Doggie Waggaman was a 
prominent fixture of the Washington, DC social and residential architecture scene.82 He had 
studied architecture at the École des Beaux Arts and started out as an architect in his father’s 
firm until he founded his own in 1926.  From 1945, he served in the navy, where he spent part of 
the time designing and building prefabricated shelter and furniture. 
George R. Jordan and Pedro Rivera Cintrón formed the second team, responsible for the 
Leeward Islands, British Honduras, Trinidad, Jamaica, Curaçao, and Aruba.  A Boston native, 
Jordan attended Northwestern and MIT and headed a construction firm in Washington, DC.  
After the Caribbean, he became a career housing diplomat, leading projects in Ghana and Korea.  
Rivera Cintrón came from Puerto Rico’s SPA, where he had been working as a rural sociologist 
since 1949.  He was born in 1921 in Salinas, Puerto Rico and studied at the College of 
Agriculture and Mechanic Arts in Mayagüez. 
The two teams continued Hanson and García’s method of frequent and short visits, 
following extensive written exchanges.  The first phase of the Caribbean housing program 
proved that aided self-help housing could be implemented under many different circumstances; 
the second phase focused on refining the system by testing faster construction methods and 
taking steps to organize the host country’s construction industry.   
One of the major difficulties in implementing aided self-help was the length of 
construction.  The time not only wore on the participants and made it hard to motivate them, but 
it also increased overhead costs.  T.O. Lashley, the Manager-Secretary of the Barbados Housing 
Board, pinpointed the problem in an article: “The making of the concrete blocks by the self-help 
                                                





team is one of the most laborious of the jobs, and if this could be eliminated the period of 
erection would be reduced considerably.”83  
The Puerto Rican SPA had also found block-making to be arduous and introduced poured 
concrete walls and roofs, using plywood forms, in early 1953.  Although the technique required a 
higher degree of skill, the system was faster and cheaper than the prior concrete-block method 
they had developed.84 In Grenada, Waggaman tested the poured wall system but used metal 
forms so that they could be reused.  Ericksen also found a substitute for block making in 
Barbados, where he took advantage of the opening of a new brick factory and organized a supply 
of hollow clay building blocks for new aided self-help schemes. 
The Point Four technicians collaborated with local governments on construction 
decisions and continued investigating new materials.  In Trinidad and St. Vincent, they built 
wood frame houses with tapia, a type of insect-repellent grass, and clay panels.  They worked 
with reinforced concrete in Montserrat, and continued experiments in soil-cement in St. Lucia, 
Dominica, and British Honduras (now Belize) and coral stone and megcrete in Barbados.85  
In Surinam, FOA technicians assisted the Dutch government in carrying out a new Ten 
Year Development Plan, establishing a joint servicio under the Office of the Prime Minister.86 
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Three percent of the Plan’s budget was dedicated to housing, and Joseph Coulam was recruited 
to serve as an FOA housing consultant in Paramaribo.87 Coulam was the head of the Department 
of Woodwork and Building Construction at Utah State University and had been stationed in 
Tehran since 1951 as a Point Four Housing Branch Chief.88 He arrived in Surinam with his wife, 
Elva, and advised the government in setting up a Housing Department and implementing a 
national low-cost, self-help housing program.  Until 1957, the government focused on urban 
housing, about half of which was built through aided self-help, after which the focus shifted to 
rural housing as a result of a land-reform program that broke up old plantations and resettled 
farmers on small lots with aided self-help housing.  Coulam decreased construction time by 
moving from simple handmade machines to a block-making factory.  He ran time studies and 
tried to introduce pre-cut lumber, the use of power tools, and functional planning and modular 
coordination in design.  He also worked with the local Bruynzeel Timber Industry Company to 
precut and standardize lumber.89 
                                                                                                                                                       
RG 469, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of Latin American Operation, Geographic Files 
(Central Files), 1952-58, NARA. 
 
87 The Ten Year Plan (1955-64) was followed by a Supplementary Development Plan (1965-66), 
then the First Five Year Plan (1967-71), Second Five Year Plan (1972-76), and the Long Term 
Development Programme (1975-90).  The financing of development plans was almost entirely 
borne by the Netherlands until 1975.  B.H.P. Mhango, Aid and Dependence, the Case of 
Suriname: A Study in Bilateral Aid Relations (Paramaribo, Suriname: SWI, 1984); Dudler et al., 
"The Economy of Surinam ": 683. 
 
88 Utah State University, Iran and Utah State University (Logan, Utah: Utah State University, 
1963), 11,74,137. 
 
89 “Non-Military Country Program, Surinam, Housing,” 27 Dec. 1958, folder, “Surinam,” box 5, 
RG 469, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of Latin American Operation Program Staff, 
Country Program Books, 1958-59, NARA; Committee on Banking and Currency US Senate, 
Study of International Housing: Subcommittee on Housing, Committee on Banking and 




The Aided Self-Help House  
What unified the aided self-help houses of the Caribbean was much greater than the 
details that separated them.  While some islands charted a course of tamped-earth or tapia 
construction, these were the exception, as most governments instituted projects using concrete 
construction.  No one ever did a full-scale evaluation of the Point Four experiments in building 
materials in the Caribbean; no one ever determined which material or construction technique was 
cheapest or strongest, but it almost did not matter.  From the beginning, the great majority of 
Caribbean governments wanted housing made of one material, concrete.  
There was a practical rationale for concrete—it was a sturdy material, resistant to insects, 
and hurricanes—but outside Puerto Rico, shipping charges made it quite expensive.  The 
material modern architects celebrated as the solution to cheap housing was not available in the 
dependent territories outside Puerto Rico, where houses were built with locally-produced cement 
that cost four dollars a barrel and reinforcing steel that cost six cents a pound.  In Antigua, 
cement was purchased from Puerto Rico at $11.60 per barrel and reinforcing steel was bought 
from England for fourteen cents a pound.90 It was for this reason that Crane had stressed the use 
of cheap, local materials, but the countries themselves opted for white concrete homes. 
The symbolic properties of cement were seductive.  The territories of the Caribbean 
hoped to emulate the Puerto Rican model of development, a process that was punctuated by 
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pristine concrete architecture.  The presence of cement in these territories indicated a degree of 
industrialization and modernization.  As the Caribbean Commission’s journal stated in 1955, 
cement was “The bedrock of modern industrial development.”91 But in reality, most of these 
countries lacked production capabilities and self-help concrete blocks were made by hand with 
imported cement.  
A conspicuous sense of Modern architecture emanated from the self-help homes, partly 
in their use of its stylistic features, but also in the way the aesthetic was channeled through 
Puerto Rico.  Puerto Rico had established itself as a model of economic and social development 
for the region, and its Caribbean neighbors tried to emulate its economic success while importing 
its development symbols.  But outside Puerto Rico, aided self-help houses were only an image of 
modernization.  Few of the islands in the 1950s had gone through a program of land 
redistribution, possessed the level of industrialization as Puerto Rico, or had their own cement 
factories.  The aided self-help houses were a kind of decorative development, replicating the 
image without the cause.  As miniaturized modern suburban dwellings, with drying cement 
walls, corrugated roofs, and small private yards, these houses, scattered across the Caribbean, 
created an aesthetic of development, and when US technicians would later institute aided self-
help in Central and South America, the white concrete house, born in the Caribbean, would 
become synonymous with the program. 
  
The Changing Role of Housing in Technical Assistance 
                                                




When President Eisenhower established the Foreign Operations Administration (FOA), 
one of the few things that did not change in the reshuffling was the small and overlooked role of 
housing in technical aid.  Shelter improvement was lodged in the FOA’s Health, Welfare, and 
Housing division with George L. Reed as the FOA’s Housing Director.  Reed had grown up in 
Puerto Rico and had helped organize the island’s US Housing Authority office in 1938 and 
headed it until 1942, when he served as a lieutenant colonel during the war.  Reed dedicated his 
postwar life to international housing, serving as a housing advisor in London (1946), Greece 
(1947-1950), Burma (1951-1953), and Indochina (1953) before heading the FOA housing 
office.92 
Reed and one secretary comprised the totality of the FOA’s Washington housing staff, 
with about forty technicians in the field.  Reed continued previous TCA programs, focusing on 
aided self-help, the development of indigenous building materials, and training local personnel, 
but there was no general policy directive approved by top officials.  Like Crane, Reed sought a 
larger role for housing, claiming that it could play an instrumental in developing “stronger or 
more stable governments,” because it is “something visible and physical.”  Looking back at his 
time building housing in post-Civil War Greece, Reed believed that “the new roof tiling and 
repaired buildings in the Greek towns and villages were more convincing of the honest intent and 
ability of a shaky Greek Government than was the police force . . . the days of the free-ranging 
Communist guerillas were numbered.”93 
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In March 1954, housing’s profile within the FOA began to change, with the Tenth Inter-
American Conference in Caracas.  At the request of the other American republics, a large section 
of the conference was devoted to low-cost housing.  Crane attended as part of the United States 
delegation; it was his last activity for the HHFA as he had decided to leave government to work 
in the private sector.  Before leaving for Caracas, the office threw him a party and presented him 
with a luggage set as a parting gift.  He would need it, since he had accepted a job as a consultant 
at the firm of Constantinos Doxiadis, where he would work as a private international housing 
advisor worldwide.94  
The Caracas conference proceeded in the same manner as many previous housing 
discussions between the United States and the other American republics.  The republics wanted 
an Inter-American bank to help finance housing; the US said no.  The republics also called for an 
Inter-American housing institute, additional centers like CINVA, and a conference dedicated to 
housing; the US said no, no, and no.  US officials stressed that funds should be used for general 
economic development, through which housing conditions would naturally improve, but Crane 
knew they needed to counter with at least one positive proposal, and so the US delegation 
promised increased technical assistance in housing, with a focus on aided self-help.95 
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 The conference inspired FOA Housing Director Reed and HHFA employees Douglas 
Stone and Roy J. Burroughs to come up with an “‘earth-shaking’ plan to keep Latin America 
from going either Communist or Fascist.”  Their plan envisioned using aided self-help to build 
homes for about half of Latin America’s roughly forty million families, or building twenty 
million dwelling units in ten years.96 The plan was far fetched, but housing aid was beginning to 
move beyond its limited quarters.   
In November 1954, FOA Director Harold E. Stassen ordered a meeting to reevaluate the 
role of housing in the FOA, noting that it was “one of the major unsolved problems in the free 
world.”97 Reed, armed with discussion points developed by the HHFA International Housing 
Office, convinced the gathered FOA officials that, “the house is as important economically as the 
barn; the industrial worker’s home is as important as the factory or mine.”98 A fourteen-point 
policy was approved that addressed the complex set of problems that contributed to inadequate 
housing worldwide.  Housing technicians abroad were to develop a country’s financial 
institutions and construction materials through private enterprise and government responses.  
Aided self-help was central to the proposal as it represented “the most promising modern 
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approach to housing problems in under-developed areas.”99 Aided self-help demonstration 
projects would also be added to current programs in the Near East, Asia, Africa, and the Far 
East.100 These programs would all benefit from the projects established in the Caribbean, 
described by an FOA official as “the proving ground for US technical assistance in aided self-
help housing,” that “had an important effect on our programs.”101 
  This multi-pronged approach with an emphasis on aided self-help received its first test in 
Guatemala City in 1956, in part with the help of Rivera Cintrón.  The lessons of the Caribbean 
would be bound together and shipped off to Guatemala, where thousands of little white concrete 
block houses would appear as a sign of US support in the country’s development.  The 
Caribbean technicians were now among the world’s foremost experts in aided self-help, and they 
spread the system to other areas: Hanson developed aided self-help in Africa through the UN, 
Jordan moved on to Ecuador, Coulam continued building projects in the Caribbean, and their 
reports, designs, and ideas were published and used by other new Point Four technicians.102
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In November 1954, Trinidad Bolaños de Gómez, a poor woman living in Guatemala City, 
went to the National Palace to ask her new President, Carlos Castillo Armas, for help in finding 
housing.  Bolaños was living in La Palmita, one of the capital’s many campamentos—or slum 
areas—which was crowded into a ravine to the east of the city.  She spoke to an official, who 
typewrote her plea into the president’s official registry of correspondence: Bolaños could not 
find a place to house her large family.  She had heard that the communists, who had fled the 
country following the recent coup, had left behind homes in a government housing project, and 
she wanted to know if the president would let her family move into one.  The national archive in 
Guatemala City is full of such housing requests, pleas from La Palmita, El Gallito, and other 
poor communities on the outskirts of the city, requesting better homes or land on which to build.  
There are notes from men like Manuel Cutz Gutiérrez, a thirty-three year old baker, asking for a 
cheap home, or women like Natividad Alvarado Pérez, a twenty-five year old mother of two, 
who despite working hard was not even able to build “una pequeña cobacha [sic] para vivir,” 
(“a small hovel in which to live”).1 Bolaños had a common Guatemalan problem; the country 
was suffering a severe housing shortage. 
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In Bolaños’s Guatemala City, the population was pressing strongly against the boundaries 
of the original city plan.  Like all Spanish colonial cities, Guatemala City was designed on a rigid 
grid with its important government and religious buildings organized around a large central plaza 
(Figure 3.1).  The Parque Central, as it was called, was home to the National Palace on its north 
end and the National Cathedral on the east side.  To get to the Parque Central to register her 
housing plea, Bolaños would have traveled from the mostly unpaved roads of her neighborhood 
on the city’s outskirts towards the original streets that the Spaniard Luís Díez de Navarro had 
plotted in 1776.  A century before the arrival of the first US experts, the Spanish crown had sent 
Navarro to plan the fourth Guatemalan capital, after the previous two had been destroyed by 
volcanoes and earthquakes.2 The city was established on a plateau within a rippling valley 
surrounded by mountains and volcanoes.  Even in 1954, the capital was still mostly a one-story 
city, where an abundance of land had allowed the city to spread horizontally, while earthquakes 
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and poverty had stunted its vertical growth.  Bolaños’s destination, the National Palace, was one 
of the few tall buildings in the capital, a group that included the Cathedral and a small number of 
reinforced concrete buildings.  As the housing pleas in the archive attest, mid-century found 
Guatemala City’s tidy colonial grid fraying at the ends and tattering in central pockets as squatter 
homes perforated and surrounded the city.  In 1939, Angel H. Balcárcel, a Guatemalan sanitation 
engineer described these settlements as “a cancer that kept extending itself through the whole 
city.”3 The cancer was fed by Guatemala City’s population boom, which grew four times in size 
between 1924 and 1944, mostly fueled by migrants moving from the countryside to the capital.  
In the same period, the percent of city residents that lived in campamentos increased from forty-
three to seventy-five percent.4  
Bolaños registered her housing request in the wake of the June 1954 coup that had 
brought President Castillo to power and sent Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán into exile—a coup that the 
CIA had secretly instigated.  The revolt ended Guatemala’s “ten years of spring” (1944-1954), a 
period of revolutionary reform that had tried to undo the country’s long history of political 
oppression and economic underdevelopment.  The policies of Juan José Arévalo (1944-1951), 
the country’s first democratically-elected president, and Árbenz (1951-1954) aimed to shift 
Guatemala from a semi-feudal economy into a liberal capitalist democracy through nationalist 
programs that sought to industrialize production and modernize the economy, improve the lot of 
                                                
3 Angel H. Balcárcel, "La Vivienda De Las Clases Pobres De Guatemala," Boletín Sanitario de 
Guatemala X, no. 47 (1939): 304. 
 
4 Reginaldo Alfonso España Guerrero, "La Construcción Privada En La Ciudad De Guatemala. 
Historia, Desarrollo Y Análisis Estadístico" (Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala, 1975), 
13, 17; Amanda Morán Mérida, "Movimientos De Pobladores En La Ciudad De Guatemala 




the average Guatemalan, and weaken the grip of US corporations, most significantly the United 
Fruit Company, which owned almost all of the country’s railroad tracks and controlled its 
agriculture and major Atlantic port (Figure 3.2).   
Árbenz’s government instituted a comprehensive development plan and implemented a 
large public works program, building roads and a new port in the bay of Santo Tomás.  The 
hallmark of Árbenz’s presidency was his 1952 Agrarian Reform Law, which sought a more 
equitable distribution of land and led to the expropriation of more than half of United Fruit’s 
banana estate.  In the intervening years, the Eisenhower administration began to view the 
revolutionary government’s drive to implement middle-class reform as constituting a radical, 
leftist movement.  The US government misinterpreted Árbenz’s nationalist reforms and close ties 
to his country’s labor unions and communist officials as evidence that, “Guatemala is in effect a 
Soviet within Central America, although they deny it,” a charge that most scholars now agree 
was unfounded.  Scholars have interpreted the Eisenhower administration’s overthrow of the 
Árbenz government as a result of these communist fears and grievances from United Fruit.  The 
secret mission to take down Árbenz was viewed as a “liberation,” but this liberation, as historian 
Stephen M. Streeter has noted, “derailed one of Guatemala’s most profound periods of 
economic, political, and social change.”5 The new President Castillo was an authoritarian, anti-
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communist, and pro-American ruler.  It would now be up to the United States to help him chart 
Guatemala’s new path towards “capitalist” development. 
Bolaños’ request for housing was denied; a bureaucrat informed her that there were no 
housing vacancies in public projects.  It was the same response given to almost all the archived 
letters requesting housing.6 The housing problem in Guatemala was vast, the population was 
poor, and the new government was fragile.  The situation increasingly began to concern US 
officials responsible for Guatemala’s stability.   
The US government tried to reduce Guatemala’s severe housing crisis as a means to 
develop a politically moderate and stable country.  In the 1950s, Guatemala was the site of the 
largest US housing program in Latin America.  Although technicians began by implementing 
aided self-help housing programs similar to those developed in the Caribbean, in 1960, the 
program shifted from construction aid towards financial and legislative assistance.  Guatemala 
was, in effect, a laboratory for both types of aid in Latin America.  This chapter analyzes how the 
overall program replicated domestic US housing policies in Guatemala in order to mold the 
country’s urban environment to look like a democratic, capitalist society—in other words, to 
resemble post-war American cities.  Like the Spaniards who had imposed their colonial grid on 
the country in the late eighteenth century, the Americans arrived with their ideal city plan, the 
single-family subdivision, about two centuries later.   
 
The United States Overseas Mission in Guatemala City 
                                                
6 No. del Reg. 5732, 22, Nov. 1954, Ministerio de Comunicaciones y Obras Publicas, 1957, 




In November 1954, Edward J. Martin, a State Department official from Washington, DC, 
went to the Guatemalan National Palace to talk to the new President Castillo about a 
development assistance program between the Guatemalan and US governments.  Martin was the 
new director of the United States Overseas Mission (USOM) in Guatemala, and he was one of 
the many US representatives who had been making their way through Castillo’s office in the 
National Palace.  Attached to the embassy, missions represented the State Department’s foreign 
aid agency in the field, and its personnel were responsible for developing an aid program on the 
ground.  Martin and other USOM officials were given the task of setting up a program for 
technical assistance and economic development that would promote a stable, communist-free 
Guatemala.  Guatemala represented a country that had just “overthrown” its communist rule, and 
the US government was eager to invest significant sums and technical expertise to assure the 
triumph of democracy and the capitalist system.  To stimulate Guatemala’s economic activity, 
which had stalled with the coup and relied heavily on coffee exportation, an initial “crash” 
program was created that included large infrastructure projects.  Assistance in agriculture, health, 
natural resource development, highway construction, and public administration would help 
reduce unemployment, provide visual evidence of the new government’s achievements, and 
contribute to long-term economic development.7 
Housing was not a part of the US’s initial program for economic development in 
Guatemala, but President Castillo’s administration felt an urgency to accomplish results in the 
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housing sector as it affected the poor and middle class, the groups that had provided the 
backbone of support for the “ten years of spring,” and because Arévalo and Árbenz had 
introduced major, though ultimately inadequate, housing reforms.  Castillo requested US housing 
assistance and even announced to the Guatemalan public that his development program would 
include the building of 15,000 low-cost units.8  
Although the State Department initially ignored Castillo’s request for housing assistance, 
the deteriorating political and economic situation in Guatemala forced US officials to reevaluate 
their aid program.  At the end of 1954, unemployment was four times greater than it had been 
during the last month of Árbenz’s presidency.  In January 1955, military cadets attempted an 
unsuccessful revolt against the new government.9 Vice President Richard Nixon, on a visit to 
Guatemala a month later, telegrammed Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that he felt, 
“vigorous US support essential to preserve in power the first government in history resulting 
from overthrow of a Communist regime…I appreciate efforts of various government agencies 
heretofore but I am convinced they have been inadequate and that danger to Castillo Armas’ 
government is increasing.”10 It is impossible to quantify chaos, but in Guatemala, one can 
measure its slide into anarchy in proportion to the amount of US aid it received.  As Guatemala’s 
“liberation” became more tumultuous, the US reacted by increasing the size and scope of its 
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development aid (and reach of its covert operations).  Because turmoil and US aid were directly 
proportional—as one increased, so did the other—US grant amounts can provide an indicator for 
Guatemala’s increasing political and economic disarray: in the first year, the ICA gave 
Guatemala $3.3 million; by 1960—an assassination and military junta later—Guatemala had 
received $63.7 million from the United States.11 
In June 1955, a year after the CIA-led coup, the Office of Latin American Operations in 
the ICA developed the outlines a program for an expanded aid; it proposed $10 million for 
highway construction, $2.5 million for a rural development program, $140,000 to finish the 
Roosevelt Hospital—a project US technicians began in 1944 and left unfinished when aid was 
withdrawn during the Árbenz administration—and $2.5 million for housing.  The Guatemalan 
government was to match these grants with local, counterpart funds  and to publicize the 
program, informing the population that the projects were “evidence of the friendship of the 
people of the United States for them.”12 It was assumed that the aid program would probably last 
a year or two, until the Castillo government was solidly on its feet. 
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Guatemala presents an exceptional case study because extraordinary measures were taken 
to assure its post-coup stability.  The object of the Eisenhower administration’s policy for Latin 
America was to create a stable, secure, and especially non-communist hemisphere, which in 
many occasions meant the support of oppressive anti-communist dictators, such as Marcos Pérez 
Jimenez of Venezuela, Fulgencio Batista of Cuba, and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican 
Republic, but did not entail the granting of development aid.  Until the end of the 1950s, the 
Eisenhower administration did not establish a significant program for economic aid in Latin 
America, believing, as it did with its domestic policy, that private enterprise and free trade could 
meet the region’s development needs and foster peace and prosperity.13 Between 1953 and 1958, 
the US provided $12.6 billion in loans and grants worldwide, but less than 7% went to Latin 
America and more than half went to Asia, especially to strategically-important India and South 
Korea.14 Only Guatemala, Bolivia, a country that seemed to pose a similar communist threat, and 
hurricane-torn Haiti received substantial grants-in-aid during the Eisenhower years.  In the 
1950s, the political situation in Guatemala motivated the United States to provide an outsized aid 
program in comparison to the rest of the region, and an outsized housing program in relation to 
the rest of the world.  It is for this reason that when the State Department significantly expanded 
its Latin American aid program in the 1960s, Guatemala’s large housing program served as a 
model. 
 
                                                
13 Stephen G. Rabe, Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988). 
 
14 Jeffrey F. Taffet, Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America 




Domestic Architecture of Guatemala City 
Guatemala’s severe housing shortage was the result of factors that limited housing 
throughout the developing world.  Materials and skilled labor were in short supply, and land 
prices in urban areas were high.  There was essentially no real estate tax—it was low and rarely 
collected—leading to a loss of government revenue and the hoarding of land.  The government 
made most of its revenue on duties, licenses, and fees, a system that increased the cost of 
homebuilding since Guatemala imported most of its construction material.  Affordable credit 
facilities did not exist to finance housing.  To construct a residence, an individual had to pay in 
cash for the building site, labor, and materials.  A few institutions provided credit for the short 
term: for three years and with a fifty percent down payment.  As a result, only those in the 
highest income bracket were well-housed in Guatemala with the lowest-income citizens living in 
shacks and huts in ravines surrounding urban areas.15 
The Guatemalan government first attempted to address the shelter needs of the poor in 
the 1920s, under the presidency of General Lázaro Chacón (1926-1931), as a belated response to 
the December 1917 and January 1918 earthquakes that had leveled the capital.  To reduce the 
squatter neighborhoods that had consolidated to the east and southeast of the city, the 
government bought the areas of El Gallito, La Palmita, and La Recolección, which were located 
in ravines and were unsuitable for building, and subdivided the land into small eight by twelve 
meter lots, which were sold or given away to poor families.  Without building controls, roads or 
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utilities, families erected shacks with makeshift materials, and the areas quickly turned into the 
campamentos the government had been trying to eliminate.16 
The 1917-1918 earthquakes had damaged most of the city’s buildings, homes of the rich 
and poor as well as commercial and governmental structures.  The disaster had destroyed many 
of the city’s new structures that had been erected at the end of the nineteenth century when a new 
wealthy urban class made up of ladinos and recent immigrants profiting off the growing coffee 
economy built new homes in the center of the city as well as commercial structures centered on 
agro-exportation—banks, offices, and foreign company buildings.17 
The plans of pre- and post-earthquake Guatemala City were organized along the same 
colonial grid, but the latter city was quite different aesthetically: mostly one-story tall, built of 
bahareque, a local form of wattle and daub construction, with corrugated zinc sheets replacing 
traditional tile roofs.18 Guatemala’s first and only cement factory, Cementos Novella, had been 
established in 1898, and although the earthquake had proven the benefits of reinforced concrete 
construction, it remained rare due to its high price.19 In the 1920s, the Hotel Palace and Empresa 
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Eléctrica, both financed with US capital, were typical of the few multi-storied reinforced 
concrete buildings in the city.  Bahareque was used for the houses of the rich, the members of 
the middle-class who could afford to rebuild, and some of the few reconstructed public 
buildings.20 
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While the poor settled in informal, marginal areas adjacent to the city, the upper classes 
retained their position in the city center, rebuilding their traditional Spanish homes.  As in most 
of Latin America, urban residential architecture in Guatemala was modeled after the Spanish 
Andalusian house.  In a typical plan, a visitor entered through a central portal (Figure 3.3), 
walked through an entrance hall and into a central patio, which comprised a large rectangular 
inner courtyard with four galleries on each side (Figure 3.4).  Public reception rooms faced the 
street, while bedrooms and other living spaces were placed in the lateral galleries.  At the far end, 
one could find another, smaller service patio, which housed the kitchen, pantry, laundry, and 
servants quarters, and which also had a separate service entrance.  As land values increased in 
Guatemala City, its houses became progressively smaller.  Many of the houses rebuilt in the 
historic city center were erected on subdivided properties, resulting in a narrower entrance hall 
and a smaller central patio with only two galleries.  The plan of the urban house remained a 
constant in the urban center, though the changing styles and tastes of the elite often altered its 
decoration.21  
Guatemala lacked a school of architecture, so the capital was rebuilt by local engineers or 
foreign-trained architects.  The long and slow reconstruction period coincided with the 
immigration of European builders, engineers, carpenters, and architects in the 1920s and the 
return of Guatemalan architects who had studied and worked abroad—groups that were attracted 
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to Guatemala’s economy and brought European styles and technical expertise with them.22 These 
architects rebuilt Guatemala City in a diverse collection of neoclassical, romantic, art nouveau, 
and art deco styles, an eclecticism that would persist until mid-century.  An early experiment in 
modern idioms includes W. Bader’s art deco Teatro Lux (1936; Figure 3.5). 
The eclectic architectural styles of Guatemala are evident in the unprecedented, 
monumental building campaign of General Jorge Ubico Castañeda, whose “strong hand” ruled 
the country between 1931 and 1944.  The capital, still lacking public buildings, was a blank slate 
for Ubico’s ostentatious style.  As part of his economic development program, Ubico enlarged 
Guatemala City’s water and sewage services and paved roads, especially for the upper classes, 
and created government institutions, which required new administrative buildings.  Ubico was 
closely involved in the design of his state projects, including the National Palace (1943), 
designed by Rafael Pérez de Leon as a pastiche of baroque and colonial elements.  Some of 
Ubico’s buildings introduced modern styles to the city, such as Roberto Cordón and Pérez de 
Leon’s art deco Palacio de Sanidad (Palace of Sanitation; 1935-37; Figure 3.6) and the art deco 
Aduana Central (Central Customs; 1938). 
Under Ubico, the government built the first public housing project for workers, Colonia 
Jorge Ubico (later renamed Colonia 25 de Junio; colonia in this context means “housing 
development”).  Opening in 1936 and attributed to the engineer Gándara, Colonia Ubico 
represented the country’s first housing development (Figures 3.7 and 3.8).  In Guatemala, houses 
were built one by one.  The lower-class built their own homes, while the upper classes hired 
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architects and engineers to design their residences.  In the suburbs, where some of the elite were 
beginning to build vacation homes, developers acquired large plots of land, which they urbanized 
and divided into lots, and sold to prospective homeowners, who in turn independently built and 
arranged the financing for their homes.23 With its 128 concrete and brick row-houses centered 
around a public green space, Colonia Ubico was the government’s attempt to emulate housing 
developments abroad.  It was modern in its streamlined concrete style, use of two standardized 
house types, and planning on an urban scale.  The houses, which had plumbing, two to three 
bedrooms, separate living and dining areas, a kitchen, bathroom, and laundry room, were too 
expensive for the targeted working class, so middle-class families moved into the development 
instead.24   
Ubico’s construction projects consumed more than a third of Cementos Novella’s output 
and caused the price of domestic building materials to rise by ninety percent and of imported 
materials by 42.5 percent from 1937-1947, further stressing the housing industry.25 With little 
industrialization and no prefabrication, construction was artisanal, relying on cheap laborers and 
beasts of burden (Figure 3.9).  Hundreds of mestizo and indigenous workers in the pueblos of 
Chimaltenango produced clay bricks for construction.  To realize his massive construction 
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program, Ubico instituted a system of forced labor.  Ubico levied a tax of two quetzales a year to 
pay for a five-fold increase in the country’s network of roads, but those who could not afford the 
tax, mostly poor Mayan Indians, were required to work on the country’s roads for two weeks a 
year.  The majority of Ubico’s buildings in the capital were similarly built with forced labor, 
found through various strategies.  The police often rounded up individuals, fined them, and 
allowed them to “pay” through work instead.26 
The Revolution of October 1944, led by middle-class intellectuals, students, and junior 
army officers, overthrew Ubico’s dictatorship and brought Arévalo and then Árbenz to power.  
To stimulate development, their administrations increased spending and established new 
socially-oriented institutions, building infrastructure, national banks, schools, hospitals, and 
housing.  In their building programs, they used a rationalist architecture, which in Latin America 
had already become shorthand for “progress,” to express their administrations’ social orientation 
and modernization desires.  A cadre of Guatemalan architects working abroad, inspired to return 
to their country after the revolution, built new, national International Style structures: the 
Olympic Stadium, the campus of the University of San Carlos, the National Library, General 
Archive, music conservatory, and Federation-type schools.  One of the first buildings to set the 
new Modern direction was the design of Guatemala City’s Palacio Municipal  (Municipal 
Palace, begun 1952) by architects Roberto Aycinena Echeverría, who returned from Mexico, and 
Pelayo Llarena Murua, who had studied at the University of Illinois.  In combining International 
Style architecture with murals by Carlos Mérida, who also returned from Mexico, the building 
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aimed towards an “integration of the arts,” a unity of sculpture and architecture that European 
architects espoused and that had influenced Modern Mexican architecture.  This building was 
later followed by the planning of a Modernist civic center, which included the IGSS (social 
security) building, designed by Aycinena and Jorge Montes Córdoba and the Banco de 
Guatemala by Montes, Raúl Minondo Herrera, and Carlos Haeussler Uribio.27 
The roots of Guatemala’s functionalist architecture can also be traced to the Roosevelt 
Hospital complex (begun 1944; Figure 3.10), a joint project between the Guatemalan 
government and the US government’s Institute of Inter-American Affairs (IIAA).  Designed by 
US architect Edmund J. Whiting and located on empty land to the south of the city, the hospital 
introduced the idea of the modern superblock surrounded by green space.28 The hospital, along 
with other IIAA health centers and dispensaries scattered throughout the country (Figure 3.11), 
were among the earliest examples of strict rationalist architecture in the capital and interiors of 
Guatemala.  A US firm was in charge of construction and worked with the Guatemalan architect 
Joaquín Olivares Martínez, who had an architecture degree from the École Spéciale des Travaux 
Publics in France.  Following his work on the hospital, Olivares designed, with Willard Durán, 
an early example of modern architecture in the historic center of the city, the Edificio Engel 
(1948).  In the 1950s, Olivares helped another team of US technicians establish the self-help 
housing program in Guatemala.   
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The Roosevelt Hospital also introduced new building materials to the country, spurring 
Cementos Novella to produce concrete blocks to standard US dimensions for the structure’s 
walls.  The revolutionary governments further promoted the production of materials by 
establishing the Instituto de Fomento de la Producción (INFOP; Institute for the Promotion of 
Production) to support factories that made new types of materials, especially those of concrete—
building blocks, cement-asbestos roofing, and prefabricated units.  The government also began 
importing Mexican cement to meet the country’s growing need.29 The rise in materials 
production led to an increase in housing construction in the private sector, and, beginning in 
1948, for the building of structures higher than four stories.  Nevertheless, most houses were still 
made of adobe or bahareque.  In 1949, less that 10% of homes were made of cement.30 
Article 67 of Guatemala’s 1945 constitution officially gave the government the authority 
to build workers’ housing, but lacking a national housing policy or single housing agency, public 
housing efforts continued in a sporadic manner.  When Arévalo established the Departamento de 
Vivienda Popular (Department of Popular Housing) within INFOP to build workers’ housing, he 
added one more agency to those already involved in public housing, which included the Crédito 
Hipotecario Nacional (CHN; National Mortgage Bank), the Ministry of Communications and 
Public Works, and the municipality of Guatemala City.  In total, these agencies built about 1,750 
dwelling units during the revolutionary period.31  
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In tackling the housing needs of the lowest-income population, the government needed to 
find the balance between cost and quality.  A cheaply built project devolved quickly into a slum, 
while a well-built home could be too expensive for its intended residents.  During the 
revolutionary period, the Arévalo and Árbenz governments built at least seven projects that 
experimented with this balance.32 In fact, the need to find effective, low-cost housing solutions 
for workers, led the government’s housing projects to be among the most experimental 
architectural sites in Guatemala.   
In 1945, the Arévalo government built 264 rowhouses in Colonia 20 de Octubre in 
Guatemala City, the first project to be built since Colonia Ubico.  The project minimized costs 
with a two-room design that matched traditional adobe walls with new, industrially produced 
corrugated cement asbestos roofing, which Cementos Novella had just begun manufacturing 
using a US design.  To reduce urbanization costs, the homes sat on dirt roads and had minimal 
water and sewage facilities.  Although a later government investigation deemed the project to be 
of “baja calidad,” (“poor quality”), it was built within the budget of low-income workers.33   
The financing and design of projects were not necessarily planned beforehand, and 
housing organizations often experimented with construction and materials in the middle of 
erecting a project, increasing their costs.34 Colonia Labor, built in 1948, was made up of 190 
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units designed as two-room duplexes with bathrooms and built with cement-block walls and 
cement-asbestos roofs.  It was originally designed as a neighborhood, with playgrounds, markets 
and a bus station, none of which were realized when funds ran out and construction was 
suspended in 1951 with only 180 units built.  A similar project was erected in the city of 
Quetzaltenango, Colonia El Rosario, one of the few public projects outside the capital.35 
Colonia Bethania, 620 houses of adobe with laminated zinc roofing, was intended to 
house families that had lost their homes in 1949 when heavy rains collapsed campamentos in La 
Palmita.  Poor planning led to its opening in 1952 in an unfinished state, without its planned 
paved roads, water, or parks.36 
Colonia Las Victorias, an Árbenz Project begun in 1952, was the first housing project in 
Guatemala to use prefabrication and serial production, replacing artisanal construction methods, 
which had been the norm.  Engineers designed its ninety-four units using factory-produced 
concrete slabs and walls.  Part of the project was built by private companies—which led to the 
introduction of similar techniques in the private market.  Unfortunately, its final costs were too 
high, even for white collar workers.37 
Colonia Centro América, designed for postal and telecommunications workers, used 
three types of prefabricated roofs.  It also introduced superblocks in the layout of its original 559 
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units (only 200 were completed), but built on expensive land with reinforced concrete, the final 
costs of the homes were too high for the postal workers, so they were given to employees with 
higher salaries.38 
 
Creation of a US-Guatemalan Housing Program  
In July and August 1955, George Reed, now the chief of the ICA Housing Division, and 
Juan Cesar Cordero Davila, the executive director of the Puerto Rico Housing Authority, spent 
three weeks in Guatemala, developing a preliminary housing program.  The international housing 
officials of the ICA and HHFA had decided that the program would introduce aided self-help to 
Guatemala.  There had not been much, or any, discussion of alternative schemes.  By then, self-
help had already become an ingrained part of US policy and was being used in various forms in 
programs in Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan, Taiwan, Indochina, Indonesia, the Caribbean, 
Brazil, and Chile.39 Reed invited Cordero to Guatemala to help sell the construction system to 
USOM and Guatemalan officials.  Cordero was an impressive figure, having risen to the rank of 
major general during World War II and the Korean War.  After retiring from the army, he served 
as the Housing Coordinator for Puerto Rican Governor Muñoz Marín.  In Guatemala City, Reed 
and Cordero met with embassy and mission officials, visited the National Palace, where they 
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talked to President Castillo and various ministers, held conferences with heads of mortgage 
banks, and took numerous field trips.  In Reed’s words, “Cesar did his stuff”; his ability to speak 
Spanish and his experience in Puerto Rico convinced the Guatemalans of the benefits of self-help 
housing.40 
Reed and Cordero outlined a housing program that would keep USOM involvement to a 
minimum.  Their intent was to appease Washington, where State Department officials, wary of 
housing aid, would have to approve the program.  The language of their official communications 
and project proposals stressed short-term aid, describing a program that focused on “aided self-
help housing, on simple sound administration, and on training Guatemalans as rapidly as 
possible to eliminate necessity for US technicians.”  They recommended recruiting three housing 
specialists, one generalist, and two self-help specialists, for two years, after which USOM 
involvement would be reduced to one technician.41 
The US government had consistently rejected any financing of low-cost housing abroad, 
despite heavy pressure from various international organizations, including the Economic and 
Social Councils of both the UN and the Organization of American States, believing other capital-
intensive projects contributed much more to the development of a country.  In the Caribbean, the 
US government had only paid technician’s salaries and for basic demonstration supplies; local 
governments bore the cost of the housing projects.  Officials in Washington feared that financing 
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Guatemala’s housing program would raise “serious policy issues” and cause “embarrassment in 
future considerations of housing in international organizations.”42 The Secretary of State had 
allowed for exceptions to the established policy when he considered it politically justified.  
Several million dollars had been used in US housing programs in Greece, Israel, and Korea.  In 
October 1955, the Department of State decided that “political considerations” in Guatemala 
would “override economic criteria,” and that foreign aid funds could be used to build 
Guatemalan housing projects.43   
  
The Program Begins 
In October 1955, Temple Dick, working for his own architectural firm of Masten, Hurd 
and Dick in San Francisco, received a letter from Stanley Baruch, who was in charge of Latin 
America and Europe within the ICA’s Housing Division.  An HHFA employee had 
recommended Dick for the position of housing generalist in Guatemala.  As always, it had been a 
challenge for Baruch to find adequate personnel, and the ICA had unsuccessfully reached out to 
contacts in Puerto Rico and elsewhere.  Baruch’s letter described a “very interesting and 
demanding position,” open for two years in Guatemala, which involved working with “the very 
highest levels of the Guatemalan Government,” and implementing a housing program required 
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for “humanitarian, economic and political reasons.”44 If interested, the recruitment process would 
have to begin right away in order for Dick to get his security clearance.   
As an architect who had worked for government housing authorities, Dick fit the profile 
of the typical US international houser.  He was born in 1904 in Evansville, Indiana, and had 
studied engineering at the Evansville College and then architecture at the University of Illinois in 
Champaign.  In the late 1930s, he worked for the US Housing Authority in Washington, DC and 
then transferred to the San Francisco Public Housing Administration in 1942, where he served in 
various capacities until 1948.45 Baruch, who would eventually take over as chief of the ICA 
Housing Division in May 1956, also came from a similar background, having worked for 
housing authorities in Washington, D.C. and Connecticut, before arriving at the ICA.  
Dick accepted Baruch’s offer, packed up his things, and, with his wife Margo, started his 
journey towards Guatemala City.  His first stop was Washington, DC where he stayed for a 
three-week training program, after which he spent another orientation week in Puerto Rico, 
finally landing in Guatemala in February 1956, ready, in his words, to take Guatemala and “win 
her and hold her to the cause of the free world.”46   
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Dick arrived in Guatemala City shortly after Walter Harris, who had been hired as the 
aided self-help specialist for the program and had come to Guatemala with his wife and two sons 
after completing similar training.  It had proved impossible to find a second aided self-help 
specialist, so the search was temporarily called off.  Baruch had found Harris, thirty-two years 
old, perfect for the job—“young, energetic, an architect, city planner and professor.”47 He had 
studied at Yale’s Department of Architecture and City Planning and was currently a member of 
its faculty.  Harris was interested in modern construction methods, having worked part-time as a 
research designer in small, wooden prefabricated homes and as a consultant to a manufacturer of 
modular metal wall panels while in school.  He had also helped design the low-cost model 
“Wonder House” for General Electric.48 Harris had arrived in Guatemala City, wanting to start “a 
tangible and real housing program…to retain the faith of the people in themselves and the US”49  
Dick, the Housing Generalist, was responsible for overall programming, while Harris 
took charge of all aspects of design.  The process of starting a housing program in Guatemala 
was slow, and ground would not be broken on the first project until a year and a half after their 
arrival, hindered by the fact that the Guatemalan government was disorganized, lacked a 
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coordinated housing program, and Harris and Dick did not get along.  Later USOM officials 
would note that Dick was “a fine person and undoubtedly a good technician,” but that he was not 
“a good selection for the position,” due to his lack of experience.50 Unlike Harris, he did not have 
a clear vision or deep understanding of housing issues in the developing world.  When Harris and 
Dick first arrived, they were visited by Gilbert E. Olson, an FOA consultant and representative of 
the concrete construction industry, who was intent on selling the USOM on the idea of a low-
cost concrete parabolic house for its housing program.  The FOA often sent US industry 
representatives to consult on programs within their field.  Dick was easily persuaded by Olson’s 
vision of self-help parabolic homes, but Washington nixed the “radical design.”  Robert E. 
McCabe, a Housing Division official, explained in a letter to Dick, “Since this program is going 
to be a joint effort of the Guatemalans and the US Government, the US is certainly going to be 
clearly identified with its success or failure,” and that he still “suffer[ed] some mental anguish 
from derisive remarks about ‘Flushing Heights,’” a failed US housing development in the 
Philippines that had consisted of a core of four back-to-back toilets around which residents were 
to build a home, a project the residents had little interest in finishing.51 
                                                
50 Letter from Keith Himebaugh to Stanley Baruch, 7 May 1958, folder “Housing,” box 50, RG 
469, Mission to Guatemala, Office of the Director, Subject Files (Central Files), 1952-61, 
NARA. 
 
51 Gilbert E. Olson, “Report of Gilbert E. Olson, Advisor to US Operations Mission to 
Guatemala,” Mar. 1956, folder 2.7 “ICA Reports,” box 4, RG 469, Mission to Guatemala, 
Housing Division, Subject Files, 1956-61; letter from Robert E. McCabe to Temple Dick, 29 
May 1956, “Guatemala—Housing—HWH, 1954-56,” Box 37, RG 469, Deputy Director for 
Operations Office of Latin American Operation, Geographic Files (Central Files), 1952-58, 
NARA; Charles Abrams, Man's Struggle for Shelter in an Urbanizing World (Cambridge, MA: 




The Guatemalan program was ultimately conservative in its approach, deriving its shape 
from other international housing projects in the hemisphere.  The greatest source of information 
on aided self-help was out in the field, and the ICA and HHFA facilitated the exchange of 
knowledge between its housers through letters, the publication of booklets, and field trips.  Dick 
and Harris visited housing programs in neighboring Costa Rica and Nicaragua shortly after 
arriving in Guatemala.  Costa Rica had been an early recipient of Point Four housing aid when 
Leonard J. Currie of Walter Gropius’s Architects Collaborative was sent there in 1951 to conduct 
a housing study, after which he served as the director of CINVA in Bogotá from 1951 to 1956.  
Edmond H. Hoben, who had worked for housing authorities in Detroit and Minneapolis, was the 
current housing technician in Costa Rica, organizing the country’s new national housing agency, 
the National Institute of Housing and Urbanization (INVU, in its Spanish initials) and initiating a 
pilot aided self-help project in San José.52 
In Nicaragua, Harris and Dick met with Paul Foster, who had worked as a planner for the 
Baltimore Redevelopment Commission and was in charge of one of the few ICA city planning 
programs in Latin America.  Foster stayed in Nicaragua for seven years, establishing a new city 
planning office in Managua.  In his first project as city planner, Foster redesigned the 
neighborhood of Bolonia with garden city concepts, introducing an alternative to Managua’s 
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Spanish colonial grid.  In 1958, Foster also initiated Colonia Managua, Nicaragua’s first aided 
self-help housing project.53  
Harris and Dick wrote a final housing agreement, which was signed by the US and 
Guatemalan governments on June 28, 1956.  The document listed four interrelated objectives: to 
facilitate and encourage the development of low-cost aided self-help housing; to develop 
methods and techniques to “solve the housing problems of Guatemala”; to “strengthen the 
understanding between the people of Guatemala and the United States”; and “to foster the 
growth of democratic ways of living.”  The Guatemalan government was to provide $250,000, 
office space, local staff, as well as land, materials and services worth $500,000.  The ICA would 
provide technicians and $1.464 million.54 Rather than one large housing project, Dick and Harris 
planned to build three subprojects in different parts of Guatemala City, a total of about one 
thousand houses.  They decided to build the projects one-by-one in order, as Harris wrote, to 
“introduce the Guatemalans (and ourselves) to problems, methodology and educational hurdles 
of self help…before committing ourselves to the larger effort.”55  
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Creation of the ICIV 
To carry out the low-cost aided self-help program and ensure that Guatemalan officials 
properly spent the housing money, a joint housing agency was established under the Ministry of 
Communication and Public Works.  Known to US officials as Inter-American Houses and to 
their Guatemalan counterparts as the Instituto Cooperativo Interamericano de la Vivienda 
(ICIV), the new agency was to teach the Guatemalans about sound US administrative methods, a 
corrective to the country’s disorganized and poorly-funded housing programs (Figure 3.12).  
Mission officials hoped the ICIV would eventually serve as a national housing agency, like the 
HHFA in the US, responsible for all of Guatemala’s public housing needs.  The Minister of 
Communications and Public Works and the Director of the USOM jointly oversaw the agency, 
and each Guatemalan ICIV official had a US counterpart.  Although officials from both countries 
had to agree on the ICIV’s activities, it was not a joint servicio but a regular Guatemalan agency 
run by local officials with US technicians serving in an advisory capacity.  However, because the 
ICA was now directly funding construction, the technicians had more leverage.  The institute 
was headed by a director, with Temple Dick acting as his US counterpart.  Aguilar Batres, the 
man who devised Guatemala City’s street numbering system and division into zones, briefly held 
the position of director until he was replaced by Joaquín Olivares Martinez, who had worked on 
the Roosevelt Hospital.56 
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The ICIV was based on the Puerto Rico’s self-help housing agency and was divided into 
the same three divisions—Socio-Economic Research, Planning, and Construction.  The process 
of bringing a housing project to fruition also followed the system developed in the Caribbean: 
the participants were trained, site and housing plans were developed, foremen erected model 
houses on the site before the owner-builders began their work, and government financing was 
offered to the participants.  Oscar Putzeys Rojas, who had been in charge of urban colonias at 
Guatemala’s national mortgage bank, the Crédito Hipotecario Nacional, was selected to head the 
Socio-Economic Department, which surveyed existing housing and selected participants.  The 
ICA eventually recruited Pedro Rivera Cintrón, who had launched self-help projects in the 
Caribbean, to act as Putzeys’s US counterpart, beginning in early 1957.  Even before Rivera’s 
arrival, the division began researching spending habits, incomes, and needs of the lower-income 
group in order to develop selection criteria for the owner-builders.  They decided that laborers 
between eighteen and forty-five years old with four to seven family members and an income 
between 65 and 130 quetzales (one quetzal equaled one dollar) a month would be capable of 
meeting the program’s work requirements and mortgage payments.57  
The participant orientations carried the usual mix of practical financial and building 
information with self-help indoctrination.  Between the earliest self-help programs in the 
Caribbean and the start of the Guatemalan program, the HHFA had developed a variety of tools, 
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from handbooks to films, to train participants.  Rivera handed out literature and screened It Can 
Be Done, a film about the US’s international self-help projects, which had just won the Grand 
Prize at the 1957 Vienna Film Festival.  The film displayed a “series of scenes of hands at work 
building homes…men’s hands…children’s hands, women’s hands…Brown hands, yellow hands, 
white hands, and black,” while a narrator described how “millions of pairs of hands” were 
“lift[ing] themselves out of poverty and despair,” thus framing self-help as a “by your own 
bootstraps”—or rather, “by your own two hands”—fantasy, where one’s own hard labor 
constituted a ticket out of poverty.58  
Because he was singularly qualified, Harris headed the Planning Department instead of 
serving as an adviser, where he ran a small office of about five people that was responsible for 
architectural plans, selecting project sites, and determining construction materials and methods.  
The ICIV also hired Frank P. Robison (his last name is also spelled Robinson on some 
documents), a US architect who had studied at Berkeley and was living in Guatemala City.59  
Raúl E. Mendizabal Morris headed the Construction Department.  The ICA did not find a 
US counterpart for him until September 1957, after building on the first project had already 
begun, when John Francis De Luca, a twenty-nine year old general contractor from Washington, 
DC was hired as a construction advisor.60 
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To train these new ICIV officials in aided self-help, the ICA organized a series of 
exchange visits.  Osborn T. Boyd, who had launched an aided self-help program in Chile, came 
to Guatemala City, and the entire ICIV staff took a requisite trip to Puerto Rico.  Dick and his 
first Guatemalan counterpart, ICIV Director Aguilar Batres, visited projects in British Guiana, 
Surinam, and Chile, where they learned a surprising lesson—aided self-help actually resulted in 
almost no end savings if all the costs involved in its administration were passed on to the 
participant.  Self-help houses were not actually cheaper than paid construction, since it took a 
long time and necessitated large overhead costs whereas labor in the region was cheap and 
abundant.  Nevertheless, the mission directors in these countries still believed in self-help; as 
Dick relayed in a report to Washington, despite the lack of savings and the slow production of 
houses, the “end effect on the people is so salutory [sic] as to warrant it”—that is, the benefit of 
self-help was its ability to create self-reliant, democratic, and productive individuals.  He 
concluded, “In all three countries there was recognition of Self-Help as a social process, 
superceding in importance the physical amanities [sic] developed by means of it.”61 Indeed, as it 
became apparent over time that self-help effected little savings over contract construction, US 
international housers began to increasingly praise its ideological benefits.  Rather than change 
their policy and implement alternative housing schemes, they continued to build self-help houses 
but adjusted the rationale behind it.   
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To help the ICIV initiate its first project, the ICA sent George A. Speer to Guatemala 
from May to June 1957.  Speer was an employee of the HHFA’s Division of Housing Research, 
where he was responsible for the agency’s self-help activities.  Speer had graduated from Iowa 
State College and had worked as an architect and engineer in defense housing on the east coast.  
He became active in the field of international housing in 1949, when he was hired as a housing 
advisor for the Marshall Plan program in Greece.  Following the Greek Civil War, the US 
launched a major shelter program there to build or repair some 90,000 homes.  Speer helped 
design and implement a self-help “expansible house” for farmers, a nucleus of a home to be 
enlarged later.62  
Speer advised the ICIV on participant selection—wanting to target the working-class 
who had “‘cracked heads’ after political demonstration[s]”—and site location.  He also 
developed a tentative work schedule that listed all the activities required to complete a housing 
project and the time each would take.  This type of preparation and scheduling was new to 
Guatemala, their prior housing projects having been executed with little prior planning.  The 
technicians wanted to institute efficient US project management techniques and trained 
Guatemalans on how to outline schedules, order materials on time, and maintain costs.63 
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Although Harris was the head of the ICIV’s Planning Department, his skills were 
required in many ICA projects in Guatemala.  While designing earth-block and concrete-frame 
prototype houses for the ICIV, Harris also designed a self-help unit for a rural development 
program, tried to establish a city planning office in the capital, and worked on plans to develop 
the port of Santo Tomas with Paul Foster.64 With Harris spread so thinly, Speer designed the first 
project with the architect’s input.  Instead of Harris’s prototypes, Speer designed a house along 
the Puerto Rican system, using reinforced poured concrete.65  
 
The First Project: Colonia Centro América  
 In the 1950s, Guatemala City began to shift from its introverted grid plan, from a city 
turned towards its central plaza, to an outwardly expanding city, pushed beyond its borders by 
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local elites.  What had begun in the post-earthquake period as a slow trickle of upper-class 
migration from their traditional site next to the city center towards the suburbs, had become a 
strong flow in the 1950s and 1960s.  The upper classes were abandoning the center, moving at 
first to established suburbs, and then building new neighborhoods as demand increased.  The 
new houses they erected similarly shifted from the introverted Spanish house, the block home 
turned towards its interior courtyard, to houses oriented towards the outdoors—single, detached 
houses surrounded by land.  Already in the 1920s and 1930s, suburban patrons, building vacation 
homes more than permanent residences, had begun experimenting with a variety of US and 
European styles, the most popular in the period being California mission revival and the chalet 
style.  In suburban neighborhoods, such as Santa Clara, Guatemalans also built prefabricated 
wooden homes, imported mostly from the United States.  But in the mid-century, patrons began 
commissioning homes of modern materials, reinforced concrete and glass, and in styles that 
directly recalled contemporary North American suburban architecture.66   
 A photograph on the cover of a 1960 ICIV publication advertises the ICIV’s first aided 
self-help project, Colonia Centro América (Figure 3.13).  The initial group of about twenty 
families broke ground on the first self-help housing project on 1 July 1957 and additional groups 
began each two weeks thereafter.  With white concrete box-houses neatly woven over a green 
landscape, the development much more closely resembled the new elite suburbs than prior public 
housing projects.67 Of course, it was not an upper-class community, its owner-builders were part 
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of Guatemala City’s poor, working class, and the homes were located on government-owned 
land closer to the city center and next to an Árbenz housing project from which it took its name, 
Centro América.  The residents’ migration route through the city was quite different from that of 
the elite, summarized on the publication’s cover with the words, “from slums to modern homes,” 
and captured in a dramatic before and after series that juxtaposed a chaotic campamento with the 
organized and sanitary colonia.  With yards, gardens, and reinforced concrete homes, the colonia 
resembled the homes and neighborhoods that the upper classes were building for themselves in 
the suburbs; the similarity resulted from the fact that they both drew from the same US model of 
subdivisions and modern homes. 
Speer originally designed an orthogonal site plan for Colonia Centro América that kept to 
Guatemala City’s grid, but Harris modified the plan to, in effect, introduce the US neighborhood 
unit (Figure 3.14), a planning idea developed by Clarence Perry and popularized by Clarence 
Stein and Henry Wright in their 1928-1929 plan for Radburn, NJ.  Perry had developed the 
neighborhood unit as a town plan that fostered a sense of community by promoting face-to-face 
interactions.68 Harris probably believed this plan would enhance the community-building effects 
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of self-help construction.  As in Radburn, Harris made “use of superblock principles” and 
separated pedestrian and vehicular traffic with walkways between homes, cul-de-sacs and large 
arterial streets that ran around the project.  By substituting paved streets for walkways, Harris 
also reduced urbanization costs.  Few of the participants owned cars anyway.  Perry had 
advocated centering the neighborhood unit around a school; instead, Harris planned the colonia 
with a cheaper recreational green space in the middle.69 
 The ICA technicians wanted to make their colonia an exemplary subdivision, not only as 
a model for later public projects, but also to inspire the private sector to mimic North American 
builders and erect large-scale housing developments.  Although Colonia Centro América used 
some of the language of upper-class suburban neighborhoods, it also represented a continuation 
of the Guatemalan government’s prior housing efforts, as it was built as an entire neighborhood 
and used one standardized house design.  The first private-sector housing development in 
Guatemala, Residencial El Sauce, was built in 1956, the year before construction began in 
Colonia Centro América.  Built by the company Viviendas SA, it was the first to offer 
Guatemala City’s residents the opportunity to buy houses on the speculative market.  The project 
was small in scale, fifty units, and built on land leftover from a government lotification and 
urbanization program.  Viviendas SA built houses on the city’s pre-existing site plan, which was 
the norm for these early private developers.  Later developers followed the government’s public 
projects and purchased tracts of land on which they built neighborhoods on garden city 
principles.  The projects Jardines de Utatlan I, built in 1959 by Viviendas SA, was the first 
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private project to provide social and commercial spaces.70 Guatemala City’s housing history 
offers one of the few examples where private housing followed the lead of public housing. 
The self-help participants built simple concrete duplexes that resembled the minimal 
units of the Caribbean (Figure 3.15).  Speer and Harris designed a 51.3 square meter house using 
poured concrete walls and roofs, rather than the time-consuming concrete blocks.  Because 
poured concrete construction required more collaboration than block construction, the 
Guatemalan program used mutual aided self-help, that is, the male heads of household worked 
together to build each family’s home (Figures 3.16 and 3.17).  In order to use interchangeable 
form panels that were identical in size, the unit was designed on a modular basis, a common US 
construction technique that did not exist in Guatemala.  As in Puerto Rico, the panels were 
interlocking and self-aligning to help the unskilled labor, and each form could be used up to 
thirty times.  For earthquake resistance, the homes had steel webbing in the roof, footings, and 
walls.  With the men working nights and Saturdays, it took about 1,800 hours, or eighteen 
months of labor, to finish each dwelling unit.  The most time-consuming aspect was what Dick 
called the “veritable forest of braces”—the placing and stripping of forms—which took up half 
of the total time.71 
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The duplexes had butterfly skylights that let light into an interior bathroom, while the 
other rooms had their own windows (Figure 3.18).  The kitchen and baths were placed at the rear 
in order to concentrate plumbing pipes.  The kitchen had counters, shelves, and moved the 
traditional Guatemalan pila, an outdoor sink for scrubbing laundry, indoors.  The combination 
living and dining room reduced costs, but there was also something modern about this open 
layout.  The house had three bedrooms with flexible closet partitions in the children’s rooms to 
accommodate different family compositions.   
The houses were estimated to cost about $2150 each, with $1300 for the structure, $240 
for land, $220 for site improvement, $160 for a city water connection charge, and an 
administration overhead cost of $230.  Amortized over twenty years with a three percent interest 
that would fold back into a revolving fund to build more ICIV homes, the owner-builder paid 
roughly $12.05 a month, exclusive of utilities.  In comparison, units in the nearby Árbenz public 
housing project at Colonia Centro América, completed in 1955, cost $4200 with only twenty 
percent greater floor area.72 
Indoctrination for the self-help builders did not finish with the end of construction.  At 
the end of 1958, Rivera established a division of social work within his Socio-Economic 
Department to help the participant families settle into their new homes and to foster a communal 
spirit amongst them.  Rivera wanted the social workers to continue the process begun by self-
help, “transformar nuestro hombre común en un individuo, más autosuficiente y más 
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independiente moral, espiritual y económicamente,” (“to transform our common man into an 
individual, more self-sufficient and more independent morally, spiritually, and economically.”)  
Social workers provided “training” for the homeowners on how to properly use, decorate, and 
maintain their homes.  They also taught them to cook well-balanced meals, sew and knit, 
methods of proper childcare, and gardening.  They also helped members of various ICIV 
developments set up sports teams and community organizations.73 The 1960 ICIV booklet 
includes photographs of families in their finished houses, of a family gathered in the living room 
“enjoying their new home,” and of a child’s backyard birthday party (Figures 3.19 and 3.20).74 
On display are exemplary suburban virtues—the cohesive nuclear family and the tight-knit 
community—that US culture tied to the single-family home, but here we see them transported to 
Guatemala City via the ICIV.  In building US-style neighborhoods in Guatemala, US officials 
hoped to also transport the “American” way of life. 
 When construction began in Colonia Centro América, officials had already started 
planning a second 138-unit subproject, Colonia Las Victorias (later renamed Colonia 10 de 
Mayo), which used the same house design.  Because his mission ended in August 1957, Harris 
worked on preliminary site plans for Las Victorias in New Haven and sent them to Guatemala.  
Frank P. Robison, the US and Berkeley-trained architect in the Planning Department, took over 
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as its head.  In Las Victorias, Harris tried to find “the best balance of green area, usable lot area, 
and good topographic integration.”  He designed the neighborhood with curved streets that ran 
parallel to the contours of the land, as he had wanted to do in the first project (Figure 3.21).  Las 
Victorias was thus the first housing development in Guatemala built on garden city concepts.  
The land was on a slope, downhill from a campamento, and curving the streets also reduced earth 
movement and construction costs.  Harris continued to use the neighborhood unit concept, 
implementing three types of roads—large two-way streets surrounded the development, while 
smaller one-way streets, and pedestrian walk-ways ran between houses.  Harris originally placed 
a school in the center, but it was replaced with a central square, since education officials already 
had plans for another site.75 
 
Political Turmoil Expands the Housing Program  
In July 1957, just as the residents of Colonia Centro América were beginning to build 
their homes, President Castillo was assassinated by a palace guard.  Within the next seven 
months there were two interim presidents, a military junta, and violent demonstrations 
throughout the country.  Despite the chaos, Oscar M. Powell, who had become the director of the 
USOM in Guatemala in 1956, noted that the housing projects were still making “very good 
progress.”  The groups were building their homes, but their country was falling down around 
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them.  Powell believed that homeownership, as spread to the lower-income classes through the 
ICIV program, offered a means to tackle the instability of the country.  In February 1958, he 
asked the State Department for an increase in funds for housing, arguing that “owners of their 
own homes are less likely to incite or take part in these upheavals.”  He wanted a program 
though that also targeted the middle class, “including the intelligent younger group from among 
whom leaders with liberal leanings are likely to emerge.”  His new USOM plan to significantly 
expand homeownership would have a two-pronged approach: to use aided self-help for workers 
who earned less than $150 a month and to stimulate private building through long-term financing 
for those who earned more.  As in the United States, he envisioned a bifurcated housing system, 
state-built housing for the poor and government-supported private construction for the well-off.  
Powell felt that it was now more important than ever to deal with the housing issue on a broad 
scale to “aid a non-communist government in demonstrating its concern over and ability to deal 
with one of the most acute needs of urban Guatemala.”  If a government “without communist 
taint” would emerge, wrote Powell, then special assistance funds should be used for projects that 
promise the “widest and most popular impact” to “strongly support” an “active, aggressive anti-
communist regime.”76 
 General Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes, an anti-communist politician, was elected—with the 
help of secret US intervention—and began his six-year term on 2 March 1958, but his autocratic 
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rule would only last until 1963 when he was ousted in a coup.77 Two months after his election, 
the US congress approved a $10 million Special Assistance program for Guatemala. “Our 
commitment to Guatemala,” explained a confidential ICA report, “is more political and moral 
than financial.  As the leader of the Free World we simply cannot afford to have the only country 
ever freed from Communist domination again subjugated.” The funds provided aid for rural and 
agricultural development, sanitation, education, army training, and public works in addition to a 
$2.4 million allocation for aided self-help housing.  The programs were to focus on cities since 
they were “particularly susceptible to Communist propaganda which is often disseminated 
through the labor unions.”78  
Including Guatemalan government contributions, the housing program expanded from 
two to seven million dollars.  The larger program would allow self-help to spread to regions 
beyond the capital, and would “significantly broaden the base of home ownership, the backbone 
of a politically stable citizenry, in areas of unrest.”79 Washington, however, had dismissed 
Powell’s two-part plan, marking the funds for self-help housing only.  The government was not 
yet comfortable with increasing its role in international housing.   
 
Changes in Aided Self-Help 
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The families that began construction in Colonia Centro América in July 1957 did not 
move into their homes until November 1958.  To commemorate the event and publicize the 
cooperative program, an official dedication ceremony was held on the grounds of the colonia 
(Figure 3.22).  Flags from both countries were raised, speeches were read by President Ydígoras 
and US Ambassador Lester D. Mallory, and keys and deeds were handed out to the participant 
families.  The first lady, Maria Teresa Laparra, surprised each participant with a kerosene stove.  
US officials noted that the stoves were not “gifts” but a “dividend” for their hard work.80 The 
ceremony became a ritual, repeated for the press for all future ICIV housing projects.  The 
official speeches emphasized similar themes, linking aided self-help to the greater cause of the 
“free world,” as exemplified by Powell’s 1959 words,  
Two free nations, Guatemala and the United States, joined to found this project.  Thirty 
free men joined to build thirty homes under the sponsorship of the project.  There can be 
no doubt as to the validity of our system.  Unlike other systems which made the 
individual the tool of the State, we see before us what is possible when the State provides 
the tools to the individual.  This is as it should be.  This is the way in which free men 
grow strong and the way in which the free world grows stronger.81 
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It was lofty language and thus encapsulated not so much the outcome of the program as much as 
the ambition of its officials.   
Although the goal of the Guatemalan housing program remained constant over the next 
two decades—to promote democracy, capitalism, and stability—from the beginning, the manner 
in which that goal was reached was in flux.  Aided self-help was a worldwide US experiment and 
Guatemala, was a large Latin laboratory, testing the theory that owners who build their own 
homes have cheaper houses and stronger characters.  By the time of the ICIV’s first dedication 
ceremony, construction on the third project had already begun, and its participants were building 
their minimal homes in a novel manner: they were spending twenty hours a week prefabricating 
parts in a bodega at night, while their homes were built during the day—by paid labor.   
The houses of Colonia Centro América and Las Victorias had taken an extraordinarily 
long time to build, almost a year and a half, and it became clear to John De Luca, the young 
construction technician, that poured-concrete, self-help housing was not the most economical or 
efficient way to raise a house.  When it came time to plan the third project, about 580 houses in 
Colonia Los Cipresales, De Luca took the opportunity to devise an accelerated construction 
method that supplemented the participants’ work with paid labor.  He felt that because the 
participants, mostly low-income employees, were unlikely to do construction work after 
completion of their homes, hiring workers increased the number of skilled laborers through on-
the-job training.82 Many of the ICIV’s paid laborers came from the ICA road building program, 
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and De Luca trained them in repetitive construction techniques, where workers specialized in one 
task, construction experience the laborers then spread into the private sector.  De Luca estimated 
that every private construction project underway in Guatemala City had workmen who had 
trained in the ICIV program.  In 1961, three of the five foremen the ICIV had trained worked as 
superintendents in private industry.83  
To reduce further the construction period, Temple Dick replaced the poured-concrete 
system with prefabricated self-aligning concrete blocks, thereby eliminating the use of forms, the 
most time-consuming aspect of construction.  The blocks did not need mortar and had a hollow 
core, through which reinforced concrete columns were poured to make the house structurally 
sound.  To hide irregularities produced by the blocks, the homes were covered with a rough 
plaster finish.  The roof was made of prefabricated tile beams, over which was placed a 
reinforced concrete slab.84  
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Rather than importing interlocking blocks, Dick hoped the new design would promote a 
local industry—and it did—but it was a very Guatemalan form of industry in that it was owned 
by North Americans.  The ICIV project used blocks made in Guatemala City by Bloques Basco, 
a company recently established by two Americans, Milton J. Bass and William “Bill” F. Luce.  
Luce brought the machinery, capable of producing 5,000 blocks a day, from Los Angeles in 
order to serve the ICIV, Basco’s “prime customer.”  Businessmen, members of congress, and the 
press in the United States were enamored with Bill Luce, probably because he represented 
everything they wanted US development programs to be—spirited Yankee businessmen whose 
“can-do” spirit showed Latin America how it’s done.  Guatemala was to be Luce’s exemplar; it 
was there that he established Bloques Basco and Urbanizadora, S.A., a company that built 
private housing developments.  Luce wanted to take on the ICA and show that privately financed 
homes were “The best way to fight communism.”85  
De Luca also introduced the prefabrication of components to speed up ICIV construction.  
The participants worked for twenty hours a week in a large, open bodega where they produced 
building materials: interior partition panels, door thresholds, kitchen counters, reinforced hollow 
tile roof beams, concrete fence posts, and stepping stones in a “factory production line manner” 
                                                                                                                                                       
RG 469, Mission to Guatemala, Housing Division, Subject Files, 1956-61, NARA; W. Paul 
Strassmann, Housing and Building Technology in Developing Countries (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University, 1978), 55-57. 
 
85 Letter form Milton J. Bass to Joaquin Olivares, 18 Sept. 1958, folder 2.3 “General 
Correspondence (Outgoing),” box 3, RG 469, Mission to Guatemala, Housing Division, Subject 
Files, 1956-61, NARA, College Park; Paul R. Kennedy, “Low-Cost Housing in Guatemala 
Provides 3-Room Units for $640,” New York Times, 16 Jul. 1961, R1; Department of State 
Airgram from USAID/Guatemala to AID/Washington, 6 Aug. 1963, folder “Soc 4: Housing and 
Urban Development Luce Project,” box 47, RG 286, USAID/Guatemala, Program Files, Acc. 




(Figure 3.23).  Eventually, the ICIV leased the block-making machinery from Basco and made 
blocks in the bodega as well.86 Working in a bodega facilitated better supervision, allowed the 
participants to work during the rainy season, and lowered electricity bills, since the project site 
no longer needed to be flood-lit for night-time labor.  But more than that, De Luca felt the new 
construction system demonstrated to private builders the feasibility and practicability of modern 
repetitive construction methods and the benefits of using standard units.87 
The interlocking-block house required 1,450 hours of labor, while the poured concrete 
home required 1,800 hours.  With the introduction of paid labor, blocks, and prefabrication, 
houses in Los Cipresales were erected in six months.  Because the shorter construction time 
saved overhead administrative costs and wages in Guatemala were quite low, the new system did 
not originally cost much more than the old, and over time, as the paid workers became more 
skilled and faster, the houses became cheaper.88 
Frank P. Robison, the head of the Planning Department, designed Colonia Los 
Cipresales, sending Harris the final scheme for his input.  His duplex units maintained the same 
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concrete-box aesthetic as the previous plans, but its dimensions were squared off and coordinated 
with that of the Basco block (Figures 3.24 and 3.25).  The plan was an improvement over the 
first house: the rooms were organized around a small, rectangular hall, providing the three 
bedrooms with more privacy; the bathroom was moved to an exterior wall, since the skylight had 
proved expensive and cumbersome to build; and the living-dining room was separated from the 
kitchen by a counter-top and cabinets.  A much larger project, Los Cipresales was still planned 
as a neighborhood unit, but it was centered around a school, commercial and green areas, and a 
soccer field .  The bodega had been built large enough to convert into a school after construction 
(Figure 3.26). 
Robison spread his knowledge and training beyond the ICIV.  In February 1959, he 
began teaching construction drawing courses at the new Faculty of Architecture in San Carlos 
University.  Around 1953, three Guatemalan architects, who had received their training in the 
United States and Mexico—Roberto Aycinena Echeverría, Jorge Montes Córdova, and Carlos 
Haeussler Uribio—started the country’s first Architecture Department under the Faculty of 
Engineering at the University of San Carlos.  In 1958, with the help of other architects, including 
Robison, they elevated the study of architecture to a faculty.  After Robison resigned from the 
ICIV in January 1960, he opened his own private architectural firm in Guatemala City.89 
Both the Guatemalan and US members of the ICIV concurred that construction needed to 
be accelerated, but they did not agree that paid labor was the solution.  These changes were 
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unilateral decisions made by the US “advisors”.  Although the ICIV Director Olivares felt the 
new house plan “representa sin duda, una mejora para el use de esta vivienda,” (“represents, 
without a doubt, an improvement for the use of this house,”), he was concerned that the 
reduction of participant labor to thirty percent of the entire workload meant that, “es ilusorio 
aplicar al sistema empleado en los Los [sic] Cipresales la denominación de ‘Esfuerzo Propio y 
Ayuda Mutua” (“it is an illusion to apply the denomination ‘Aided Self-Help’ to the system used 
in Los Cipresales.”)90 Olivares also found out that the workers of Los Cipresales were not 
satisfied with the construction quality of their homes.  He felt that the blocks were not well made 
and that the walls were not as sturdy as in the previous projects.  Dick dismissed Olivares, 
commenting that his observations were “peculiarly similar to recent allegations appearing in a 
certain part [read, communist] of the local press.”91 The US advisors won this battle.  In March 
1959, Olivares resigned as director of the ICIV after numerous conflicts with Dick and De Luca 
and was replaced by Arturo Bickford, who had been mayor of Guatemala City in the 1930s.  
Olivares went on to oversee the construction of the Bank of Guatemala building, designed by 
Jorge Montes Córdova and Raúl Minondo, in the capital’s Civic Center and became the Minister 
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of Communication and Public Works during the government of Enrique Peralta Azurdia (1963-
1966). 
Although Powell and the USOM viewed the new system as a “happy medium,” 
Washington officials were also displeased; congress had supported the housing program, because 
it was considered to be completely self-help.  Baruch felt that self-help was fundamental to the 
cause of the program, because “a person involved in building his own home is a more substantial 
citizen than one who owns his own home where his only contribution had been a token 300 
hours of Bodega activity.”  De Luca countered that the participants still received such benefits in 
the bodega and that passing off the houses faster had a “greater political effect for the 
program.”92 De Luca and Dick nevertheless persevered with their new version of “self-help”, 
despite Washington’s reservations, and with the Special Assistance funds granted in 1958, they 
built a fourth ICIV project of about 870 units next to Los Cipresales using the same construction 
methods.  Robison’s interlocking-block house plan was used but varied with construction in 
single units, duplexes, and quadruplexes.  US-Guatemalan joint funds covered two more 
projects: another 200-unit expansion of Colonia Los Cipresales and a project for railroad 
workers in the capital. 
 De Luca and Dick’s changes to the ICIV’s program demonstrate both the US control of 
the joint program and the flexibility of aided self-help.  Officials in Washington had one, limited 
                                                
92 Letter from Oscar M. Powell to Grover C. Kincaid, 12 Feb. 1959, folder “Housing,” box 66, 
RG 469, Mission to Guatemala, Office of the Director, Subject Files (Central Files), 1952-61; 
letter from Stanley Baruch to Temple Dick, 24 December 1958, folder, “Housing,” box 66, RG 
469, Mission to Guatemala, Office of the Director, Subject Files (Central Files), 1952-61; 
memorandum from John De Luca to Stanley Baruch, 12 Nov. 1958, Folder 2.4.2 “Stanley 





definition of the system, one that had taken shape in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean, but this 
system could not be directly transferred to other settings.  US technicians in the field did not use 
self-help as a one-size-fits-all strategy, even though officials in Washington seemed to see it that 
way.  The ICIV changes also point to the problems of self-help when used on a large scale, some 
of which were already known to Dick prior to construction—the lack of net savings and the long 
construction time.  Originally, the technicians had been willing to accept these drawbacks in 
exchange for its “salutory” effects on the individual.93 But it seems that it had become a harder 
compromise to make, perhaps because those effects were not readily appearing in the 
participants. 
By 1959, the Housing Division within the USOM had expanded from three to seven 
people in response to the large number of ICIV projects and Bernard Wagner was its new chief.  
Wagner had previously served as a housing advisor in Germany and Turkey, and in Guatemala, 
he wanted to turn the ICIV into a national housing agency, engaged in all types of activities, not 
just those invoking self-help.  His opportunity came in 1960, when President Ydígoras asked the 
ICIV to build a housing project for school teachers in the capital, a group with whom he needed 
to curry favor, and a slum clearance project that would move families into multifamiliares, or 
apartment buildings.  The president requested that both projects be built entirely with paid labor.  
Ydígoras was undoubtedly inspired by housing developments in Mexico, Guatemala’s other 
major influence outside the United States, where Mario Pani and other Modern architects were 
erecting multifamiliares in the capital, high-rise towers that embodied European housing 
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theories.  The problem for the ICIV was that the agreement between the United States and 
Guatemala stipulated that it could only construct aided self-help projects.  Wagner petitioned 
Washington to amend the ICIV’s rules, and at the end of 1960, Washington gave the 
organization the authority to built housing projects without self-help labor.94 Thereafter, 
President Ydígoras designated the ICIV to be the country’s central housing authority, a role 
which it had in effect assumed since other agencies were barely involved in housing.  Because 
prior US grants would run out by the end of 1961, the Guatemalan government provided four 
million quetzales for the continuation of the ICIV’s program to cover the paid-labor 
multifamiliar (Figure 3.27), teacher housing, and a fifty-five unit project for the military in 
Mariscal Zabala.95  
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Tropical House Type 
 With the Special Assistance funds, the ICIV began building projects outside Guatemala 
City at the end of 1958, initially in Escuintla and Retalhuleu, cities to the west of the capital.  
Local ICIV offices were established in these city’s town halls.  Located at a lower elevation near 
the coast, the tropical climate in these cities was quite different than that found in temperate 
Guatemala City.  Because houses built outside the capital needed a different design solution to 
account for the heat and humidity as well as the lack of certain building materials, Robison and 
the ICIV Planning Department developed a third house type for tropical weather.  The unit, 
designed to maximize ventilation, was the most open of the three types (Figures 3.28 and 3.29).  
Windows were left unglazed and covered with wooden shutters, while interior partitions and 
closets were only two meters high to allow cross ventilation.  A pitched roof provided a wide 
overhang to protect from the sun and rain.  Property walls were built with hollow pumice block, 
which was more attractive than the concrete post and wire fences of the first three projects.  The 
construction system was partially prefabricated.  Pre-cast reinforced concrete beams and columns 
were used as a structural skeleton and filled with self-aligning pumice blocks, made by workers 
in a central bodega.96 The site plans for Colonia El Quetzal in Escuintla and Colonia San 
Antonio in Retalhuleu brought US planning ideas embedded in the neighborhood unit to areas 
outside the capital.  An ICIV project was also built in Mazatenango, spreading their work further 
into the interior of the country, and Quetzaltenango, the second most populous city in Guatemala 
(Figure 3.30). 
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Public vs. Private Housing 
Even though some members of congress, like Senator Allen J. Ellender of Louisiana, 
complained that building hundreds of houses in Latin America was “beyond the limits of what 
the Congress intended,” ICA officials viewed the Guatemalan program as a success.  With US 
support, Guatemala had a housing authority that was building popular and sound projects.  
Baruch referred to ICIV housing as the “show piece of the hemisphere,” Bernard Wagner called 
it “the most popular of all ICA programs” in Guatemala, and Robert L. Rupard, an ICA official, 
believed it was the “most successful program of this type that we have undertaken any place in 
the world.”97 It was also providing great “Good Neighbor” mileage in articles, photographs, and 
films.  Despite the accolades, the ICIV’s small output had done little to close the country’s 
housing gap.  In 1960, Guatemala had an urban population of about 931,000, roughly a quarter of 
the country’s total population, and an urban housing deficit of 75,000 homes.98 Then again, 
Guatemala’s self-help program was conceived as a “demonstration” of tools that could tackle the 
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housing needs of the lowest-income workers, not as a solution to Guatemala’s immense and 
complex housing problem. 
Most international housers felt that stimulating the private sector was the only way to fix 
the housing shortage of the developing world; it was what Temple Dick had referred to as “an 
ideal…and the ultimate answer.”99 Members of the HHFA and ICA’s Housing Division wanted 
to export the US’s system of housing finance, especially its savings and loan institutions and 
FHA mortgage insurance. 
Latin American nations had also pushed for the establishment of an Inter-American Bank 
to finance housing in the region, most notably at meetings of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) throughout the 1950s.  Beginning with the February 1953 meeting of the OAS’s 
Economic and Social Council, the Chilean delegation routinely introduced a proposal to establish 
a regional housing bank.  The US government developed the complementary habit of shooting 
down all Chilean efforts, wanting to concentrate less on “social welfare” and more on economic 
development.  US housers, at the HHFA and ICA (and its predecessor agencies), knew that 
finance was as important as technology in aiding housing, but there was no desire beyond their 
offices to establish a costly and difficult credit system. 
The year 1960 sits on the fulcrum between two types of housing aid in Latin America, 
separating the small-scale grants for “demonstration projects” of the 1950s from large-scale, big-
budget loan programs that targeted finance and legislation in the 1960s.  The shift resulted from 
a complete reevaluation of the US’s policy towards Latin America, following Vice President 
Nixon’s disastrous 1958 tour through the region, where he was met with angry and violent anti-
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US protests, and especially the 1959 Cuban Revolution.  Latin America’s seeming embrace of 
Fidel Castro and anger towards the US’s support of anti-communist dictators in the region, led 
Eisenhower to establish an extensive economic development program for Latin America, which 
Kennedy would later expand into his Alliance for Progress in 1961.  The administration’s new 
slogan was “trade and aid,” which was supported in mid-1960 by a Social Progress Trust Fund 
(SPTF), which provided $500 million in subsidized loans for health, education, land reform, and 
housing to Latin America.  The loans were administered through the newly established Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB), which was collectively run by the American republics to 
support development projects, but because its decisions were determined by contributions, the 
US essentially controlled the body.100  
Housing’s profile in development aid also became more prominent at the end of the 
1950s.  Originally seen as a drain on development resources, economists and political scientists 
instead began to view it as a tool to motivate savings, stimulate industrial development, and 
distribute income.  In 1959, the Committee on Foreign Economic Policy, which established 
broad economic guidelines for US foreign policy, decided that the federal government should 
promote homeownership abroad.  In 1960, congress delegated the Development Loan Fund, a 
federal agency that mostly gave loans to countries outside Latin America, to include housing in 
its objectives, especially the promotion of savings and loan abroad.  By early 1960, Baruch could 
claim that the climate in Washington for housing had improved.101 
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In the fall of 1960, the members of the Organization of American States met in Bogotá to 
discuss development plans.  The final report—the Act of Bogotá—listed measures to improve 
social and economic conditions.  Due to US influence, the Act prodded the American nations to 
reassess their legal and institutional frameworks, credit facilities, land distribution, and tax 
structure.  In terms of housing, the US delegation pressed for an inter-American program that 
would strengthen private housing initiatives, specifically legislation measures that encouraged 
savings and loan associations and the home mortgage market.  They also recommended the 
continuation, on a pilot basis, of aided self-help housing.  The US hoped that the SPTF loans 




In 1958, during the early months of the Ydígoras administration, the Washington firm of 
Klein and Saks, which had set up an office in the Presidential Palace, began to lobby the 
president to push mortgage insurance legislation through the Guatemalan congress.  The State 
Department had hired Klein and Saks in 1955 to help implement a cohesive development plan in 
Guatemala.  Founded by Julius Klein, Herbert Hoover’s assistant secretary of commerce, and 
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Julien M. Saks, a Wall Street banker, the firm was dedicated to persuading developing countries 
to adopt free market policies.103   
The US government had first exported the FHA model abroad in 1946, when three 
housing officials established a program in the Philippines and a former FHA official served as an 
advisor on a Cuban initiative—but international FHA activity remained dormant until the late 
1950s.  Although the desire to establish FHAs and savings and loan institutions abroad existed 
within the US government, the political will to back such a program with funds did not.  These 
institutions would not just require finance and legislative experts to rewrite laws, but most likely 
heavy investments of “seed capital” as well.  The situation changed in 1956, when the 
government of Peru invited four US housing finance specialists to develop its national housing 
program.  The team included men from a variety of establishments: Morton Bodfish, President of 
the First Federal Savings and Loan Association of Chicago; Neal Hardy, Director of the National 
Association of Home Builders’ National Housing Center; Charles Sigety, Deputy Commissioner 
of the FHA; and Lawrence Cox, the Executive Director of the Norfolk Redevelopment and 
Housing Authority in Virginia.  After a one-month study period, the consultants prepared 
legislation, based on the US example, that created savings and loan institutions and an FHA in 
Peru; it passed with minor modifications.  Baruch and the State Department felt that the trip was 
so successful—in its small cost, limited time commitment, and large results—that it should be 
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replicated in other countries.104 Soon after, other small housing finance teams helped pass 
savings and loan legislation in Chile and Ethiopia. 
While there had always been discussions of reforming Guatemala’s system of housing 
finance, the State Department and both governments were finally becoming more amenable.  The 
office of Klein and Saks drafted the initial legislation for mortgage insurance and submitted it to 
the Guatemalan congress in early 1959, naming the new agency, the Instituto de Fomento de 
Hipotecas Aseguradas (Institute for the Development of Insured Mortgages), or FHA, a name 
that asserted its bureaucratic heritage.105 FHA house prices were capped at 15,000 quetzales in 
order to target middle-class housing, the population that was too poor to afford current financing 
systems and was too wealthy for the ICIV.  This group was also targeted for political reasons as 
one of the main US objectives in Guatemala was to encourage the growth of an “urban middle 
class with a stake in the capitalist system and with sufficient knowledge of Communism to resist 
its encroachment.” Officials felt homeownership, along with broader employment and 
educational opportunities, was a means to achieve this goal.  As James E. Bent, an S&L expert 
sent on a short mission to Guatemala wrote in 1960, “The more home owners a nation creates 
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within its borders the more intellectually moderate its citizenry.  Radicals are rarely people living 
in well-integrated families in homes of their own.”106  
In tandem with the FHA, the laws governing Guatemala’s modest savings and loan 
program, which had been established in 1948, were also liberalized.  In this way, the Guatemalan 
financing system emulated that of the United States: savings and loan institutions would provide 
financing to individual and large-scale builders, while the Guatemalan FHA would offer 
mortgage insurance.  Guatemalan officials instituted a US-style housing financing system in 
order to receive funds from the US government, which had begun promoting S&Ls throughout 
Latin America with the promise of large “seed capital” loans.  Peru’s savings and loan 
institutions had recently received such a loan from the Development Loan Fund.107 
The FHA legislation spent two years in Guatemala’s congress, where it was amended, 
revised, and debated by various Guatemalan politicians and US technicians.  A variety of 
housing finance specialists were sent to Guatemala during those years to rework the FHA law 
before congress.  Robert L. Strelitz, who joined the USOM Housing Division in 1959, was the 
only long-term advisor.  He was the anchor in the Housing Division’s shift from construction- to 
finance-oriented aid.  Strelitz was an architect who had worked for several years at the HHFA 
and FHA before serving as a housing finance advisor for four years in Iran and then Lebanon.  
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The ICA had sent him on a number of short-term consulting missions, a system that became 
more popular after the Peruvian program.  The short-term housing finance consultants in 
Guatemala included Miguel Juara, who had been the second-ranking officer at the Cuban FHA; 
James E. Bent, Manager of the Hartford Federal Savings and Loan Association in Connecticut; 
and Carl T. Mitnick and Paul L. Burkhard of the National Association of Home Builders.108 US 
homebuilders were eager to initiate mortgage insurance abroad as it would expand their market.   
 At the end of 1960, two mortgage insurance consultants were sent to Guatemala to write 
regulations and procedures for the new FHA.  Simeon C. Bluh, who had established his own 
mortgage bank in Coral Gables, Florida, and Robert H. Hau, the chief of operations of the San 
Juan field office of the FHA, spent two months lobbying congress and establishing the FHA’s 
bureaucratic framework.  Using US policies and regulations as a model, they wrote FHA 
administrative rules, underwriting guidelines, a procedures handbook, and public relations 
booklets—many of which were direct translations from US documents.  They also established 
construction standards and minimum property requirements, which were based on those of the 
United States, and would thus export North American notions of residential design to Guatemala.  
After leaving Guatemala, Hau went on to establish another FHA in Panama.109 
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 The Guatemalan Congress passed the FHA legislation, Decree 1448, on 7 June 1961, 
providing it with an initial 900,000 quetzales in state funds.  The four members of FHA’s top 
staff, which included Oscar Putzeys, an ICIV official who was now the FHA’s chief of 
operations, spent several months training in Puerto Rico, Washington, and Miami.  The ICIV 
also had a new role in the FHA, approving architectural plans and specifications and training its 
inspectors.  The Guatemalan FHA was officially inaugurated on 21 May 1962.  In August 1962, 
Guatemala received its first Inter-American Bank loan for housing, $5.3 million to distribute 
between the ICIV and the Caja Central de Ahorro y Prestamos, the country’s new central 
savings and loan bank.  To receive the loan, the Guatemalan government had to contribute 5.44 
million quetzales to these same institutions.  The money was intended to cover 3,260 ICIV 
homes and 2,000 privately-financed homes.110 
  
FHA Housing 
As in the United States, the Guatemalan FHA expanded mortgages from eight to twenty 
years, decreased the size of down payments, and put affordable financing in the hands of the 
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country’s small middle class.  In the 1950s, before the establishment of the FHA, only about six 
hundred privately built homes had been erected a year and very little of it was for the middle-
income group.  In the first six months of 1962, seventy-four houses were built with FHA 
guaranties; the next year, 611 were built; by 1966, there were 3,300 FHA houses total; in 1970, 
the number reached 6,000.  The number of savings and loan institutions also increased from one 
to three, allowing them to finance more houses, from 1,375 houses in 1963 to 2,883 in 1965.  
Over time, the housing demand decreased, but between 1960 and 1975 (until the 1976 
earthquake), the private sector build 2,000 to 2,600 units a year total.111  
The Guatemalan FHA, in its body, rules, and regulations, was modeled after that of the 
United States, and its effect on Guatemala City’s built environment, where the large majority of 
FHA homes were built in the 1960s, was remarkably similar.  A tour through a new FHA 
development displays the effects of this new institution on urban domestic architecture.  An 
advertising pamphlet for Lomas de Pamplona (Figure 3.31), a speculative housing development 
built by developers Granai y Townsen, exemplifies a typical FHA project.  “Venga!” (“Come!”) 
it calls out with a beckoning index finger, “a Lomas de Pamplona y conozca su futura . . .” (“to 
Lomas de Pamplona and get to know your future . . .”).112 A middle-class family in Guatemala 
City no longer hired an engineer or architect to design a home or built their own house but rather 
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shopped for a finished house on the speculative market.  As in the US, most FHA housing was 
erected by volume builders.  Before the FHA, builders had erected few private housing 
developments in Guatemala City, about nine total, but the FHA stimulated the construction of 
subdivisions.  Between 1962 and 1966, seventeen developments were built.113 The FHA also 
financed the construction of condominiums, introducing this new housing type to Guatemala.  
Guatemala City’s first condominium, Santa Clara, was built in the late 1960s.   
The Lomas de Pamplona pamphlet includes a site plan of the 205-unit development 
(Figure 3.32).  The project is a self-contained unit, sitting in a southern suburb off the city’s grid 
with streets that curve with the slope of the land.  Other projects, like the more expensive 
Colonia Mirador included recreational areas, schools, and shops.  All these new developments 
sprung up in the suburbs of the city.  When Guatemala City’s elite left for the suburbs, the 
middle class first took over their place in the central sector, but in the late 1960s, FHA funding 
allowed the middle class to emulate the elites and move to the peripheries of upper-class suburbs.  
In effect, the FHA hastened the middle-class flight from the city center to the suburbs.  Today, 
Guatemala City’s colonial main square, the Parque Central, serves as a center for the city’s 
working class, while the upper classes congregate in zone 10, the so-called zona viva, to the 
south of the city. 
The Lomas de Pamplona pamphlet advertises that the homes are pretty, economical, 
well-made and designed, easy to purchase, and are part of the FHA system (Figure 3.33).  The 
photographs, drawings, and plans show three different types of small, modern houses available 
for purchase, the “Ideal,” the “Ensueño” (“Dream”) and the “Residencial,” which all use the 
                                                




same plan with different exteriors.  Due to FHA standards and guidelines, which dictated 
materials, construction methods, dimensions, and use, these homes were quite similar to ones 
found in Guatemala City’s other new developments.  What is immediately apparent is how 
different these houses are to the traditional Guatemalan homes the middle class left in the city 
center and how similar they are to suburban North American residences.  These FHA homes had 
closer ancestry in the suburbs of Southern California than central Guatemalan City.  While these 
homes emulated the residences of Guatemala City’s elite, who already lived in houses modeled 
on modern US designs, the FHA regulations codified these changes and sped up their adoption 
by Guatemala City’s middle class.  The FHA guidelines forced builders to use reinforced 
concrete instead of traditional materials, like bahareque, rock foundations, stone or mud walls, 
and tiled roofs, which were still popular in the city center.  Lomas de Pamplona’s one-story 
homes were modern, made up of smooth concrete interlocking planes, with voids filled by large 
windows.   
FHA guidelines also replaced the traditional Guatemalan house plan with a modern US 
design.  Whereas traditional homes had separate living and dining areas, a large kitchen, and 
open courtyards, FHA minimum room size guidelines required that middle-class homes have an 
open living-dining room, smaller kitchens, large windows for light, and backyards instead of 
courtyards.  The only traditional aspect left in the Lomas de Pamplona homes is the outdoor 
laundry sink, the pila.  Larger homes could be found in other developments, like Vivibien, which 
offered ample-sized homes with servant spaces and a carport.  As the FHA codes precipitated a 
shift from traditional Spanish homes to a modern model imported from the United States, 1950s 
suburban America replaced eighteenth-century Spain.  One cultural center replaced another. 
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As evidenced by the introduction of the FHA into Guatemala, changing a country’s 
bureaucratic structure can have a strong and far-reaching impact on its built environment.  While 
the former system required a type of man-to-man transmission of knowledge—US technicians 
directly training their Guatemalan counterparts—a national bureaucracy anonymously blankets 
its “expertise” on an entire market.  S&L experts Bluh and Hau spent two months in Guatemala, 
drafting regulations and building codes, and left a profound effect on the country’s domestic 
architecture.  It is interesting that US international housing programs affected architectural 
production abroad through almost anonymous technicians—“nobodies” in the world of 
architecture—and that their tool of choice was bureaucracy.  Guatemala City did not transform 
into a post-war US city, its DNA was too different from the US to ever become such a thing, but 
US technicians and businessmen guided its residential development in the 1950s and 1960s 
along US lines, inserting their ideal residential plan, the single-family subdivision, hoping that it 




When major housing programs were expanded to the rest of Latin America in the early 
1960s under President Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, they looked much like Guatemala’s 
program, with an emphasis on establishing a sound housing authority, using aided self-help for 
the poor, and instituting savings and loan and mortgage insurance for the upper classes.  As had 
happened in Guatemala, most of the aid in the 1960s would be channeled to stimulating the 
private sector rather than the public. 
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The USOM housing program in Guatemala was phased out ahead of schedule in June 
1962, in accordance with a new policy of using short-term consultants.  William K. Wittausch, 
who had become the chief of the USOM’s Housing Division in December 1961, packed up his 
bags and returned to California feeling that the program had ended too early.  The housing 
technicians left the country, but large loans would continue to flow in.  Although US assistance 
helped establish an urban and regional planning faculty within the University of San Carlos in 
the mid-1960s and continued to finance the ICIV, the housing effort had mostly shifted to 
encouraging private financing through savings and loans and long-term mortgages.  In 1964, 
additional funds were made available to Guatemala’s savings and loan institutions through a ten 
million dollar loan to the Central American Bank.114 
 In December 1964, Bernard Wagner returned to Guatemala with Gordon E. Howard for 
two weeks and reported that Guatemalan officials felt that the technical assistance program in 
housing should not have been terminated.  After researching the situation, they felt that “their 
attitude was justified,” finding that the country still lacked a national housing policy, did not 
have a real housing authority, and that later ICIV projects had been poorly implemented.  
Although the ICIV had programmed 750 units a year when the US housing technicians left, they 
had only managed to build 470 a year.  The ICIV had, however, continued to use mass 
production and efficient construction techniques introduced by US technicians and had thus 
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continued lowering the cost of units.  Wagner and Howard saw the FHA as one of the brighter 
spots of the US’s legacy as it was “significantly raising standards of neighborhood design and 
through requiring the use of an architect and minimum standards, the quality of  individual 
houses.”115  
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In late 1947, Nelson Rockefeller and his close friend, architect Wallace K. Harrison, 
decided to establish a homebuilding venture for the developing world.  The two were convinced 
that with Harrison’s design expertise and Rockefeller’s capital resources and Latin American 
contacts, they would be able to find a means to provide the region with cheap, sanitary, and 
plentiful homes.  The company would form part of the International Basic Economy Corporation 
(IBEC), which Rockefeller had recently established to spur economic growth in the developing 
world.  Although the new enterprise was centered around the same goal as the Point Four 
program, to spread US know-how and stimulate economic development, Rockefeller would 
attempt to do so while turning a profit.   
The shortages of the “third world” attracted both do-gooder experts, who were driven by 
a desire to alleviate suffering and ensure world stability, and profit-motivated businessmen, who 
saw these deficiencies as market opportunities.  Rockefeller, possessing a faith in capitalism’s 
benevolent potential, was an earnest mixture of these two types.  Profit-seeking companies, he 
believed, could transfer knowledge and promote economic growth more efficiently than the 
government, and he founded IBEC as an example of his development model.  IBEC would spend 
the next two decades advancing this alternative, though perhaps more American, scheme to aid 
the developing world: the spread of US know-how through private industry. 
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Although IBEC’s business strategy changed over time, Rockefeller originally opened 
subsidiary businesses in developing countries to import new technologies, distribution methods, 
and US capabilities to a country’s “basic economies.”  Along with housing, IBEC entered the 
fields of agriculture, industry, health, and finance.  In its first eight years of existence, the 
company concentrated its efforts in two countries, Venezuela and Brazil, where it set up 
companies in farming, fishing, wholesaling, milk distribution, seed production, grain storage, 
and helicopter crop-dusting.  IBEC and Chase National Bank also initiated an investment 
banking operation that became one of Brazil’s first mutual funds.  Throughout the mid- to late-
1950s, the company expanded into new fields and other Latin American countries and the 
Middle East.1 
This chapter will chart the history of the IBEC Housing Corporation as a means to trace 
the interdependent relationship between business and government in the field of international 
housing.  Although these entities offered two models for helping the “third world,” they did not 
develop as separate strands.  Under Truman and Eisenhower, an ideological belief in the free 
market’s ability to solve social and economic problems had led the government to carve out a 
substantial role for private enterprise in economic development programs.  At the same time, US 
businesses were more than eager to take advantage of government programs that helped them 
expand into international markets.  Once government officials and private builders came to 
realize that the housing shortage of the developing world resulted from a lack of capital rather 
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than construction “know-how,” the two strands became firmly entangled, as IBEC and other 
private builders more actively sought financing from the federal government.   
 
A House Built Like a Road 
Rockefeller’s IBEC Housing Corporation began much like the Point Four housing 
program: by researching new construction and materials techniques to export to the developing 
world.  But while the HHFA charted a low-tech course with aided self-help, IBEC forged a path 
that developed new, sophisticated machinery to mass-produce housing in the developing world.  
The IBEC Housing Corporation was born in late 1947 during an afternoon of observing road 
construction in Venezuela.  It was in this oil-rich country, which had many ties to the oil-rich 
Rockefellers, that Rockefeller had first become concerned with the standard-of-living in the 
developing world.  Rockefeller and Harrison, the head architect of the UN building and an IBEC 
executive, watched as colossal LeTourneau road-building equipment, rather than hundreds of 
laborers, built a Venezuelan highway.  The LeTourneau Company had recently revolutionized 
road construction with mammoth machines.  First, a tree crusher uprooted close to 1300 trees an 
hour; then a series of machines cleared the path of smaller obstacles, roughly leveled the road, 
and provided a final grading.  The last behemoth poured a fresh ribbon of concrete road.2 The 
image of this machinery at work, so quickly and smoothly laying miles of highway, returned to 
Harrison during a later discussion with Rockefeller and the Venezuelan president about the 
                                                




country’s severe low-cost housing shortage.  Perhaps road-building equipment could construct a 
house as swiftly as a highway.3  
On the long propeller plane flight back to New York, Harrison had plenty of time to 
discuss his road-building-cum-house-construction idea with Rockefeller.  The architect had a 
long-standing interest in housing, having experimented with new materials and mass-production 
techniques before World War II.  He had designed two prefabricated houses, including an 
unsuccessful aluminum model, but these attempts had been based on automobile factories and 
the concept of a plant continuously stamping out ready-made homes; road-building offered a 
new model.  Rather than “bringing the house to the machine”—which had proved unsuccessful 
with his earlier aluminum house—Harrison wanted to bring “the machine to the house site.”4 He 
hoped this new construction model would help Venezuela, and the rest of Latin America, address 
its housing shortage. 
Harrison envisioned a building system that united three basic elements: concrete 
construction, road-building methods, and a production line located at the building site.5 To 
execute this idea, Harrison recruited his friend Emil H. Praeger, a leading concrete engineer who 
had designed floating breakwaters for the Normandy invasion and had worked as a consultant on 
the UN building.  Harrison and Praeger designed a simple box house: two concrete slabs—the 
roof and floor—sandwiching walls made from poured concrete.  It was a simple structure that 
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would prove to be complex to construct.  The initial plan was to use road-building machines to 
first pour a concrete ribbon of road, four inches thick and thirty feet wide, divided into slabs with 
wooden strips every thirty feet.  Another machine would then roll through, pouring concrete 
walls onto forms on alternate slabs with the immediate slab lifted to provide a roof. 
 
Huntington, Long Island 
Having developed the outlines of a road-built-sandwich-house, Harrison decided to test 
the idea by building two model homes on his property in Huntington, Long Island.  He 
contracted the Corbetta Construction Company, a firm dedicated to developing new concrete 
construction techniques, to erect the 27 by 28 foot houses, which included four rooms, a porch, 
and a bathroom.6 The loud noises of the construction site throughout April 1948 were not the 
clunking of hammers against nails or the hum of hand-held power tools.  Instead, new, modern 
sounds of an industrialized process filled the site: the drone of large engines, the screech of steel 
surfaces tightening against each other, and the slurp of vacuum-suctioned air and water.  Time-
lapse images similarly would not have shown a house slowly rising from the ground, instead the 
IBEC house was poured at once from above (Figure 4.1).   
The first step, laying the road, was easy; workers graded the land and poured a flat 
concrete surface divided into four sections for roofs and floors.  The next step was the most 
complicated element—pouring the wall forms onto alternate slabs.  To speed up production, 
Harrison and Praeger turned away from the common practice of using multiple, lightweight 
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forms, instead implementing a unitary form, a single cast for all the walls and partitions of the 
house.  Praeger worked with the Vacuum Concrete Company of Philadelphia to design the form.  
The result was a gridded, mechanized giant—steel surfaces outfitted with levers, jacks, and bolts 
that could mechanically tighten surfaces into place.  Although steel was durable, the form’s 
resultant thirty-five ton weight created a new problem—mobility.  The construction team 
decided to move the form using a gantry, which could lower the form into position, set on 
railroad tracks.  Once the form was in place and its steel surface sealed and tightened using 
mechanical levers, concrete was poured through chutes atop of the form (Figure 4.2).  Then, a 
vacuum system, with pipes that connected the form to a truck, ran for fifteen minutes to extract 
water and pre-stress the concrete.  The morning after the pour, the entire form was loosened, 
lifted, and moved to the other slab.  The first house pour took seven and a half hours and five 
hours for the second house, during which the twenty-three ton roof slab was placed on the first 
house with the gantry and a vacuum-lifting machine (Figure 4.3).7 
Huntington was the early incarnation of the “IBEC Method,” as the construction 
technique became known, a system that built monolithic houses the way workers in Manchester 
wove textiles, with as little personal touch and handwork as possible.  Mechanizing production 
sped up construction, but the IBEC Method departed from typical industrialized manufacturing 
in one crucial way: the process did not necessarily result in a cheaper house.8 It was an 
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impressive system—with levers, gantries, and vacuum concrete—but all this mechanization was 
expensive, and the system, even on a large scale, was not necessarily cheaper than handwork.  
Nevertheless, the Huntington experiments created a livable, quickly-built house that left Harrison 
and other IBEC Housing executives confident that with a little tweaking, their whirring IBEC 
Method could become an effective homebuilding system.   
To sell this new “product,” Rockefeller established an IBEC subsidiary in 1948, the 
IBEC Housing Corporation, which existed in various forms until the late 1970s.9 The 
promotional literature of the company’s early years was dedicated to the IBEC Method, as the 
company built its identity around its novel construction system (Figure 4.4).  Although Harrison 
had played a lead role in developing the Method, he participated very little in the housing 
company’s future activities.  Two new executives primarily steered its early endeavors: President 
George A. Dudley and Vice President William V. Reed.10 Dudley was a thirty-three-year-old 
architect who had studied at Yale, where he met Harrison, who had served as a chief design critic 
in the late 1930s and hired Dudley to take notes during the design process of the UN 
headquarters.11 Reed had started his career at the US Housing Authority before making the 
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transition into the private sector, eventually working for Southern California Homes, a company 
involved in mass-produced housing.12  
 
Marshall Manor, Norfolk, Virginia 
In an article devoted to the first housing development built with the IBEC Method, 102 
duplexes in Norfolk, VA, an October 1949 issue of Life Magazine invited its readers to marvel at 
the “House Built Like a Sidewalk” (Figure 4.5).  Before embarking on a project abroad, Reed 
first wanted to build a large-scale project in the United States to “be doubly sure that all the bugs 
are out of the process.”13 IBEC Housing partnered with a Norfolk businessman to build Marshall 
Manor, an FHA-insured rental project for African Americans.  Perhaps it was not obvious to the 
average Life reader, but the article’s accompanying photographs did not illustrate its snappy title; 
there were no road-building techniques to be seen.  Rather than depicting a form of sidewalk 
construction, the images showed a gigantic World War II bomber crane, suspending a massive 
steel form in midair.   
The construction system described in article’s text and photographs was something 
altogether different than what had been implemented in Huntington.  The initial concept, which 
used road-building machines, railroad tracks, and a gantry was cumbersome, needed a lot of 
space, and required houses to be plotted on a straight line.  Its limitations for a large project were 
obvious.  To allow for greater flexibility, the IBEC team decided to scrap the gantry and 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
12 William V. Reed and Elizabeth Ogg, New Homes for Old: Public Housing in Europe and 
America (New York: The Foreign Policy Association, 1940), 112. 
 





maneuver the steel form with a crane.  To support such a heavy load, they procured a 
LeTourneau bomber crane that had been used during the war to quickly clear crashed airplanes 
from runways.  They also eliminated the key road-building feature, the pouring of slabs on 
graded ground, in order to reduce the cost of preparation.  Instead, they specified that slabs be 
poured in stacks, “pancake fashion,” with each forming the bed of the next.14 The bomber crane, 
which quickly became the new symbol of IBEC Housing, also picked up the floor and roof slabs 
from a pack.  The Life photograph did not illustrate a “house built like a sidewalk,” a catchy 
gimmick IBEC continued to use despite the removal of road-building techniques, but it did 
indicate what was most important about the new method: it was the machines, rather than the 
small, cropped bodies of the laborers below, that efficiently built the houses; technological 
progress was helping to solve the world’s housing shortage.15  
IBEC’s houses were simple.  The final duplexes, advertised as having “Gibraltar-like, all-
concrete construction,” consisted of twenty-four by twenty-eight feet units with two bedrooms, a 
living room with a large picture window, a bathroom, and kitchen organized along a small 
hallway (Figure 4.6).  To create a more interesting-looking house than that of a pure box, the 
street façade was slightly recessed to make room for a small front porch.16  
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In building their first project, IBEC Housing executives felt there were many advantages 
to their system: the materials used, sand, gravel, cement, and water, were readily available; on-
site construction eliminated the need for heavy transportation and storage costs; and the final 
house structure was sturdy, fire- and vermin-proof, and equally suited to both tropical and 
temperate climates.  More than anything, the IBEC executives were pleased that the Norfolk 
project seemed to prove that the method could effect a substantial savings in construction cost 
over conventional methods.  The houses cost between $3,500 and $3,600, a little more than six 
dollars a square foot, whereas conventional comparable construction was about ten dollars. The 
project also provided IBEC with a modest profit, an important fact given Rockefeller’s desire to 
show that “operations can be conducted profitably in marginal and sub-marginal areas of the 
housing industry through the cooperation of the government and business.”17 
The press lauded IBEC’s efforts in the housing field and many Latin American officials 
expressed an interest in their product, but the government’s international housers were less 
enthusiastic.  Jacob Crane and other members of the HHFA were initially interested in 
cooperating with IBEC Housing on Point Four missions but soon realized its cost made it 
difficult to implement abroad.  Crane also felt that with a system that results in identical houses, 
“1,000 units would look deadly.”18 Leonard J. Currie, the future head of CINVA, summarized 
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the problems with the IBEC system in a letter to an HHFA official, “this IBEC housing appals 
[sic] me!  Hot concrete boxes, unsympathetic, using up our critical cement and steel and equipt., 
and hi-priced operators; and all being done by what impresses me as an intelligent bunch of 
guys.”19 These were issues the IBEC team had failed to consider in designing their Method—its 
use of expensive materials, skilled and semi-skilled labor, and inflexible design—features that 
would make it difficult to use in Latin America.  Its implementation in Marshall Manor was 
successful due to two reasons: it was built in the United States, where labor was expensive, and it 




After Marshall Manor, IBEC Housing executives began to search for international 
opportunities in Israel and India, two countries on the forefront of international experiments in 
housing, as well as in Cuba, Brazil, and Chile.  Their expansionist ambitions, however, were cut 
short by the Korean War (1950-1953), which brought about heavy price increases and export 
restrictions.20  
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 The only opportunity to work abroad during the Korean War arose in the aftermath of the 
May 6-7, 1951 earthquakes in the Valle de la Esperanza, El Salvador, the worst in the country’s 
history.  The earthquake destroyed the Valley’s farmlands, leveled five towns, and left 23,000 
people homeless.21 IBEC Housing President Dudley contacted the Salvadoran government to 
offer the company’s assistance in rebuilding homes.  Not only did the Salvadoran government 
accept the proposal, but they also asked IBEC Housing to develop a complete reconstruction and 
development program for the Valley. 
Reed and Dudley had no experience working closely with a local government to create an 
economic development program, but they were convinced they could execute a private Point 
Four program.  City planner Edward G. Echeverría, who would go on to work for the ICA as a 
housing advisor in Colombia in the mid-1950s, was hired as the project director, in charge of a 
team of roughly twenty people.  After four months of study in the beginning of 1952, they 
developed an optimistic four-year plan that centered around a modernization program for the 
valley’s agricultural production and the introduction of garment and broom factories.  IBEC 
Housing decided to put the execution of their plan, which included programs in health, 
education, industry, commerce, public works, housing, and agriculture, under the aegis of a 
Valley Authority.22 
As with most earthquakes, the Valley’s unsound construction had been the major cause of 
devastation.  Cane and thatch buildings dominated the area, and Echeverria wanted to replace 
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them with new earthquake-resistant concrete houses, even though the average valley family 
could not afford such a home.  It was impractical to import the expensive IBEC Method, and the 
IBEC staff did not want the Salvadoran government to subsidize new construction, so instead 
they turned to another novel building method that could “help the people of the valley help 
themselves”—aided self-help construction.23 In 1952, Hanson and García were just beginning 
their program in Surinam and self-help was beginning to spread throughout the Caribbean and 
permeate the thinking of policy-makers.  The IBEC El Salvadoran program was one of the 
earliest government-sponsored self-help programs outside Puerto Rico but little is known about 
the project.  Echeverría and local architect Carlos Odiago designed five minimal self-help house 
types for about two thousand homes.24 The designs accommodated different economic and 
occupational needs: one design had an extra room for a store; another, a workshop for artisans; 
two had space for domestic animals.  The houses, made of brick, concrete block, corrugated 
metal roofs and louvered windows, contrasted sharply with the traditional cane houses of the 
Esperanza Valley (Figure 4.7).25  
Once the plan was put into place, Echeverría and IBEC officials left El Salvador and put 
the execution in the hands of the Esperanza Valley Development Authority.  In September 1953, 
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after the first sixty-one model houses had been built as tests, Pieter C. Pauw, a Point Four 
technician serving in El Salvador, visited the Valley to inspect the development.  Pauw was 
distressed with what he found: no self-help construction had been used, as the Valley Authority 
had hired unskilled labor instead.  Pauw was also concerned that the homes were too expensive, 
as their cost had been determined on the assumption that the agricultural and industrialization 
program would be successful and raise the standard of living.26 It is unclear exactly what 
happened to the Valley project beyond Pauw’s visit, but the silence in the IBEC Housing 
literature, which tends to promote each corporate success, indicates that El Salvador was more of 
a chastening experience for the company.27  
 
Puerto Rico 
It is no surprise that when IBEC Housing President Dudley and Vice President Reed were 
finally able to test the IBEC Method “abroad” in 1953, they chose to do so in Puerto Rico.  The 
island already had a reputation as a development-program laboratory, and with its access to 
federal funding and FHA mortgage insurance, the executives viewed it as an “ideal training 
ground,” offering the opportunity to further refine the IBEC Method and test its applicability to 
Latin America.28  
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Dudley and Reed decided to begin with an initial FHA-insured development in San Juan 
in order to gain local experience, hoping to eventually operate on a broad basis throughout the 
island.  They also partnered with a Puerto Rican construction company, Rexach & Rivera, to 
build the project and with the Corbetta Construction Company to train the crew and take care of 
preliminary construction needs.  Each partner was to receive one third of the profits.29 
Reed, who moved to Puerto Rico to oversee the project, found a site in the San Juan area 
with enough land for 1600 units as well as a large park, playgrounds, shopping centers, and a 
new school.  The Puerto Rico Housing Authority had already prepared the general site planning, 
which followed the contours of the land in order to minimize the cost of grading and to take 
advantage of the area’s natural drainage.30  
To design the houses, Reed hired the then relatively unknown and low-cost architect 
Edward Larrabee Barnes.  Reed knew Barnes from his time at Southern California Homes, which 
had been formed to market a prefabricated house that Barnes had developed with industrial 
designer Henry Dreyfuss in 1947.  For an airplane manufacturer, they created a prototype for a 
mass-producible, single-family home, which was made with aircraft tools and of aircraft 
materials, principally a lightweight aluminum panel used for interior airplane floors.  Barnes 
possessed the right mix of social interest and experience in mass-produced housing, firmly 
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believing that  “modern architecture and social commitment were inextricably linked.”  He had 
studied architecture at Harvard with Walter Gropius and Marcel Breuer, graduating in 1942, and 
would go on to develop his own brand of Modernism in projects such as the Haystack Mountain 
School of Arts and Crafts (1958-61), the Walker Art Center (1966-71) and the Dallas Museum of 
Art (1978-83).31   
IBEC commissioned Barnes to design two basic single-family house types, which it 
intended to sell to the public before beginning construction, using the tactic that had become a 
staple of American homebuilders, the open house.  In mid-1954, more than 8,000 Puerto Ricans 
visited Las Lomas to inspect IBEC’s model Trade Winds and the Bel Air homes (Figures 4.8 and 
4.9).  The crowd filed into the white interiors of each home, noting that they both had three 
bedrooms with closets—with the easy addition of a fourth bedroom—a living-dining room, 
kitchen, bathroom, and patio.  The Trade Winds was slightly larger, at 705 square feet, with the 
Bel Air at 685 square feet.  Barnes adjusted the IBEC Method’s white concrete boxes for use in 
the tropical Caribbean, creating greater ventilation through double doors that connected the 
living room to the patio, adjustable aluminum louvered windows, and vents beneath roof 
overhangs.  Conscious of the fact that their customers wanted a neighborhood with an assortment 
of house types, IBEC executives asked Barnes to give the project some variety through detail, 
rather than structure.  There was only so much diversity one could inject using the monolithic 
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IBEC Method, but Barnes developed his two house plans into three “styles” that varied in façade 
design and use of a tropical, pastel color scheme.32 
All of the homes sold before construction began in mid-1954 and cost an average $6000 
with monthly payments of $45, resulting in a $1.2 million pre-tax profit.  By early 1955, IBEC 
was using six forms and two cranes to build six houses a day, finishing all 1,583 houses by June 
1956.33 After visiting Las Lomas, Nelson Rockefeller ordered IBEC Housing to plant a native 
Puerto Rican tree in front of every home; Saman, Mariposa, Roble, Guama Americano, Pink 
Cassia, and Flamboyan Rojo trees were brought to the development, and the native tree program 
became a permanent part of IBEC Housing’s residential developments on the island.34  
Las Lomas was cheap, modern, and successful in the eyes of both IBEC executives and 
homebuyers.  The Badillo family, the first family to move into a Las Lomas home, wrote to 
IBEC Housing, “On this our first morning in our dear new home at Villa Las Lomas…I want to 
tell you that we are happy and enchanted in our beautiful and comfortable home…I think this is 
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one of the most beautiful urbanization of our Island.”35 Once it was clear to IBEC executives that 
they had developed a lucrative business model, they simultaneously began to develop new 
housing projects and dropped their partnerships with Corbetta and Rexach & Rivera, investing in 
earthmoving and cement-mixing equipment to handle the projects and profits from beginning to 
end.   
Two new developments, named Lomas Verdes and Altamesa, were initiated almost 
simultaneously in the suburbs of San Juan.  While Altamesa was a smaller, 631-unit project, 
Lomas Verdes tested the IBEC Method on an even larger scale—2,600 units of various types of 
single-family homes, with space set aside for garden-type apartments, schools, and parks.36 Reed 
wanted Lomas Verdes to “reproduce the varied and integrated pattern of a long-settled 
community, with a variety of housing types and complete community facilities.”37 He again hired 
Barnes, whom he found, “extraordinarily inexpensive” to design the houses: a two-bedroom in 
the range of $4,500 to $5,000 and two types of three-bedrooms, a basic one for about $6,500 and 
a more luxurious one for roughly $9,000.  Wanting to work with a local architect, Reed hired 
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Henry Klumb to do the site plan, and he divided Lomas Verdes into four sub-communities, each 
with its own shopping center and park.38   
This flurry of construction should not be confused for confidence in the IBEC Method.  
While executives in New York continued to sell and praise their construction system in hopes of 
finding new building opportunities, Reed in Puerto Rico began to doubt the method’s efficacy.  
The high cost of both the heavy equipment and US personnel handicapped its universal 
applicability.  In March 1955, as construction progressed on Las Lomas, Reed sent Dudley a 
memorandum where he described his reservations, writing that the IBEC Method had 
“demonstrated its usefulness and promises to become an effective tool for lowering housing 
costs in certain areas” (my emphasis), but he also noted that where wages were low, traditional 
construction was actually cheaper.  Reed wondered if they were “trying to fit a square peg into a 
round hole” in using the IBEC Method in the developing world, where labor was cheap.  Reed 
wanted to instead develop other, more flexible low-cost housing approaches, such as pre-casting 
techniques or “the growing movement throughout the ‘under-developed’ countries toward so 
called ‘Self-Help’ projects.”  His memo also included a surprising conclusion; for all of the 
company’s investment in new technology and dedication to solving the housing shortage through 
machines, Reed felt that “the most needed single aid to low cost housing lies, not in the field of 
construction method, but in the field of financing.”39 Reed realized that it was not their vaunted 
Method that made IBEC Housing successful in Puerto Rico but the government’s FHA 
financing. 
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 Reed was determined to find a better construction system, and he investigated Puerto 
Rico’s rich array of housing experiments.  While visiting a tilt-up construction site, he was 
impressed with its cost and ease and estimated that it could save roughly $133 per house over the 
IBEC Method.40 The Reparto Santiago  Iglesias, a small 250-unit development IBEC Housing 
had in the pipeline, seemed like an optimal test for tilt-up construction.  Named after a Puerto 
Rican labor leader, the project had received a fair amount of attention in the press due to the fact 
that it was a collaboration between labor and capital: built by a Rockefeller, “the epitome of 
‘monopoly capitalism,’” and financed by members of the “socialist” International Ladies 
Garment Workers Union.41  
For the project, Barnes used a modified version of his Consolidated Vultee minimal 
house, with a large front porch, living-dining room, kitchen, bathroom, and an outdoor laundry 
(Figure 4.10).  The reinforced concrete panels were cast in beds on site in order to cut 
transportation costs.  After the concrete set, the panel was vacuum lifted to a curing stack.  Once 
ready, it was taken a short distance to the house site by trailer, where it was lifted and vertically 
placed on the edge of a roughly-poured floor slab.  Exposed reinforced rods at the edges of the 
panels allowed them to be welded to the slab, each other, and the roof panels.  While a small 
crane installed the wall panels, a bomber crane still handled the roof.  To finish the house, a 
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monolithic, faux-marble terrazzo floor was laid over the rough slab, doors and aluminum 
jalousies were set into openings, and the house was painted.42  
Cheaper and much more flexible in design, the pre-cast panels were clearly superior to 
the monolithic IBEC Method.  After the 2600-unit Lomas Verdes project was finished, IBEC 
decided to stop using the Method in Puerto Rico, and it sent the machinery south for a new 
project in Santiago, Chile.43 In its corporate literature, IBEC Housing changed its image from an 
entity built around the Method to a company that offered a variety of the latest, modern building 
technologies.  IBEC Housing promoted itself as a leader in the development of construction 
methods, and it continued to research new, low-cost housing solutions, mainly at the request of 
the Puerto Rican government.  In one of its more experimental projects, IBEC teamed with 
Puerto Rico’s housing agency, the Corporación de Renovación Urbana y Vivienda (CRUV; 
Urban Renewal and Housing Corporation) to build minimum-cost, emergency housing for 
victims of Hurricane Donna in 1960.  IBEC transported pre-cast panels and barrel-arched roofs 
to the site and erected shell houses in an hour (Figure 4.11).  The project used an element of self-
help as the homes were finished and decorated by the owner-occupier families.  IBEC 
executives, however, were not happy with the final result: the houses lacked running water and 
electricity, and the place quickly began to look like a slum.44 After the shell-housing program, 
IBEC adopted a policy against building unfinished houses or using any self-help in their 
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programs.  It was their last attempt “to live with the self-help program advocates [by]…join[ing] 
them.”45 
 IBEC Housing had the fortune of entering the Puerto Rican market just at the inception of 
its housing boom, and due to their financing and connections, they quickly became the largest 
single-family homebuilder on the island.  By 1960, the company had built 6,100 homes.  Four 
years later, IBEC held a “Double Ten” celebration, ten thousand homes in ten years.  The vast 
majority of their projects used tilt-up construction and were financed with FHA insurance.46  
 
Iraq and Iran 
 In the mid-1950s, the IBEC corporation as a whole began moving into new countries, 
operating in thirty-three nations by 1965, and into new activities, including mutual funds, 
manufacturing, supermarkets, and poultry.47 This expansionist push also infected the offices of 
IBEC Housing, where confidence from their Puerto Rico experience led executives to look for 
more opportunities abroad.   
Although executives promoted IBEC Housing as a developer of modern construction 
systems, their next efforts in the Middle East forced them to lose confidence in this approach.  In 
1956, the company attained a contract from the Iraqi Development Board, which was charged 
with leading a broad national program to introduce new building techniques and materials.  
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IBEC Housing was hired to erect twenty experimental two-story houses, using a special precast 
sandwich panel that consisted of two layers of dense concrete with a layer of foam concrete in-
between.  The local Al Mansur Construction Company also hired IBEC Housing to erect six 
model houses as a demonstration of different construction methods and materials, including 
precast sandwich panels, cast-in-place concrete, and foam concrete blocks.  For both of these 
projects, IBEC had to import heavy construction equipment that was not available in Iraq, 
including one of its bomber cranes.  These systems proved expensive and local contractors 
building with traditional brick construction consistently outbid IBEC for other Iraqi projects.  
When IBEC ended operations in Iraq, following the July 1958 coup that overthrew the monarchy 
and government, they lost a half-million dollar investment and one of their bomber cranes.48 
 The company did not find much more success in their only project in Iran, where IBEC 
signed a contract in 1958 to build a two-to-three-hundred unit project in Teheran at the invitation 
of the shah.  From the beginning, the project was marred with problems of financing, the use of 
construction techniques ill-suited to Teheran’s extreme hot and cold weather, and a sloped plot 
of land at the edge of the city that only supported two hundred units.  After using their slab 
system, which was more economical on larger-scale construction, and renegotiating better 
financing with a local bank, IBEC was able sell the homes—but it is unclear if they were able to 
recoup their investment (Figure 4.12).49 
  
Lima, Peru 
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In mid-September 1960, Harvey C. Weeks, the new Vice President of IBEC’s Housing 
Division, went to Lima to investigate the feasibility of a Peruvian housing program.  IBEC hoped 
to launch large-scale programs, similar to their activities in Puerto Rico, in Peru and Chile.  
While open opportunities had beckoned them to the Middle East, this time, they decided to be 
more cautious and follow the green stream of dollars that was beginning to flow from 
Washington to South America.  Their success in Puerto Rico and failure in Iraq and Iran made 
IBEC executives realize that Reed’s early analysis was correct: it was not so much building 
techniques but financing that limited housing construction in the developing world.  It was not 
the IBEC Method that had made their Puerto Rican enterprise lucrative but its FHA guaranties 
and access to US funds.  While an experimentation with construction technology marked IBEC 
Housing’s early endeavors, by the early 1960s—on the heels of changes in government policy—
the company began to shift its emphasis towards finding reliable long-term, low-cost mortgages 
in Latin America.50 
Weeks dedicated his first month in Lima to locating the basics for a housing program: 
land, architects, and mortgage financing.  Within a few weeks, he had secured the first two items 
on his list.  He found a large tract of land just outside Lima, the Hacienda Salamanca, which was 
well-priced, in a good location, and in possession of the right “snob appeal.”  IBEC had decided 
to start with a middle-class housing development, since it was a safer investment in Peru’s 
untested waters.  Weeks also hired “an excellent local architect,” Juan Gunther, who had 
designed IBEC supermarkets projects in Peru.51 Initial construction financing would come from 
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US sources, but first Weeks needed to find a Peruvian institution able to extend mortgage credit 
to potential purchasers of IBEC homes.  It quickly became apparent to Weeks that financing was 
the rare commodity that would determine the size and shape of the project.   
At the end of September, Weeks attended a small embassy dinner, where he learned just 
how difficult it would be to obtain mortgages for his future homebuyers.52 The usual diplomatic 
crowd was in attendance, but Weeks had come to the embassy dinner to speak to the grand-
daddy of Peru’s S&L system—the London School of Economics graduate, descendent of 
Spanish conquistadors, and “Converted Aristocrat,” Pedro Beltrán.53 It was Beltrán who had 
visited Washington in 1956 as a Peruvian representative to request ICA assistance in housing 
finance, which resulted in Peru’s new system of thrift institutions.  It was also Beltrán who had 
established Mutual Peru in 1957, the country’s first savings and loan association (mutual de 
ahorro y préstamo) under the US-written law.  There were one or two other nascent mutuales in 
the country, but the well-connected Beltrán was the only one who had managed to get a “seed 
capital” loan for his institution from the Development Loan Fund.54 When Beltrán became Peru’s 
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Prime Minister and Minister of Economy in August 1959, he “left” the Mutual by putting his 
son-in-law, Felipe Thorndike, in charge.  The DLF loan to Beltrán and Thorndike’s Mutual Peru 
was essentially Weeks’s only source of immediate financing.  Weeks spoke with both men at the 
embassy party, hoping they could commit twelve million soles to IBEC to build about two 
hundred homes at Hacienda Salamanca.  Although IBEC had originally planned to build one 
large project and the plot could fit roughly 1200 houses, Weeks decided to begin with a small 
development and build Salamanca in stages due to the uncertainty surrounding Peru’s thrifts.55 
Beltrán and Thorndike wanted to commit the money for the Salamanca project, partially because 
they believed IBEC, through the Rockefeller family, had some influence over Washington, but 
new regulations had recently made it more difficult for mutuales to transfer US funds, and it 
seemed they would not be able to offer him the full amount.56 
The regulations came from Washington and from Morton Bodfish, a US S&L technician 
stationed in Lima who became a constant subject in Weeks’s letters to New York, first described 
with criticism, then frustration, and finally exasperation.  Bodfish had been a member of the 
original US technical assistance team that had written Peru’s S&L legislation.  Weeks believed 
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Bodfish had “offended everyone here—Americans and Peruvians,” with his hardheaded and 
often condescending personality.  Bodfish had managed to sow a similar combination of 
controversy and respect at most of his prior positions.  He had been a key player in the rise of 
thrift institutions in the United States, as president of his own savings and loan in Chicago, 
advisor to President Hoover, original member of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and leader 
of the US Savings and Loan League, the industry’s professional organization, a position from 
which he had been forced out after one too many accusations of corruption.  Bodfish was almost 
single-handedly responsible for transforming the system of savings and loan in the United States 
into a bona fide industry through the shear force of his arrogant and powerful personality and his 
chummy relationship with central legislators.  
As a technical assistant in Lima, Bodfish had established unwritten rules for US “seed 
capital” funds that determined how much money IBEC could receive from the Peruvian 
mutuales.  He wanted to distribute money among many small builders that erected fifty houses 
each to keep the Peruvians from “playing cousins,” or favorites, and he especially scorned the re-
circulation of money back into US pockets.  At one meeting, Bodfish let Weeks know that he 
thought IBEC officials were “a bunch of parasites, coming down here to do a job without 
money.”  In fact, he did not think IBEC was “worth a damn.”57 Local Peruvian builders pressured 
the mutuales to at least loan the Peruvian deposits in their thrifts to them, but a large portion of 
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the US loans to Peruvian S&Ls were recycled back into US pockets.  Mutual Peru, for example, 
promised IBEC a quarter of its US-loan money and gave funds to other US builders active in the 
country.  The Peruvian S&Ls helped transfer development money from the US government to 
US businessmen.58  
Weeks and other IBEC Housing executives did not see themselves as “parasites” but as 
model builders, who were improving local housing, introducing large-scale building, reducing 
the cost of middle-class homes, demonstrating how to manage effectively a large construction 
site and use long-term financing, and showing other private builders in Peru how to put it all 
together to turn a profit.  They claimed that everything IBEC did in Latin America, it did to 
inspire other businessmen to follow, hoping the multiplier effect would boost economic 
development.59 
Weeks left his first month in Lima without any assurances about financing, but he still 
felt that IBEC should initiate a housing program in Peru.  The political situation seemed stable, 
and he believed that there was a good chance that the US would soon offer Peru more loan 
money, and when it did, IBEC would already be positioned to profit.60 Able to secure nine 
million soles from Beltrán’s Mutual Peru and three million from Mutual El Pueblo, a thrift 
recently established by Father Daniel McClellan, a priest from the United States, Weeks had 
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enough money to commence the first stage of Salamanca, a 216-unit development.61 Weeks 
believed these initial houses would act as a catalyst for increased savings, stronger thrift 
institutions, more mortgage money, and thereby an expanded Salamanca project.  IBEC 
executives in New York approved Weeks’s plan, wanting to build in Peru even on a “break-
even-basis.”62 
 
Rodman Goes to Washington 
In May 1961, Rodman C. Rockefeller, who had recently become president of the IBEC 
Housing Corporation, took a quick, two-day trip to Washington, DC, intent on using his 
influential surname to lobby international housing officials.  Rodman went to Washington, as did 
many private builders that year, in search of lucrative opportunities for IBEC.  The State 
Department was in the midst of expanding its international housing programs in Latin America, 
and Rodman wanted to carve out a role for his company and perhaps find government assistance 
for the company’s new Peruvian endeavor.   
Two months prior, President Kennedy had announced that the United States would 
sponsor Latin America’s economic and social development.  In an address to the American 
republics, he pledged to launch a “vast cooperative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and nobility 
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of purpose, to satisfy the basic needs of Latin American people for homes, work and land, health 
and schools,” and for emphasis he repeated these basic needs in Spanish, “techo, trabajo y tierra, 
salud y escuela.”63 The program, known as the Alliance for Progress—la Alianza para el 
Progreso—was a massive ten-year, $20 billion aid program (equivalent to over $100 billion in 
2011) aimed at improving the Latin American economy and standard-of-living in order to stave 
off the spread of Communism.  It was supposed to be the Marshall Plan that Latin American 
officials had long requested.64 The program would mostly focus on increasing the economic 
growth rate and productivity, creating a more equitable distribution of national income, and 
reducing unemployment.  The Alliance’s objectives included improvements in the fields of 
education, health, agriculture, and urban development.  The program was founded on self-help 
principles, helping Latin American governments develop and mobilize their own resources to 
create and meet development plans and targets.65 The Alliance officially marked a policy shift 
that had already begun to take shape in US foreign aid to underdeveloped countries: from a focus 
on the transfer of technical skills and knowledge, beginning with Point Four, to supporting and 
financing a long-term program of social and economic development.   
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During Rodman’s visit, Alliance planning was in full swing.  Government officials across 
various agencies were preparing for the August Inter-American conference in Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, where twenty-two Latin American countries and the United States would formally 
ratify a charter that spelled out the Alliance’s social and economic goals.  It was already clear 
from prior meetings that Latin American officials would demand broader US aid for the shelter 
sector.66 In Uruguay, housing would ultimately become the ninth objective of the Charter of 
Punta del Este, as the nations in attendance promised, “To increase the construction of low-cost 
houses for low-income families in order to replace inadequate and deficient housing and to 
reduce housing shortages; and to provide necessary public services to both urban and rural 
centers of population.”67 It was unclear exactly how this goal would be met, but US officials 
knew that the Alliance would need to provide financing for Latin American housing—a program 
they had resisted for most of the 1950s.  A variety of political and economic factors made them 
change course.  “In short,” summarized Timothy Atkeson of the Development Loan Fund, “the 
United States suddenly adapted the view that substantial aid should be given for housing in order 
to promote political conditions congenial to democracy and orderly economic development.”68 
But beyond the desire to devote large funds to housing in order to suppress radicalism, new 
development theories recast the shelter sector as a stimulant to the economy.  Development 
economists had classified housing assistance as a hindrance to growth because it funneled money 
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away from factories and infrastructure, which were viewed as the most important aspects of 
development.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s, some economists began to reevaluate these 
priorities and champion some social expenditures, including housing for its ability to stimulate 
savings, investment, and employment.69 If the goal was to improve Latin American housing 
significantly, US officials knew that they would have to finally address housing financing—not 
just issues of design and construction.  It was well understood that the federal government’s 
support and liberalization of home loans in the 1930s and 1940s had promoted the great postwar 
housing boom, and it was no secret that finance was a means to reduce Latin America’s massive 
housing deficit.   
Rodman and other American builders eagerly welcomed this increased focus on 
international housing, as they knew that it meant millions of dollars in loans would be channeled 
southward to build new dwelling units.  Indeed, during the 1960s—the “Decade of 
Development”—US international housing programs throughout the world ballooned, especially 
in Latin America where the Alliance launched housing programs in almost every nation.70 While 
Latin America had made up a small percentage of housing funds in the 1950s, in the following 
decade, it became the largest recipient of US housing aid in the world. 
At every institution Rodman visited, he realized that international housing policy was 
changing.  Old patterns and methods that had developed under Point Four would continue in the 
new program—the federal government was still intent on using experts to share “know-how”—
but in a complete policy shift that began under Eisenhower in the late 1950s, the US government 
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now directly financed construction and mortgages.  As the Alliance was supposed be a 
cooperative program and not a handout, the US provided long-term, below market-rate loans 
rather than grants, and local governments were also required to provide substantial contributions.  
The Alliance turned the Guatemalan program into a regional model as US loans for housing 
primarily traveled in two directions, to national housing authorities to build new developments, 
especially through self-help housing, and to institutions of mortgage financing.  Kennedy spelled 
out this strategy in his message to congress, requesting Alliance funds.  “Much can be done for 
middle income groups through improved credit mechanisms,” he wrote, “But, since the great 
majority of family incomes are only $10 to $50 a month, until income levels as a whole are 
increased, the most promising means of improving mass housing is through aided self-help 
projects.”71 In other words, self-help housing would be used until the Alliance helped incomes 
increase to levels at which the majority of the population could buy a home on the speculative 
market.  Under the Alliance, the US system of savings and loan became a chief export to Latin 
America, where thrifts had been almost nonexistent before US intervention.  By the end of the 
decade, technicians helped establish S&Ls in Bolivia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.72 Many of these countries developed 
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institutions along Chile’s model, which combined the functions of the FHA and thrifts into one 
institution.73 
In Washington, Rodman found “a great deal of confusion and uncertainty” amongst the 
government’s international housing offices—an apt description for the Alliance for Progress 
housing program throughout the 1960s, not just its inception.74 The government did not create a 
separate bureaucratic entity for the Alliance, but spread its tasks amongst various agencies.  
Responsibility for Latin American housing was divided between three major institutions—the 
State Department, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Loan Fund—
resulting in a disorder and lack of clear policy that was unfortunately common throughout 
Kennedy’s new program.  A theme of Alliance for Progress scholarship bears repeating here: the 
program is exceedingly difficult to study.75 Related papers in the National Archive are 
disorganized, uncataloged, dirty, and a great portion of them remain classified.  The chaos of the 
archives reflects the overall disorganization with which the Alliance was run.76 As just the 
housing program alone illustrates, multiple and overlapping funding and organizational schemes 
made it difficult to administer an effective aid program and make it difficult to study its history 
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today.  It is not surprising that to date, there is still no comprehensive scholarly history of the 
Alliance for Progress or USAID.  To introduce the reader to the new and confusing world of 
Alliance housing programs, this chapter will follow Rodman as he made his rounds during his 
May 1961 trip to Washington.  
 
The Development Loan Fund 
Rodman hoped to find support for private builders working in Latin America at the 
Development Loan Fund (DLF), which had ushered in the era of long-term development loans.  
President Eisenhower had established the institution in mid-1957 as a lending arm for the 
International Cooperation Administration to provide financing for development-oriented projects 
abroad by offering below market-rate loans for building roads, dams, industries, and other 
projects.  In 1960, DLF officials pioneered a new form of housing assistance for Latin America 
by supporting the creation of savings and loan associations to channel money into private 
construction.  Committed to using its funds to increase homeownership in Latin America, 
especially amongst the low- and middle-income groups, the DLF financed only private housing 
for sale that cost a maximum of $5,000, exclusive of land.77 
After ICA technicians helped Peru and Chile pass S&L legislation and establish thrift 
institutions, the DLF made its first “seed capital” loans to motivate the systems’ growth and 
prevent the early, slow accumulation of savings from inhibiting the outflow of mortgages.  These 
loans also provided US technicians with leverage to coax countries into emulating the US system 
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of housing finance.78 Only once the government of Peru established a central bank that emulated 
and functioned like the US Federal Home Loan Bank did the DLF issue a $7.5 million “seed 
capital” loan, provided it was matched by $7.5 million from the Peruvian government.79 As in 
the United States, the Peruvian thrifts were established to put homeownership within reach of its 
small middle class by offering twenty-year amortized mortgages with a twenty percent down 
payment.80 Before this intervention, Peruvian mortgages were typically five years with a thirty 
percent down payment.81  
Rodman had a disappointing meeting with George Wyeth, the Director of the Private 
Enterprise Section of the DLF, where he learned that the Fund did not plan to make direct loans 
to private builders.  Rather, they wanted to continue the trajectory they had started in Peru, 
loaning money to FHA-like institutions and national home loan banks in Latin America.82 In 
1961, the DLF made “seed capital” loans to mortgage financing institutions in Chile ($5 million), 
Ecuador ($5 million), Panama ($2.5 million), Peru ($1 million to a private S&L and $7.5 to a 
central bank), and Venezuela ($10 million).  As most of these loans supported middle-class 
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housing, the DLF also provided a $12 million loan to Colombia’s housing authority, the Instituto 
de Crédito Territorial, to redistribute as mortgages for aided self-help housing homeowners.83 
 
The Inter-American Development Bank 
Rodman also visited another relatively new institution, the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB), a multilateral regional bank founded in 1959 to invest in development projects.  The 
US government had long opposed the creation of such an institution but overturned its policy on 
the heels of the Cuban Revolution.84 Truman had charged the bank with administering the $394 
million (later increased to $525 million) Social Progress Trust Fund, authorized by congress, 
which mostly provided loans to Latin America for housing, sanitation, and education.  The 
agreement that set up the Trust Fund limited its use in the shelter sector to “housing for low 
income groups, through assistance to self-help housing and to institutions providing long-term 
housing finance and engaged in mobilizing domestic resources for this purpose.”85 The IDB 
Board of Directors established policies that further limited their assistance to unsubsidized, 
private homeownership, and in most cases, for new homes.  Stanley Baruch, the Housing 
Director from the ICA, became the Chief of Housing of the IDB in 1961, and assured Congress 
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that “every family receiving a mortgage which is financed in part with Social Progress Trust 
Fund resources must pay for the full cost of the house including land, urbanization, labor, 
materials, administrative overhead, etc.”86 
Rodman met with Rollin Atwood, the Chief of the Office of Special Operations, who had 
previously served as the Director for Latin America at the ICA, where he learned that the IDB 
planned to devote a large percentage of its housing budget to the creation of S&Ls throughout 
Latin America and the promotion of self-help housing for the lower-income group.  By the early 
1960s, this two pronged solution—S&Ls for the middle class and self-help for the working 
class—had become the standard US government international housing plan across its various 
agencies.  For the most part, the IDB followed this housing policy throughout the 1960s.  While 
the DLF’s early loans supported the development of thrifts in Chile, Peru, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, the IDB provided loans for S&Ls in El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, and 
Guatemala.  Loans to national housing authorities supported a variety of house types and 
financing schemes: thrifts, cooperatives, union-sponsored housing, and a significant portion to 
aided self-help housing.  By 1962, the IDB was funding self-help housing projects in Argentina, 
Chile, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela.  One of the largest IDB loans, $15.2 million (with $15 million local 
participation) went to Colombia’s national housing agency, the Instituto de Crédito Territorial, 
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for 13,000 dwelling units in Kennedy City to be built through self-help, mortgage lending, and 
public bidding.87   
 
The United States Agency for International Development 
Officials at the State Department and the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) 
echoed the same ideas promoted by the DLF and IDB: their plan was to use loans to support the 
spread of thrift institutions for the middle class and aided self-help for the lower-income group in 
Latin America.  At the State Department, Rodman met with two development officials, Milton 
Barall and Alex Rosenson, as well as Stanley Baruch, the head of the ICA Housing Division, 
who echoed the thoughts of the DLF and IDB. 
The ICA would not exist for much longer as the Kennedy administration was intent on 
overhauling the country’s foreign aid program, not just to Latin America but the entire “third 
world.”  Their goal was to transform the ad hoc and limited development programs that had 
evolved during the 1950s into a coordinated, full-scale, million-dollar loan program aimed at 
long-term, self-perpetuating growth.  To make these sweeping changes, the Kennedy 
administration submitted the Act for International Development (later renamed the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961) to Congress, which would transform the ICA into the United States 
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Agency for International Development (USAID or AID), the final reorganization of the State 
Department’s aid agency that exists today.88 
Throughout the 1960s, a substantial portion of AID’s budget went to loan programs that 
supported major capital projects meant to facilitate economic development.  Despite the 
Alliance’s mandate for shelter improvement, housing was still treated as a secondary field.  
Some guidelines had been set in the Foreign Assistance Act, which instructed that housing 
programs should place emphasis on “the purchase of homes,” and stressed the use of savings and 
loans, free labor, and cooperatives.89 It was not until August 1962, a year after its establishment, 
that AID officials approved an agency policy on housing.  The resultant document continued 
prior ICA programs and codified ideas that had already permeated international housing, 
providing loans and technical assistance to intermediate credit institutions and publicly-financed 
housing authorities.  The programs were designed to encourage homeownership by supporting 
S&Ls, self-help programs, and cooperatives.  It declared that US interest in housing assistance 
was both economic and political, as “Poor housing may be a significant factor in matters of 
health, family stability, moral values, and political unrest . . . particularly true in some urban 
slum areas where general economic and political discontent may be exacerbated by extremely 
low housing standards.”90   
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The Alliance for Progress was organized through AID’s Bureau for Latin America.  
Although AID Alliance resources were supposed to supplement IDB housing programs, in 
reality, there was no clear line of demarcation between the programs, and both supported S&Ls 
and aided self-help throughout the region.  In its first three years of operation, AID initiated a 
variety of projects in Latin America, including $2 million for 1,200 aided self-help homes in 
Buenos Aires, $3 million for aided self-help housing in Chile, $2.1 million to establish a 
National Housing Dank in the Dominican Republic to support a nationwide system of savings 
and loan, $30 million slum clearance project in Venezuela, $400,000 for a union project in 
Honduras (Figures 4.13 and 4.14), and $30 million for slum clearance in Venezuela.91 
Throughout the 1960s, USAID funded: large slum clearance projects in Latin American cities, 
moving squatters to new communities on the outskirts of cities (Figure 4.15), self-help housing 
programs for urban and rural communities (Figure 4.16), and a wide variety of other projects, 
spreading the Alliance’s handshake logo throughout the region (Figure 4.17).  Although policy 
favored single-family housing, some aid also helped produce multifamiliares in the region 
(Figure 4.18). 
 
The Housing and Home Finance Agency 
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 After Rodman visited the major institutions involved in Latin American housing—the 
DLF, IDB, and the State Department—he was alarmed to find that almost all of the officials he 
talked to—Atwood, Barall, Rosenson, and Baruch—viewed aided self-help housing as a policy 
priority, supporting its widespread use for low-income shelter.  Although self-help is technically 
a construction strategy that could be applied to any house type, with only a few exceptions, US 
government aided self-help resulted in complete single-family homes for sale, of the variety 
developed in the Caribbean.92 Rodman was quite disturbed by the “unquestioning” and “blind 
acceptance” of the system, feeling that there was not enough evidence to justify such universal 
endorsement.93 Within ten years, Jacob Crane’s concept had managed to pervade quietly all 
levels of international housing policy.  There is no simple way to account for aided self-help’s 
popularity, but as Rodman pinpointed, the system had run up the ranks of government through 
“blind acceptance.”  Although ICA self-help housing programs were underway in a number of 
countries, including Korea, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Surinam, Trinidad, Ecuador, Rhodesia, 
Nigeria, British Honduras, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Venezuela, Indonesia, and Israel, with 
mixed levels of success, and the Guatemalan program, the largest in Latin America, had already 
switched to hired labor—few in Washington outside the housing office knew such details.  Aided 
self-help had become a policy darling without any real institutional reflection or critical 
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evaluation.  Officials turned to self-help in part because it was the only major idea in circulation 
for solving low-income housing problems in the developing world.  There really were no 
competing theories or experiments, and the “blind acceptance” of self-help further hindered the 
growth of any alternative schemes.  It also did not hurt that aided self-help had been well-
branded, encapsulating the ideology behind post-war foreign aid in microcosm.  US development 
aid was intended to “help countries help themselves” by marshalling their own talent and 
recourses into economic growth.  Self-help housing appropriated the same language and was 
often held up as a symbol of this philosophy at work.  A  1967 Alliance report beamed that “Self-
help home building in Latin America embodies the true spirit of the Alliance.”94 
Surprisingly, Rodman only found skeptics of the system at the HHFA, the birthplace of 
US government self-help housing.  There, Rodman met with a group of men that included the 
Administrator, Robert C. Weaver, and Daniel R. Hamady, the Assistant Administrator for 
International Housing.  By 1961, the ICA almost solely coordinated international housing, and 
the HHFA International Office was relegated to handling foreign visitors and recruiting ICA 
consultants and was seldom invited to participate in major policy decisions.  The HHFA officials 
were frustrated that the State Department had not consulted their office in their current expansion 
of housing efforts.  Administrator Weaver felt that self-help housing, taking on a central role in 
international housing, was “a dangerous program upon which to place all one’s attentions,” but 
his reservations were rarely aired beyond the HHFA office. 
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 Rodman had hoped to secure government support for IBEC projects in Latin American, 
and he left Washington feeling discouraged that no agency had shown interest in directly 
financing US contractors to build housing abroad.  Most of the institutions wanted to focus on 
lower-income, social housing, especially built through aided self-help.  But Rodman would not 
be disappointed for long; when the Act for International Development would finally pass in 
September, Congress would establish a new program, the Housing Investment Guaranty, to 
involve private US builders in the construction of housing projects similar to those insured by the 
FHA in Latin America.95  
 
IBEC Starts Building in Peru 
Weeks was optimistic that the Peruvian government would support IBEC’s plan to build 
homes.  Led by President Manuel Prado y Ugarteche, the government was determined to reduce 
the pueblos jóvenes, or shantytowns, that had grown around Lima.  It was estimated that Peru 
needed between a million and a million and a half new dwelling units within the decade.  Paul 
Foster, who had established a city planning office in Nicaragua as a Point Four technician, 
became the Chief Housing Advisor for AID in Lima and helped initiate a variety of housing 
programs.  In 1961, the government established a national housing institute, the Instituto de la 
Vivienda, in order to attain US Alliance for Progress loans and carry out a ten-year national 
housing program, commencing with a two-year “crash” project using a $22.8 million loan from 
the Inter-American Development Bank to partly finance 35,000 dwelling units.  The project 
introduced utilities and public services into squatter settlements, low-income shell housing, and 
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aided self-help housing.96 AID also enacted a slum clearance project in Canta Gallo and resettled 
about 2,300 of its displaced families in Chacarilla de Otero, a new suburban development to the 
north of Lima where the families built self-help homes.  AID technicians also helped launch 
housing cooperatives in the country through a $6 million loan (and $4 million Peruvian 
government contribution) and built an 800-unit aided self-help project in the town of Chimbote.97 
While Peru’s Instituto de la Vivienda received Alliance loans to build low-income 
housing, IBEC planned to take advantage of loans made to the country’s mutuales.  In March 
1961, IBEC broke ground in Salamanca on three model homes, one each of the two- to four-
bedroom types Gunther had designed.  The homes were not built by road-building machines, 
bomber cranes, or even pre-cast construction.  As a sign that their early machine-heavy efforts 
had been misguided, the homes were built by old-fashioned manual labor.  Traditional brick 
construction was, in the end, the cheapest way to build in Lima (Figure 4.19).  To keep the 
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project on budget, the company only hired Peruvian workers, except for Weeks, and to keep their 
investment at a minimum, they subcontracted almost all of the labor.98  
After three months of construction, Weeks placed a quarter-page advertisement in each of 
Lima’s two leading papers to announce the opening of the model Salamanca homes.  US builders 
introduced both volume building and the marketing strategy of the “open house” to Peru.  Eager 
visitors entered the rectilinear homes through the living-dining room, which had large picture 
windows that looked over a front garden (Figure 4.20), and admired the modern furnishings 
provided by Sears in Peru.  A short corridor provided access to the bedrooms and a single 
bathroom, while the kitchen connected the living room to an enclosed outdoor service patio and 
garden.  Front and rear gardens flanked the homes (Figure 4.21).  Made of reinforced concrete, 
brick, and tile, the houses were also designed for expansion, as the enclosed service garden could 
easily convert to a service room and bathroom and the roof was designed to support a second 
story.  The houses cost between 88,800 soles and 125,000 soles (about $3,500 to $4,800), within 
the limit of the DLF’s $5000 policy, to be paid with a 30% down payment and twenty-year 
mortgage, with each house producing an average $485 profit for IBEC.99  
Within the first week of the open house, all 216 homes of Salamanca’s first section were 
reserved, with a waiting list of 1500 people who wanted to buy homes in the proceeding sections, 
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if, and when, more long-term mortgage financing became available.  Even though it was not 
clear if the mutuales would be able to oblige, Gunther began planning the next three sections of 
roughly 200 houses each, as the first section was erected (Figure 4.22).   
Construction on the second sector proceeded in fits and starts, as political and economic 
contingencies in Washington repeatedly opened and shut the tap of US funds.  In the summer of 
1962, the Kennedy Administration temporarily suspended all aid to Peru, including loans, as a 
response to its July coup.100 In November, the Peruvian government finally established a central 
home loan bank, the Banco de la Vivienda (Housing Bank), to allocate funds to thrift institutions, 
a requirement to receive a $7.5 million AID/DLF “seed capital” loan (at the end of 1961, the 
DLF became a part of USAID).101 Within the first six months of 1962, the number of Peruvian 
savings and loan associations increased from four to nine, but very little money flowed to the 
mutuales while the bureaucracy of the central bank was slowly set up.  By the middle of 1963, 
the mutuales had largely exhausted their funds and sat, with empty coffers, waiting for the Banco 
de la Vivienda to act. They had funded the construction of about 1,300 homes in Peru, a little 
over a third of which were in Salamanca.  The IBEC project had deeded 374 houses, and another 
83 houses in Salamanca’s second sector sat completed but could not be sold due to a lack of 
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mortgage money.  No new houses in the third sector had been started.  Salamanca was 
paralyzed.102  
 
AID Housing Guaranty 
At the same time that construction ceased at Salamanca, another US builder was busy 
erecting Apollo, a 440-unit development in Lima, to be sold at an extravagant 123,500 soles per 
house.  Apollo was not reliant on Peru’s shaky, nascent S&L system; instead, the bustle of the 
construction site was directly fed by mortgage money from the United States.103 These 
developers were taking part in a new US-government initiative, the Housing Investment 
Guaranty program, established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, a program that resulted 
from a strong lobbying campaign on the part of private US builders.   
The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB), the trade group of private US 
builders established in 1942, had been an active force in international housing since the late 
1950s.  NAHB members had been involved in goodwill State Department trips—such as an 
exchange visit seven members took to Poznan, Poland in the middle of 1957 to study housing—
and had been hired as ICA consultations—exemplified by the trip Richard D. Hudson, a New 
Jersey builder and Chairman of the NAHB research institute, took to Chile to start a pilot 
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program to industrialize the Chilean lumber industry.104 The National Housing Center on L 
Street in Washington was their private version of the HHFA’s International Housing Office, 
hosting individuals from abroad, working to exchange knowledge, and using the Center to spread 
the “concept of homeownership, obtained through private enterprise…to virtually every corner 
of the world.”  It wasn’t until the late 1950s, that the NAHB began to see the true financial 
potential of working with the State Department.105 
Beginning in 1957, the incredible post-war housing boom in the United States began to 
slow, and builders became more eager to expand south of the border.  NAHB President Larry 
Blackmon, himself an international builder, described international housing as “a tremendous 
business opportunity and challenge, but at the same time a great service to the world to do 
something about housing her people.”106 To construct abroad, builders needed to coax US 
investors to put money in South American housing, a typically risky venture due to regional 
inflation and political instability.  The NAHB developed the idea of an FHA for Latin America, 
where the US government would protect housing investments.  NAHB lobbyists sold the 
program to Congress as one that would “demonstrate” and spread US building and financing 
techniques to Latin America, while promoting the free market and homeownership.  As the 
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chairman of NAHB’s International Housing Committee, Dan L. Dise, commented, “Nothing 
adds as much to economic and political stability as homeownership.  Houses have impact . . . 
People are conceived, live and die in them,” but warning, “The impact can be bad if we loan 
money from our government to another government to build houses that are sold, rented or given 
away on a spoils system to people of the party in power.”107  
The NAHB’s lobbying resulted in passage of the AID Housing Guaranty in 1961, which 
protected US investors, typically insurance companies, that provided long-term financing for 
housing projects built by US builders in Latin America.108 AID guarantied investments and 
compensated lenders for all losses, including loss through expropriation or confiscation, damage 
caused by war, or from usual business reasons.  The program was riskier for the government than 
the domestic FHA, but USAID officials saw it more as “an economic development tool” than a 
mortgage insurance program.  Losses were written off as the cost inherent in trying to develop 
housing in less industrialized countries.  To motivate investors, the act also initially set interest 
rates slightly higher than those for similar loans incurred by the FHA.109 
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Congress authorized the program in 1961 to guaranty $10 million worth of housing 
investments in Latin America, an amount that increased to $250 million by 1964.  Although the 
original act guarantied seventy-five percent of loans, by 1962 it was amended to full coverage.  
In October 1963, the FHA opened a Latin American office to process applications.  To be 
accepted into the program, projects had to be built for sale by private US builders and similar to 
domestic FHA projects: single-family homes for middle- and lower-middle income families in 
Latin America, built to last, and with utilities.  Some FHA standards were relaxed for Latin 
America: most, but not all, of the projects had paved streets and some of the FHA’s minimum 
standards were reduced.  Because projects were intended to serve as “pilot demonstrations” for 
local builders and financial institutions, projects were accepted if they offered something new to 
a host country that could be replicated.  The first housing investment guaranty was approved in 
1963 for Las Americas, a middle-income project in Cali, Colombia.110 
 The solution to IBEC’s financing woes in Peru was yet another US government foreign 
aid program.  But as with the mutuales, the process to get a guaranty from the FHA was bumpy 
and held up by numerous bureaucratic glitches.  Although IBEC submitted an application to the 
FHA’s Latin American office in July 1963, it was not until April 1964 that they received an 
affirmative answer: a $2.2 million guaranty to build 506 units in Salamanca to be sold for an 
average 150,000 soles ($5,500).111 The FHA approved Salamanca because officials believed it 
                                                
110 Press Release, “First Investment Guaranty for Housing in Latin America,” 30 Aug. 1962, 
folder “AID Investment Guarantees, 1962,” box 14, RG 207, International Affairs Subject Files, 
1942-64, NARA. 
 
111 In the interim period, the liquidity of the Peruvian mutuales began to improve, and with 
financing from Mutual Peru, IBEC was able to finish the 377-unit third stage of Salamanca and 
start part of the fourth. “Explanation of Delay in Sales to Date,” 16 May 1964, IBEC fiche, Peru 
Salamanca, 753-07, card 14; Harvey C. Weeks, “Report on Salamanca de Monterrico,” Feb. 22, 
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demonstrated how to use long-term financing and large-scale production to build middle-class 
housing.112 The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Iowa and the Fidelity Mutual Life 
Insurance Company of Philadelphia provided the long-term investment, and the Banco de la 
Vivienda del Perú acted as a local administrator, inspecting and supervising the project, sending 
reports back to the FHA in Washington, from inception until the mortgage was completely 
repaid.  Homeowners in the FHA section of Salamanca received twenty-year mortgages with a 
twenty percent down payment.  At the end of 1965, when funding financing switched from the 
mutuales to FHA-guaranteed financing, a total of 1,000 dwellings had been built in Salamanca.  
It was the first time any private builder had constructed as many units in one Peruvian project.113  
At the end of 1966, construction began on the 1,500th and final home in Salamanca, a 
housing project in Lima built with public and private US funds streamed through local S&Ls and 
                                                                                                                                                       
1965, folder 1441, box 79, series 8, RG 3B 21 (IBEC); letter from Eduardo Raygada to John 
Kelly, 22 Feb. 1964, IBEC fiche, Peru Salamanca, 753-07, card 13; “Market Data,” June 1964, 
IBEC fiche, series J, reel 119; memorandum from Rodman C. Rockefeller to the Files, 1 Feb. 
1965, IBEC fiche, Peru Salamanca, 753-07, card 17; memorandum from C. Allen Ellis to 
Rodman C. Rockefeller, 17 Apr. 1964, IBEC fiche, series J, reel 119, RAC. 
Salamanca ended using the guarantee for only 456 homes and Peruvian S&Ls; the difference was 
covered by Peruvian mutuales.  Letter from Rodman C. Rockefeller to Harvey C. Weeks, 12 
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112 Letter from William T. Stansbury to Murray Silberman, 14 Sep. 1965, folder 1444, box 80, 
series 8, RG 3B 21 (IBEC), RAC. 
 
113 The administrator was paid through a fee on the homeowner’s monthly payments.  “Operating 
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Agency for International Development Housing Investment Guaranty Program,” 17 Aug. 1963, 
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the Latin American office of the FHA.114 In 1967, IBEC signed another $2.7 million Housing 
Investment Guaranty for Alto de la Luna, a new 546-unit project in Arequipa, Peru.  Although 
the projects were attractive and well-built, they failed in their primary function; they were 
ineffective stimulants for development.  Salamanca, and other Latin American FHA projects, 
neither helped the local system of mutuales nor created a multiplier effect among local builders.  
The company’s plan had been to “demonstrate” new housing strategies, but they mostly 
demonstrated a “known”: that the shortage of middle-class housing in Peru was the result of a 
lack of financing—not materials, architects, or “know how.”  Between 1961 and 1965, The 
Housing Investment Guaranty covered $450 million in private US investment to build 90,000 
middle-income homes, but as with IBEC and Salamanca, US builders and investment firms were 
the greatest beneficiaries of the program.115 The IBEC story demonstrates how private US 
builders were able to take advantage of the government’s programs for their own profit.  In doing 
so, they built FHA-type housing developments, projects like Salamanca de Monterrico, which 
spread US-style suburbs into Latin America for the region’s middle class. 
In 1965, AID officials, concerned that the Housing Investment Guaranty program mostly 
profited US builders and did little to help Latin Americans, requested Congress to amend the 
legislation, to re-orient the program towards institution building, development, and low-income 
housing.  The original program that helped US builders attain loans to build “demonstration 
projects” was replaced with four new types of loan guaranties: to home mortgage institutions in 
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Latin America; to housing projects for lower-income families; to housing projects that promoted 
the development of institutions, such as free labor unions, cooperatives, and other private 
enterprise programs; or to low-cost developments that used mortgage financing sources from 
Latin America.116  
The Alliance’s broader housing programs, through the DLF, IDB, and USAID, were also 
coming under criticism.  Between 1961 and 1965, these institutions made loans close to $500 
million to finance the construction of roughly 500,000 homes.  The IDB provided housing loans 
to fourteen countries, applying more than forty percent of the Social Progress Trust Fund to low-
cost housing projects.117 Between 1960 and 1969, the number of housing units built by Latin 
America’s public sector rose from 62,000 to 278,000 units, with an annual growth rate of 
eighteen percent.  Although significant, it was not nearly enough to keep pace with the increase 
of the housing deficit, exacerbated by the continued rural migration to urban areas.118 As one 
report critical of the Alliance put it, “urban squatters in Latin America have erected many more 
square feet of housing than the Alliance has built.”119  
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It was not just that the Alliance had failed to reach its naïve goal of reducing the housing 
shortage, it was that the programs themselves were poorly executed.  Throughout the 1960s, new 
homeowners in Latin America worked cooperatively on aided self-help projects and S&Ls 
provided mortgages to erect middle-class homes, but many of these projects, especially the larger 
and more visible “crash projects,” were poorly planned.  When Carlos Lacerda, the governor of 
the Brazilian state of Guanabara, wanted to eliminate shantytowns in the center of Rio de 
Janeiro, he received Alliance assistance counterpart funds to develop a model slum clearance 
project that relocated the residents to two new housing projects on the outskirts of the city, Villa 
Alianza and Villa Kennedy.  Real estate developers, who gained access to the cleared property, 
and neighboring luxury apartment owners benefited from the program, while the shantytown 
residents moved to new housing far from any employment opportunities, and with an expensive 
bus ride into Rio that consumed a quarter of their monthly earnings.  Lacerda’s opponents 
capitalized on the poor execution of the program, and he lost his reelection.  Similar problems 
and protests emerged after the building of other Alliance satellite cities: the model community of 
Ventanilla, launched by Pedro Beltrán, was established fifteen miles outside the capital in a 
sandy desert, while Kennedy City was built without access roads and bus routes to Bogotá.120   
Furthermore, the US government’s emphasis on spreading homeownership, even 
amongst the lower-income group, was failing.  The average low-cost housing unit built with 
Alliance funds cost between $1,500 and $2,000, requiring payments of $10 to $15 a month.  
While this amount was within the means of unskilled wage earners, the public housing 
institutions still encountered high levels of evasion from the occupants of low-cost housing, with 
                                                




arrears in some projects amounting to fifty percent.  Without recouping their investment, 
institutions were unable to begin new housing projects.121 The Alliance’s policy came out of the 
experience of the United States and Europe, regions that had a much higher rate of income and 
savings than Latin America.   
These housing developments represented prominent and embarrassing examples of the 
Alliance’s failure.  It was not just the housing program that was under criticism.  By the mid-
1960s, it was clear that the Alliance for Progress as a whole had made little political and 
economic impact in the region and had failed to reach the majority of its goals.  Development 
was much more complex than the simple exportation of US “know how” and loans.  The 
Alliance’s primary objective, on which most effort had been expended and all other goals were 
dependent, had been an economic growth rate of at least 2.5 percent per capita per year in each 
country. but between 1961 and 1967, the average increase was only 1.5 percent.  The second 
major goal—a more equitable distribution of national income—displayed little of any 
improvement.122 The Alliance came under heavy criticism, for its failure and imperialistic 
attitude, in the United States and Latin America, where its name—la Alianza para el Progreso—
could be conveniently reinterpreted as the “the Alliance Stops Progress.123 There was no official 
end to the Alliance; instead, it just slowly petered out during the late 1960s, as focus shifted 
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away from Latin America after the assassination of President Kennedy and President Johnson 
made Vietnam a priority.124 
As this criticism and gradual fading reduced AID loans in the late 1960s, the Housing 
Investment Guaranty became AID’s primary means to provide long-term financing for housing 
in the developing world, which continued to encourage private US lenders to provide long-term 
financing for housing projects abroad.  Over time, the Housing Investment Guaranty program 
turned to supporting the growth of S&L institutions in Latin America, primarily channeling loans 
to housing finance institutions, rather than to private sponsors and developers of individual 
projects (the Latin American office of the FHA consequently closed).  By the early 1970s, local 
S&Ls financed most private housing purchases in Latin America, with 220 associations and 
more than 500,000 homes financed through 1972.  In 1969, congress decided to make the 
Housing Guaranty program worldwide in scope, and provided it with a $130 million additional 
authority, creating a total congressional authority of $705.1 million.125  
By the early 1970s, USAID’s Housing Guaranty had covered $550 million in Latin 
America, which amounted to 51,367 units in 68 projects, but its program was still was coming 
under heavy criticism.126 An investigation conservatively estimated that only families in the top 
29% of household wealth could afford the houses built through the Housing Guaranty and only 
families in the top 21% were actually buying them.  The report also found that the program had 
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“no appreciable impact” on the difficult objective of improving housing for lower-income 
families.127 Officials in Venezuela, Colombia, and other Latin American countries complained 
that the program’s demonstration value had been negligible and its housing projects were not 
popular.  It still seemed that US investors, who had been guaranteed a return and operated 
without a loss, were the greatest beneficiaries.  Between 1963 and 1973, the USAID paid $1.2 
million to US investors on nineteen projects, most claims resulting from currency devaluation.128 
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From Point Four in 1949 to the Alliance for Progress in 1961, the US government 
initiated a wide variety of housing programs in Latin America, including: aided self-help 
housing, cooperatives, union housing, private middle-class developments funded by local 
savings and loans or USAID Housing Guaranties, and new satellite cities.  US international 
housing had a substantial impact on Latin America’s built environment, as technicians helped 
spread modes of concrete building, trained local architects, engineers, and bureaucrats, rewrote 
legislation, introduced new types of community plans, and demonstrated large-scale 
construction.  By sharing “know how” and providing large loans, technicians helped spread the 
US suburban subdivision throughout Latin America.  The goal was not just to alleviate Latin 
America’s squatter problem but to use housing to introduce US middle-class values to an 
unstable region.   
International housing programs failed for several reasons, not the least of which was the 
fact that US officials rarely reevaluated their program during this period.  Instead of a careful 
analysis of needs and conditions, a policy was cobbled together that sought to export US housing 
systems with a few modifications for the developing world.  It was a policy that grew out of 
momentum rather than reflection.  Mortgage markets were created through FHAs and thrift 
institutions to stimulate the construction of private middle-class homes, while government 
housing authorities helped the low-income group build their own homes through aided self-help 
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housing.  Although the establishment of S&Ls helped stimulate the construction of middle-class 
housing, US builders seemed to have been the prime beneficiaries of these programs.  In 
countries such as Guatemala, US housing assistance also reconfigured the urban fabric to favor 
the development of suburban homes.   
The US government continued to expand its self-help housing program even though it 
was not necessarily cheaper than a house built by skilled labor.  The use of expensive materials 
and long construction times drove up costs, leaving low-income individuals with modern, single-
family homes and mortgages they could not afford.  Despite signs in Guatemala in the late 1950s 
that self-help housing was an inadequate strategy to address the shelter needs of the poor, 
officials in Washington continued to push the system throughout the 1960s, blinded by a belief 
that self-help created democratic individuals—independent, self-reliant, and home-owning.   
By the early 1970s, government officials, technicians, and housers had realized that there 
were no clear and simple solutions for improving the housing conditions of the developing world 
and that the large, invasive, and expensive programs of the 1960s had proved to be failures.  
Housing was a complex issue, involving multiple structural issues, and there was no “silver 
bullet” to check the growth of the region’s shantytowns.  The failure of Alliance housing 
programs in the 1960s led to a policy shift in 1973, when congress passed a new Foreign 
Assistance Act that compelled USAID to focus on the alleviation of human suffering and address 
“basic human needs” rather than economic growth.  In 1973, the US government also 
significantly reduced its housing programs and ceded the field of international housing to the 
World Bank.  
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Pushed by the “new directions” of 1973, as the “basic needs” policy was labeled, AID 
rewrote its shelter sector policy to focus more on requirements of lower-income groups.1 AID 
officials encouraged developing countries to adopt national housing policies that addressed the 
housing needs of all its people and helped countries develop institutions that could reach the poor 
majority.  AID technicians returned to implementing limited, small-scale solutions, as it had in 
the 1950s.  Their policies were shaped by new ideas that emerged in reaction to the large-scale 
international housing efforts of the 1960s.  John F. C. Turner emerged in this period as an 
influential critic of Alliance-type housing programs.  Through studies of Peruvian squatter 
settlements, Turner came to the conclusion that such settlements were not the problem, but rather 
the solution.  He called for a new type of self-help housing that gave full control to the resident-
builders, believing that squatters, rather than the government, were the best judges of their own 
needs and the best equipped to address them.  He advocated “progressive development”—
incremental changes in squatter homes—rather than the “instant development” the United States 
government had implemented.2 His writing helped change the international housing landscape, 
and USAID’s new policy enacted slum upgrading—providing better roofs, utilities, and services 
to existing squatter homes—over the demolition of squatter settlements and the construction of 
entirely new sites.   
USAID officials again concentrated on developing minimum shelters to reduce housing 
costs and introducing alternative shelter methods, such as: slum upgrading—improving access to 
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utilities, roads, health, and education centers; sites and services—grading land and dividing it 
into lots, with water and sewage, health centers, schools, and markets; core housing—a sites and 
services approach with a basic housing shell on each lot (four walls, a roof, and water facilities) 
designed to be expanded by the owner with self-help labor; and low-cost units for sale or rental.  
These more modest programs were viewed as a new approach in housing aid, and little attention 
was paid to the field’s early history.3 The projects were mostly financed through USAID’s 
Housing Guaranty, which was reoriented from middle-income housing to sheltering the poor, but 
the loans could not reach the poorest sectors of society or the poorest developing nations due to 
the commercial-rate financing.  The Housing Guaranty program was still politically motivated 
and tied to State Department goals.  For example, between 1975 and 1976, 82% of the Housing 
Guaranty loans went to only four countries: Chile, Israel, Korea, and Portugal.  From 1961 to 
1995, the program helped channel $2.7 billion in loans (valued at $5 billion in 1995) to forty-
four countries for home construction, mortgages, shelter improvements, urban infrastructure, and 
other housing-related projects.4  
The Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s had a significant impact on the housing 
program, shifting its emphasis toward aiding more advanced, credit-worthy countries and 
addressing financial and structural issues.5 USAID changed its housing goal from demonstrating 
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the construction of low-cost housing projects to enacting policy reform in recipient countries, 
and the Housing Guaranty was used as leverage for recipient countries to enact USAID-
recommended reforms.  USAID officials helped Chile establish laws to create a mortgage-
backed securities market, Ecuador to index housing finance to inflation in order to stimulate 
private investment in housing during periods of high inflation, and Tunisia to convert a central 
government agency from directly producing individual housing to a wholesaler of land to private 
developers.6 
The debt crisis also hurt the financial health of the Housing Guaranty program as 
uncollected debt more than doubled from 1989 to 1994.  A 1995 report concluded that the 
program was in serious peril as the fees the program charged investors only covered 
administrative costs and not the large cost of defaulted loans, which by 1995, had cost the US 
government over $540 million.  As a result of criticism and a general antipathy in Congress 
towards foreign aid programs following the Republican Revolution, the Housing Guaranty was 
slowly wound down until it was officially terminated in 2000.  USAID today still provides 
housing aid as part of its urban development program.7 
 In 1973, when the United States began to pull back its housing aid and significantly 
reduce its assistance, the World Bank entered the field.  Robert McNamara, as World Bank 
president, launched a slum-focused shelter aid program, as part of his plan to shift the institution 
to address urban problems.  In housing, the Bank’s policy was similar to USAID’s “new 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
6 Office, Foreign Housing Guaranty Program: Financial Condition Is Poor and Goals Are Not 
Achieved. 
 
7 Peter Kimm (Director of Housing and Urban development at USAID, 1966-2000), in 




directions” as it initiated sites-and-services and slum-upgrading projects in Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia.8 
Beginning in 1973, the World Bank took up the majority of international housing 
activities, and their programs grew throughout the 1970s and early 1980s.  But while sites-and-
services type projects were their initial emphasis, from 1987 to 2005, they made up only fifteen 
percent of loans.  As with USAID, World Bank policy shifted as a result of the Latin American 
debt crisis and high inflation, which left officials feeling that they needed to address larger sector 
concerns.  Beginning in the late 1980s, the Bank’s focus shifted to housing finance and policy-
oriented projects (as well as disaster relief), helping liberalize and deregulate the financial 
systems of developed countries.9 Policy moved away from poverty orientation and supporting 
low-income housing towards the creation of an active private sector and expanding mortgage 
financing.10 
From the early 1950s to the mid-2000s, international housing policy has progressed in a 
cycle: from limited assistance in the 1950s, to a broader, more ambitious approach that sought to 
reform the entire housing sector in the 1960s, back to a humbled emphasis on incremental 
change in the 1970s, and returning to sectoral concerns in the 1980s and 1990s.  The history of 
international housing illustrates how ideas flow in cycles, how they move from popularity, to 
gospel, to dismissal, and back again.  Although each turn in the international housing cycle 
differed from its predecessor—sites-and-services were not the same as aided self-help housing—
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the motivating philosophy was similar: whether officials believed the best mode of effecting 
change was to aim at small, incremental transformations or to tackle broad structural issues.  It 
will be interesting to see how the sub-prime mortgage crisis will affect USAID housing policy, 
which helped liberalize mortgage markets abroad in the 1990s and 2000s.  Perhaps international 









Due to copyright restrictions, some figures have been removed from this dissertation. 
 
 
Figure 1: Kennedy places a symbolic brick in Ciudad Techo (later renamed Ciudad Kennedy), 
Colombia, December 1961.   
Photograph from M. Carter McFarland, “Alliance for Progress Makes Housing Instrument of 





Figure 2: US and Brazilian officials dedicate a plaque at Vila Kennedy, a low-cost housing 
project in Maceio in Northeast Brazil.  In this photograph: Jack Kubish, Director USAID/Brazil 
(center), Mrs. Kubish (holding the cloth), Governor Luiz Cavalcanti, John Dieffenderfer, 
Director of the Northeast Brazil program, and Brazilian and US officials, c. 1964.   
Photograph from folder 8, box 1, RG286-C, Prints & Negatives: Photographs of Foreign 




Figure 3: Page from "Alianza Para El Progreso, Libro Para Colorear" (Alliance for Progress, 
Coloring Book), 1960s.  Captions read: We all help each other to raise new houses (left).  The 




Figure 4: Page from "Alianza Para El Progreso, Libro Para Colorear" (Alliance for Progress, 
Coloring Book), 1960s.  Captions read: Soon will have a pretty house in which to live (left).  
We’ll also have a lot of space to play (right). 







Figure 1.1: Jacob Leslie Crane, c. 1945 




Figure 1.2: Two-bedroom minimum house.   
From FHA, Principles of Planning Small Houses (1940). 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Slum dwellings in Fajardo, Puerto Rico, probably 1940s. 





Figure 2.2: Photographs of aided self-help construction in Puerto Rico. 







Figure 2.3: Before and after photographs of aided self-help in Puerto Rico, c. 1950.  
From Luis Rivera-Santos, “Puerto Rico has a new Approach to Low-Cost Rural Housing 
Problem,” Journal of Housing May 1951, Journal of Housing (May 1951). 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Machine for making concrete blocks by hand. 
From Luis Rivera-Santos, “Puerto Rico has a new Approach to Low-Cost Rural Housing 





Figure 2.5: Partially built self-help house with concrete mixer. 




Figure 2.6: Elevation and plan of Puerto Rico aided self-help house. 
From Wolcott C. Waggaman and J. Robert Dodge, Manual on Design for Low-Cost and Aided 





Figure 2.7: Toro and Ferrer, Caribe Hilton, built 1949 
 
  
Figure 2.8: Middle-class housing in Puerto Nuevo 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Page from Rafael Picó, “Puerto Rico: Its Problems and Its Programs,” Town and 
Country Planning (July 1953). 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Self-Help Houses, Paramaribo, Surinam, photographed by Eugene P. Campbell, 
M.D., Sept. 1954. 
From folder “Program-Surinam,” box 9, RG 469, Deputy Director for Management, Office of 
Public Services, Public Health Division, Latin America Branch, Latin American Country 





Figure 2.11: Paramaribo Self-Help Houses in construction, photographed by Eugene P. 
Campbell, M.D., Sept. 1954. 
From folder “Program-Surinam,” box 9, RG 469, Deputy Director for Management, Office of 
Public Services, Public Health Division, Latin America Branch, Latin American Country 




Figure 2.12: Elevation and plan of Surinamese aided self-help house. 




Figure 2.13: Cutting coral stone for building, Barbados, 1950s. 





Figure 2.14: Aided Self-Help House, Clinketts, Barbados, c. 1953. 
From folder "Barbados Housing,” box 1, RG 469, Deputy Director for Operations, Office of 
Latin American Operation (Cent. America & Caribbean Div.), Geographic Files (Central Files), 







Figure 2.15: Aided self-help house elevation and plan, Clinketts, Barbados. 




Figure 2.16: Making Landcrete blocks in St. Vincent, 1950s. 




Figure 2.17: Landcrete aided self-help house, Dominica. 




Figure 2.18: Landcrete house, St. Lucia, 1950s. 
 








Figure 2.19: Donald Hanson, Walcott C. Waggaman, and Gordon Ericksen, c. 1954. 
From a newspaper clipping found in folder “Barbados-Housing,” box 1, RG 469, Deputy 
Director for Operations, Office of Latin American Operations (Cent. America & Caribbean 




Figure 3.1: Aerial view of Guatemala City, c. 1953, photograph by Cornell Capa. 





Figure 3.2: Bananas headed for the United States, 1947. 
From “Monthly Report, July-Dec. 1947,” box 2, RG 469, IIAA, Health & Sanitation Division, 




Figure 3.3: Typical Guatemalan City house, as exemplified by the house of the Asturias 
Taboada family. 




Figure 3.4: Interior courtyard of a Guatemala City house built after the 1917-1918 earthquake 
with reinforced concrete.  






Figure 3.5: W. Bader, Teatro Lux, Guatemala City, 1936. 
From folder 190 “Guatemala—Guatemala City,” box 7, RG 469-LA, NARA. 
 
 
Figure 3.6: Palacio de Sanidad, Guatemala City, 1935-37. 





Figure 3.7: Colonia Ubico, Guatemala City, built 1936. 




Figure 3.8: Colonia Ubico, Guatemala City, built 1936. 





Figure 3.9: Donkeys transporting building stone from the mountains, Guatemala, December 
1947. 
From “Monthly Report, July-Dec. 1947,” box 2, RG 469, IIAA, Health & Sanitation Division, 

















Figure 3.10: Roosevelt Hospital, Guatemala City, begun 1944. 
From “Monthly Report, Jan.-Jun. 1947,” box 2, RG 469, IIAA, Health & Sanitation Division, 






Figure 3.11: Dispensary No. 4, “La Parroquia,” a district health center erected in Guatemala 
City erected by the Servicio Cooperativo Inter-Americano de Salud Publica (Inter-American 
Cooperative Public Health Service), a servicio of the IIAA and local city government, 1945. 
From “Monthly Report, Year 1945,” box 1, RG 469, IIAA, Health & Sanitation Division, 




Figure 3.12: Instituto Cooperativo Interamericano de la Vivienda (ICIV) logo with the image of 
an aided self-help house. 






Figure 3.13: Cover of ICIV publication The Program of Inter-American Houses / El Programa 





Figure 3.14: Site Plan for Colonia Centro América, Guatemala City, 1957. 





Figure 3.15: Duplex house in Colonia Centro América, Guatemala City, built 1957-58 




Figure 3.16: Owner-Builders working on their homes at night, Guatemala City, c. 1957. 







Figure 3.17: Reinforced-concrete forms, Guatemala City. 




Figure 3.18: First House Type, Guatemala City, 1957. 





Figure 3.19: Family “enjoying their new home,” according to the ICIV booklet. 
From The Program of Inter-American Houses (1960). 
 
 
Figure 3.20: Child’s birthday party, Guatemala City. 




Figure 3.21: Colonia Las Victorias site plan, Guatemala City, 1957 





Figure 3.22: Dedication Ceremony, Colonia Centro América, Guatemala City, 1958. 





Figure 3.23: ICIV participants working in a bodega. 








Figure 3.24: Colonia Los Cipresales, second house type. 




Figure 3.25: Colonia Los Cipresales, house plan. 





Figure 3.26: Colonia Los Cipresales, site plan. 





Figure 3.27: Multifamiliar, model, photograph from Prensa Libre, 25 May 1961. 
Clipping from folder “Newspaper Releases,” box 7, RG 469, Mission to Guatemala, Housing 




Figure 3.28: Tropical House Type. 







Figure 3.29:  Tropical House at Escuintla. 






Figure 3.30: Map of Guatemala with location of different ICIV projects. 





Figure 3.31: Lomas de Pamplona advertising pamphlet, cover, late 1960s, Guatemala. 
From folder “Soc 4-9, Housing & Urban Development FY 67, Private Sector,” box 27, RG 286, 






Figure 3.32: Lomas de Pamplona site plan from the advertising pamphlet, late 1960s, Guatemala 
City. 
From folder “Soc 4-9, Housing & Urban Development FY 67, Private Sector,” box 27, RG 286, 






Figure 3.33: Lomas de Pamplona pamphlet,  interior, late 1960s, Guatemala. 
From folder “Soc 4-9, Housing & Urban Development FY 67, Private Sector,” box 27, RG 286, 







Figure 4.1: Construction site at Huntington, New York, 1948.  A continuous concrete slab is 
first poured using standard road-building equipment, after which a gantry lowers the wall form 
into place.   





Figure 4.2: Concrete is poured into the form, Huntington, Long Island, 1948.  The single-
pouring operations creates a monolithic structure. 






Figure 4.3:  The gantry moves the roof slab from its position adjacent to the house. 






Figure 4.4: IBEC Housing Corporation promotional literature, c. 1950. 
From folder “Tech, IBEC,” box 5, RG 207, International Affairs Subject Files, 1942-64, NARA.   
 
 
Figure 4.5: “House Built Like a Sidewalk,” Life Magainze (Oct. 1949) 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Marshall Manor advertisement. 
From Concrete (Oct. 1950). 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Aided self-help houses in foreground and traditional houses in background, Valle de 
la Esperanza, El Salvador, c. 1953.  
From the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Open House, Villa Las Lomas, Puerto Rico, 1954.  




Figure 4.9: Edward Larrabee Barnes, plan, house of Villa Las Lomas, c. 1954.   
From the Edward Larrabee Barnes Collection, Harvard University. 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Edward Larrabee Barnes, Reparto Santiago Iglesias, Puerto Rico.   
From the Edward Larrabee Barnes Collection, Harvard University. 
 
  
Figure 4.11: Barrel-vaulted IBEC construction, Puerto Rico.  
From the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
 
 
Figure 4.12: IBEC housing project in Teheran, Iran.   






Figure 4.13: Tele-railroad Union Housing Project built with USAID assistance in Honduras, 
mid-1960s.   
From folder “Honduras, Telerailroad Union Housing, Bulk File #1, 522-K-007,” box 1, RG 286, 






Figure 4.14: Tele-railroad Union Housing Project built with USAID assistance in Honduras, 
mid-1960s.   
From folder “Honduras, Telerailroad Union Housing, Bulk File #1, 522-K-007,” box 1, RG 286, 





Figure 4.15: Future Bairro da Aliança residents in Brazil, who formerly lived in squatter homes, 
attend a ceremony at their new neighborhood.  Alliance for Progress Director Teodoro Moscoso 
and US Ambassador Lincoln Gordon are in the background, 1960s. 
From folder 8, box 1, RG 286-C, Prints and Negatives: Photographs of Foreign Assistance 






Figure 4.16: A self-help frame house on the Asentamiento Farm in Chile.  Note the house in the 
back that was formerly occupied by the family.  Asentamiento was formerly owned by one 
family but was turned over to the workers who formerly worked the land as sharecroppers under 
a Chilean land reform program assisted by USAID, late 1960s.   
From folder “Chile,” box 2, RG 286-CF, Records of the Agency for International Development, 







Figure 4.17: The Oct. 18, 1963 edition of Como Vamos, a publication of Costa Rica’s National 
Institute of Housing and Urbanism, which displays a new USAID housing project in the country. 
From folder “Costa Rica, Slum Replacement Housing, Bulk File #3, 515-L-006,” box 77, RG 
286, Office of Development Resources, Country & Regional Project & Program Loan Case 






Figure 4.18: New units for low-income households produced by Panama’s Ministry of Housing 
with assistance from AID.   
 
From folder 141 “Panama,” box 14,  RG 286-CF, Records of the Agency for International 
Development, Photographs from the Country Files, NARA. 
 
 
Figure 4.19:  Traditional brick construction at Salamanca de Monterrico. From Samuel E. 
Bleecker, The Politics of Architecture: A Perspective on Nelson A Rockefeller. New York: 
Rutledge Press, 1981. 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Juan Gunther, plan, Salamanca home, 1961.  From the Rockefeller Archive Center. 
 
 
Figure 4.21: Rear garden of a home in Salamanca de Monterrico.   









Figure 4.22: Section one of Salamanca de Monterrico, from the 1961 IBEC Annual Report. 
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Selection of Technical Assistance Programs in Housing, 1952-1960   
Includes the Technical Cooperation Administration, Foreign Operations Administration, 
International Cooperation Administration, and Mutual Security Agency 
NEAR EAST AND AFRICA 
Egypt 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1951 Arthur D. Little, Inc., 
Consultants 
development of native resources for building materials 
for low-cost housing.   
1952- Barton P. Jenks, 
Housing Generalist 
1954- Ralph Johnston, 
Village Planner 
1954- C. L. Holmes, 
Architect 
Advise government and the Egyptian-American Rural 
Improvement Service, with respect to rural village 
planning and measures for improving housing policy, 




Year Technician/Title Description 
1953 Raymond D. Wygant, 
Engineer 
  
1953-55 Robert L. Strelitz, 
Architect 
1954- Bernard Eddy, Village 
Planner 
Aid in developing low-cost housing units for home 
ownership and rental, rural village planning and low-
cost housing construction using indigenous materials, 
training Iranians for positions of technical and 
executive responsibility in housing programs.   
  
Iraq 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952, July Al Dickens, housing 
consultant 
survey mission 




1954- Paul Beidler, 
Architect-Planner 
Improved methods for rural village planning and the 
design and construction of low-cost housing and the 





Year Technician/Title Description 
1954-56 Harold Robinson, 
Housing Generalist 
aid in building construction, community development, 
housing legislation, programming, finance, building 
materials and introduction of aided self-help housing. 
  
Lebanon 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- Alvah J. Webster, 
Housing and Shelter 
Specialist 
1952- Frank E. Patterson III, 
Chief Planner 
1952- Carl Behrens, 
Housing Economist 
planning a slum clearance and low cost housing project 
in Beirut.   
      
Liberia 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1951-53 Henry C. Boles, Head 
Architect 
Head architect in design for housing and public 
buildings 
1951-54 Granville W. 
Woodson, Municipal 
Engineer 
Adviser to the Division of Municipal Works; 
responsible for water supply and sewage disposal, town 
and city streets, municipal buildings, housing and land 
regulations, and inspection of construction within 
Monrovia. 
1954- Fred Annis, Architect Assisting in organizing and training the staff for the 
housing division in the Liberian Department of Public 
Works and Utilities, housing design and construction 
techniques in low-cost housing. 
  
Libya 
Year Technician/Title Description 




      
ASIA  AND THE PACIFIC 
Afghanistan 
Year Technician/Title Description 
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1953-55 Walter E. Conklin, 
Housing and Shelter 
Specialist 
Assistance to the government and the Helmand Valley 
Authority with village planning and housing.  Includes 
development of local building materials and 
introduction of aided self-help.  
  
Burma     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1951- George L. Reed, 
Housing Generalist 
1951- Fred Annis, Architect 
1951- E.L. Herringer, Public 
Health Engineer 
1951-52 Stephen Arneson, 
Architect 
1951-52 Huber Earle, 
Economist 
Advising government in fields of housing, slum 
clearance and residential sanitation.  Reed was named 
Associate Director of the Burmese Housing and town 
and Country Planning Board. 
1952-54 Hugo V. Prucha, 
Housing Economist 
Advisor to the Housing Advisory Board of Burma 
  
Formosa 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1954 Roy Burroughs Advise government with aided self-help housing and 




Year Technician/Title Description 




Advised Indian authorities in connection with planning 
of the new city of Gandhidham, near the new port of 
Kandla. 
1952- Bernard Loshbough, 
Deputy Country 
Director 
In charge of he Community Development Program 




1952-54 Harold R. Hay, 
Building Materials 
Specialist 
Production of building materials, improved industrial 
techniques, research programs, and training personnel  
1954- George M. Jones development, design, construction and demonstration 





Year Technician/Title Description 
1954- Charles Fuller, 
Architect 
1954- Virgil Bankson, 
Economist 
1954- Keith Hinchcliff, Self-
Help Specialist 
Aid with construction, partly with aided self-help 
methods and partly by direct government action, of 
several hundred emergency houses and necessary 
community facilities for refugee population from North 
Vietnam. 
    
Indonesia 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1954-56 Charles F. Fuller, 
Architect-Planner 
Development of a national housing policy 
1954-56 Keith H. Hinchcliff, 
Aided Self-Help 
Specialist 
Implementation of aided self-help projects, improved 
methods of housing construction, local production of 
native building materials. 





Year Technician/Title Description 
1954-   Cooperating with UNKRA in the reconstruction of housing 




Year Technician/Title Description 
1952-54 John C. Bell, Housing 
and Shelter Specialist 
Village planning, construction of training centers and 
community development projects, development of a 
low-cost housing program. 
  
Philippines 
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- Frank Cordner (MSA) adviser to the principle Philippine housing 
agency. 
      
LATIN AMERICA and the CARIBBEAN 
Bolivia 
Year Technician/Title Description 







Year Technician/Title Description 
1954- Robert S. Pinkston, 
Self-Help Specialist 
  
1954- Robert S. Pinkston, 
Self-Help Specialist 
  
1956- Otis Cross, 
Agricultural 
Extension Engineer 
Development of rural dwellings and other farm 
structures. 
1957- Kenneth Haley, Asst. 
Training Officer 
  
1958- P.V. Saporito, 
Training Officer 
  
      
British Guiana   
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953-57 University of 
Maryland 
low-cost housing and rural village planning. 
      
British Honduras   
Year Technician/Title Description 
1957- George W. Williams, 
Housing Specialist 
Development of aided self-help housing projects and 
other housing projects. 
      
Caribbean Commission    
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- Donald R. Hanson, 
Engineer 
Introduction of aided self-help and research of 
indigenous building materials and resources 
1952-54 Hector Garcia, 
Technical Advisor 
community organizer 
1953-57 E. Gordon Erickson, 
Self-Help Specialist 
1953-57 Wolcott C. 
Waggaman 
1953-57 George R. Jordan 
1953-57 Pedro Rivera Cintrón 
Aided self-help housing  
USOM/Trinidad (est. 1958), coordinated activities previously under aegis of the 
Commission 
1958 Donald R. Laidig   
      
Chile     
Year Technician/Title Description 
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1952- Osborne T. Boyd, 
General Housing 
Advisor 
Materials, Aided Self-Help Housing 
1952- Louis Grandgent nationalization and standardization of construction 
materials, prefabrication of building elements and 
improved and simplified construction methods. 









1958- David L. Krooth, 
Housing Finance 
Consultants 
1958- Arthur H. Courshon, 
ICA Housing Finance 
Consultants 
Advice on preparation of a savings and loan system. 
1958- Edward P. Miller, 
Carpenter-Builder 
Consultant 
Advise on construction of a demonstration wood 
house. 
1958 Otto C. Heyer, 
Lumber Consultant 
Three-month trip to advise on establishment of 
standards for the use of lumber in housing 
construction. 
1958-1959 Ralph Tayler two-month trip to advise on urban renewal problems. 
1958 Joseph Wolff Three-month consultation in building code revision 
1959 Aaron Horwitz (of 
Israel) 
Short-term consultation on the organization of the City 
Planning Commission 
      
Colombia     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953 Wilson Longmore, 
Housing Advisor 
Development of a housing program 
1954 University of Illinois 
contract 
Advice to the government and Instituto de Credito 
Territorial with respect to organization and execution 
of low-cost housing programs and rural village 
planning. 
1957 William N. 
Womelsdorf 
One month trip to review advise from small homes 
council 
      
Costa Rica     
Year Technician/Title Description 
301 
 
1955- Edmond H. Hoben, 
Housing Advisor 
  
1957- Francis M. Dimond, 
City Planning Advisor 
  




1958- Derek S. Singer, 
Training Officer 
  
      
Ecuador     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- Pieter Pauw, Principle 
housing advisor 
housing reconstruction in the Ambato area 
1952- Raymond Wygant, 
Field Engineer 
  
1960   Establised a National Housing Bank for a system of 
savings and loan. 
      
El Salvador   
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953 Henry H. Retter, 
Chief Engineer and 
Architect 
Develop low-cost housing 
1953- Pieter C. Pauw, 
Housing Advisor 
  
      
Guatemala     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1956- Temple Dick, Chief of 
Housing Division 
  








      
Haiti     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953- Stephen Arneson housing problems in the Artibonite Valley 
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1954- Robert George, 
Architect 
Village planning and the design and construction of 
rural low-cost housing, especially in the Artibonite 
Valley 
      
Nicaragua     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- Paul Foster, City 
Planning Advisor 
Preparation of a comprehensive city plan for Managua, 
including a zoning ordinance, master plan of streets 
and sewage, and development of a planned industrial 
district; develop master plans for smaller cities, 
including Carinto; organization of a permanent urban 
planning office in Managua. 
1957- Carl R. Zenger, Aided 
Self-Help Housing 
Advisor 
Establish within the Housing Institute a group of 
employees responsible for promoting and carrying out 
a continued aided self-help housing program, 
beginning with a demonstration project of 520 houses. 
      
Peru     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953- Robert King, 
Architect and 
Planning Consultant 
consultant to the Peruvians National Health and 
Welfare Fund 
1956   Develop a program of savings and loan associations. 
      
Surinam     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1953-57 Joseph Coulam Aided Self-Help Housing 
1960   Rural housing program 
      
Venezuela     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1960?   Development of savings and loan legislation and a 
Commission of Savings and Loan. 
EUROPE--MSA Programs 
Austria     
Year Technician/Title Description 
1952- William Wittausch advised Austrian government on improvement of 
productivity in the building industry, especially by 
rationalizing prefabrication; improved methods of 
housing finance. 
      
Italy     
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Year Technician/Title Description 
1954- Guido Nadzo, 
Housing Generalist 
Improved methods of housing design, construction 
methods, and general productivity in the housing 
industry 
      
West Germany   
Year   Description 
1952- William Wittausch 
1952- Vernon de Mars, 
Architect 
Emergency program of housing construction in the 
Ruhr district to increase the production of coal and 
steel. 
1954- Bernard Wagner, 
Architect 
Design and construction of improved housing for coal 
miners' families in the Ruhr Valley and housing of 
refugees who have escaped from the Soviet Occupied 
zone. 























1968 -003 AIFLD  1,667 condominium apartment 
on eight sites 
$6835-
$11120 




1969 -004B UPCN  324 condominium apartments $7,303 





1970 -005 Plan VEA  Part of Argentine 
government's low-cost 
housing program; construction 
of 4,300 units of various types 
$2,589-
$9,345 
1971 -006 UNIMEV II  Continuation of earlier 
program under trade union 
sponsorship; 450 semi-
detached and row houses 
$8,500 
1971 -007  SITRA  Under union sponsorship; 440 
condominium apartments 
$8,500 
1972 -008 Plan VEA II  Additional funding for general 
relending through the National 













Caja Central  Seed capital loan to the 
savings and loan system; 





1972 -004 Los Pinos  1,060 condominium 
apartments in La Paz; under 
auspices of Bolivian savings 











La Libertad  Loan to La Libertad Savings 
and Loan Association to 




1968 -004 Concepcion  470 single-family houses $6,000-
$6,773 











VIPASA  1,578 townhouses $5,677-
$7,770 
1966 -002 La Esmeralda  1,268 townhouses $6,200-
$8,123 




















1972 -004 Jardines de 
Tibas 
$2.5 440 single-unit dwellings $5,100-
$5,500 























1969 -006 BNV $6 promote an internal savings 
and loan system and 
secondary market; program 




1972 -007 Falcondo $3.5 500 units of workers' housing 
for Falconbridge, a large 
nickel mining operation. 
$6,000-
$8,500 
1973 -008 BNV $4 Extension of the earlier 












La Chala  355 single-family, semi-
detached units 
$3,750 
1970 -004 BEV  funds for relending through 
the country's 10 savings and 
loan assocation and financing 




















1965 -002/3 Jardines de 
Guadalupe 
$4.566 508 single-family homes $7,800-
$11,500 
1968 -005 Viviendas 
Cooperativas 













AIFLD  Under trade union 




1968 -002 Mackenzie  728 detached homes for 























1964 -001/II Capital City 
Silver 




1967 -002 Banco Granai 
& Townson 
$1.5 290 units built under savings 
and loan sponsorship 
$5,000 
1967 -003 Banco 
Inmobiliario 
$1.5 395 units built under savings 


















1964 -002 Jardines 
Loarque 
$1.5 332 single-family detached 
and semi-detached homes 
$3,500-
$6,200 
1970 -002B Composa 
Colonia Rio 
Grande 




1971 -004 FEHCOVIL $2.2 400 single-family detached 






















1972 -001 Independence 
City 
$1.2 164-unit extension of previous 
project 
$7,900  
1968 -002 Ensom City $5.1 611 single-family detached 
homes, using industrial-type 




1970 -008 Montego Bay $3 500 single-family detached 
and duplex homes 
$12,500  
1974 -009 Jamaica 
Mortgage 
Bank 
$10 Institution-building loan for 
long-term financing of lower-

















AIFLD-JFK $10 2,931 two- and three-bedroom 
units in four-story walk-up 




1967 -006 Matamoros $4.5 874 single-family detached 
homes originally planned; 
















El Porvenir $6.9 757 single-family detached 
and semi-detached homes 
$8,100-
$10,300 
1970 -002A BVN $2 Through the National Housing 
Bank, financing for 228 
homes 
$6,000  
1970 -002B Inmobiliaria $1 230 homes financed through 
the National Housing Bank 
$6,300  
1970 -002C Centro 
Americana 
$1 Financing for 64 homes 
through the National Housing 
Bank 
$6,300  
1973  BVN $15 In response to the Managua 
earthquake of December 
1972, loan to the National 
Housing Bank to finance 
lower-middle-income housing 















La Gloria $3 386 three-bedroom, single-
family detached homes 
$8,600  
1967 -003 Corindag I  285 units $8,500  
1971 -003 Corindag II  380 units $7,600-
$11,100 
1970 -004 Continental 
Homes 
 382 units $9,250  
1969 -005 Viviendas 
Nacionales 
















Apollo  405 detached units $4,605 
1965 -001/II Apollo  405 detached units $5,489 
1964 -002 Jardines Virtu  898 single-family homes $6,230-
$7,207 
1966 -003 VIPSE  1,352 single-family homes $6,083-
$11,498 
1966 -004 Salamanca  504 single-family units $4,893-
$7,217 
1967 -006 Alto de Luna  546 single-family dwellings 
planned; 132 built. 
$4,916-
$5,938 
1971 -008/5 BVP  Aid earthquake and flod 
victims; 8,640 units in new 
subdivisions for 
reconstruction and sites & 
















 724 single-family detached 
homes 
$10,793 
1965 -002 INRESA  425 condominium apartments $7,173-
$19,128 




1966 -003B Guacara III, 
Ciudad 
Alianza 
 444 single-family detached 
homes 
$7,500 
1967 -005 Guacara II  80 single-family detached 
homes 
$10,793 
1969 -006 CORACREVI  Under trade union credit 




1969 -008 Flor Amarillo  550 semi-detached and 
detached dwelling units 
$5,750-
$6,244 
1970 -012 BANAP  Through savings and loan 






1971 -013 INVICA  Venezuelan Foundation for 
Cooperative Housing, under 
supervision of the Banco 
Obrero, 1,000 cooperative 
housing units 
$8,500 










1970 -001 CABEI $10 $10 million to establish a 
secondary mortgage market 
operation for savings and loan 




1973 -002 Model 
Communities 
Program 
 Model communities in San 
Jose, Costa Rica and San 
Salvador, El Salvador to 
finance 2,200 units in planned 
communities, including light 
industrial and commercial 










Same as above   
            
Projects totals did not necessarily equal amount of disbursement 
 
